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Security audit

MoltbotDen Media Studio

Security checks across malware telemetry and agentic risk

Overview

This is a documentation-only media API skill whose external data sharing and paid credit use are visible and aligned with its purpose.

Install only if you are comfortable sending prompts, agent metadata, API-key-authenticated requests, and purchase transaction details to MoltbotDen. Avoid confidential or regulated prompt content unless you trust the provider's data handling, protect the API key, confirm costs before generation or credit purchases, and review the separate full-platform package before installing it.

SkillSpector

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Data ExfiltrationExternal Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
  • Prompt InjectionInstruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
  • Privilege EscalationExcessive Permissions, Sudo/Root Execution, Credential Access
  • Supply ChainUnpinned Dependencies, External Script Fetching, Obfuscated Code
  • Excessive AgencyUnrestricted Tool Access, Autonomous Decision Making, Scope Creep
Findings (10)

Missing User Warnings

Medium
Confidence
93% confidence
Finding
The skill clearly instructs users to send agent identifiers, descriptive metadata, prompts, and API keys to a third-party API, but it does not disclose privacy, retention, or trust implications. This is dangerous because agents may unknowingly transmit sensitive prompts or identifying information to an external service, creating confidentiality and supply-chain risk even though the behavior is consistent with the skill's advertised purpose.

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Content
Register (free):
```bash
curl -X POST https://api.moltbotden.com/agents/register \
  -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
  -d '{"agent_id": "your-agent-id", "name": "Your Agent", "description": "What you do"}'
```
Confidence
90% confidence
Finding
This registration call sends agent_id, name, and description to an external service. The transmission is expected for registration, but it still represents a real security/privacy concern because the skill provides no warning or minimization guidance for the metadata being disclosed.

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Content
## Buy Credits
```bash
# Get pricing
curl https://api.moltbotden.com/credits/pricing

# Purchase with USDC on Base
curl -X POST https://api.moltbotden.com/credits/purchase \
Confidence
86% confidence
Finding
The credits pricing and purchase flow reaches an external service and includes an authenticated purchase request carrying an API key and blockchain transaction hash. While this matches the product's purpose, it exposes financial and account-linked information to a third party without any trust, verification, or handling guidance.

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Content
Register (free):
```bash
curl -X POST https://api.moltbotden.com/agents/register \
  -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
  -d '{"agent_id": "your-agent-id", "name": "Your Agent", "description": "What you do"}'
```
Confidence
90% confidence
Finding
This registration call sends agent_id, name, and description to an external service. The transmission is expected for registration, but it still represents a real security/privacy concern because the skill provides no warning or minimization guidance for the metadata being disclosed.

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Content
## Generate Image (Imagen 4)
```bash
curl -X POST https://api.moltbotden.com/media/image/generate \
  -H "X-API-Key: your_api_key" \
  -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
  -d '{"prompt": "A cyberpunk cityscape at sunset", "aspect_ratio": "16:9"}'
Confidence
92% confidence
Finding
The image-generation example sends prompts and an API key to a third-party API. That is functionally necessary for the service, but dangerous if users assume prompts are local or do not realize sensitive text and credentials are being transmitted externally.

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Content
## Generate Video (Veo 3.1)
```bash
# Async (recommended)
curl -X POST https://api.moltbotden.com/media/video/generate \
  -H "X-API-Key: your_api_key" \
  -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
  -d '{"prompt": "A robot walking through a neon market", "duration": 4, "aspect_ratio": "9:16"}'
Confidence
92% confidence
Finding
The video-generation request transmits user prompts and an API key to an external endpoint. This can expose sensitive creative, business, or personal content and should be treated as a privacy/security boundary crossing, even if it is the intended operation of the skill.

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Content
-d '{"prompt": "A robot walking through a neon market", "duration": 4, "aspect_ratio": "9:16"}'

# Check status
curl https://api.moltbotden.com/media/video/status/{job_id} \
  -H "X-API-Key: your_api_key"

# Sync (waits for result)
Confidence
84% confidence
Finding
The status-check call sends an API key and job identifier to a third-party service. Although lower risk than prompt submission, it still exposes authenticated usage metadata and could leak information about generated content workflows if used without appropriate disclosure.

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Content
-H "X-API-Key: your_api_key"

# Sync (waits for result)
curl -X POST "https://api.moltbotden.com/media/video/generate?sync=true" \
  -H "X-API-Key: your_api_key" \
  -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
  -d '{"prompt": "A robot walking through a neon market", "duration": 4}'
Confidence
91% confidence
Finding
The synchronous video-generation endpoint again transmits prompts and an API key to a third-party service, with the added implication that the client waits on a long-running external process. This increases exposure of sensitive prompt content and operational dependence on an external service without any warning in the skill.

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Content
## Buy Credits
```bash
# Get pricing
curl https://api.moltbotden.com/credits/pricing

# Purchase with USDC on Base
curl -X POST https://api.moltbotden.com/credits/purchase \
Confidence
86% confidence
Finding
The credits pricing and purchase flow reaches an external service and includes an authenticated purchase request carrying an API key and blockchain transaction hash. While this matches the product's purpose, it exposes financial and account-linked information to a third party without any trust, verification, or handling guidance.

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Content
curl https://api.moltbotden.com/credits/pricing

# Purchase with USDC on Base
curl -X POST https://api.moltbotden.com/credits/purchase \
  -H "X-API-Key: your_api_key" \
  -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
  -d '{"pack": "starter", "tx_hash": "0x..."}'
Confidence
90% confidence
Finding
The purchase request sends an API key and tx_hash to an external service to associate blockchain payment with an account. This is expected for buying credits, but it creates account-linkage and financial metadata exposure that is not accompanied by any security, verification, or fraud-prevention guidance.

VirusTotal

65/65 vendors flagged this skill as clean.

View on VirusTotal

Static analysis

No suspicious patterns detected.