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Security audit

MoltbotDen Media Studio

Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk

Overview

This skill is a simple, disclosed REST API guide for generating media and buying credits, with no hidden local code or persistence, but users should treat prompts and payment metadata as data sent to an external service.

Before installing, assume prompts, agent registration details, job IDs, API usage, and credit purchase transaction hashes are sent to MoltbotDen's external API. Do not include secrets, private customer data, regulated data, or sensitive business material in prompts or metadata unless you have reviewed the provider's privacy, retention, and billing terms.

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Skill Instruction HijackingAlters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
  • Agent Memory PoisoningWrites attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
  • Remote Payload Retrieval and ExecutionFetches external code whose behavior can change after review
  • Embedded Malicious CodeShips malicious scripts inside the skill and executes them locally
  • Unauthorized Access and Privilege EscalationObtains permissions beyond the task's legitimate needs
Vulnerability Patterns
  • Data ExfiltrationExternal Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
  • Prompt InjectionInstruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
  • Privilege EscalationExcessive Permissions, Sudo/Root Execution, Credential Access
  • Supply ChainUnpinned Dependencies, External Script Fetching, Obfuscated Code
  • Excessive AgencyUnrestricted Tool Access, Autonomous Decision Making, Scope Creep
Findings (10)

Missing User Warnings

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
92% confidence
Finding

The skill instructs users to register agents and submit media-generation prompts to a third-party API but does not clearly disclose that agent identifiers, names, descriptions, prompts, and API usage metadata are transmitted externally. This is dangerous because agents may send sensitive prompts or identifying metadata off-platform without informed consent or data-handling guidance.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Confidence
86% confidence
Finding

The skill references and uses an external domain for registration, meaning data leaves the local agent environment. In context, this is functional rather than overtly malicious, but it is still security-relevant because it expands the trust boundary to a third-party service.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 21)May include surrounding context.

Register (free):

bash
curl -X POST https://api.moltbotden.com/agents/register \
  -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
  -d '{"agent_id": "your-agent-id", "name": "Your Agent", "description": "What you do"}'

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Confidence
86% confidence
Finding

The skill references and uses an external domain for registration, meaning data leaves the local agent environment. In context, this is functional rather than overtly malicious, but it is still security-relevant because it expands the trust boundary to a third-party service.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 21)May include surrounding context.

Register (free):

bash
curl -X POST https://api.moltbotden.com/agents/register \
  -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
  -d '{"agent_id": "your-agent-id", "name": "Your Agent", "description": "What you do"}'

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Confidence
94% confidence
Finding

The image-generation request transmits user prompts to an external API. Prompts frequently contain proprietary, personal, or otherwise sensitive content, so undocumented external transmission can lead to confidentiality and compliance issues.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 28)May include surrounding context.

Generate Image (Imagen 4)

bash
curl -X POST https://api.moltbotden.com/media/image/generate \
  -H "X-API-Key: your_api_key" \
  -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
  -d '{"prompt": "A cyberpunk cityscape at sunset", "aspect_ratio": "16:9"}'

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Confidence
94% confidence
Finding

The async video-generation example sends prompts and generation parameters to a third-party endpoint. This is risky for the same reasons as image generation, with added operational exposure if jobs are stored remotely and processed asynchronously.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 38)May include surrounding context.

Generate Video (Veo 3.1)

bash
# Async (recommended)
curl -X POST https://api.moltbotden.com/media/video/generate \
  -H "X-API-Key: your_api_key" \
  -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
  -d '{"prompt": "A robot walking through a neon market", "duration": 4, "aspect_ratio": "9:16"}'

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Confidence
82% confidence
Finding

The status check contacts the external API and reveals job identifiers and usage metadata to the service. This is lower impact than prompt submission but still extends the trust boundary and may leak workflow or account activity information.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 44)May include surrounding context.

md
-d '{"prompt": "A robot walking through a neon market", "duration": 4, "aspect_ratio": "9:16"}'

# Check status
curl https://api.moltbotden.com/media/video/status/{job_id} \
  -H "X-API-Key: your_api_key"

# Sync (waits for result)

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Confidence
93% confidence
Finding

The synchronous video-generation request sends prompts to an external API and waits for a remote result, again transmitting potentially sensitive content off-platform. The sync mode can also encourage direct use in workflows without intermediate review of what data is being shared.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 48)May include surrounding context.

md
-H "X-API-Key: your_api_key"

# Sync (waits for result)
curl -X POST "https://api.moltbotden.com/media/video/generate?sync=true" \
  -H "X-API-Key: your_api_key" \
  -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
  -d '{"prompt": "A robot walking through a neon market", "duration": 4}'

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Confidence
75% confidence
Finding

The credits workflow contacts an external API and the purchase call submits payment-related metadata such as a transaction hash. This can expose financial activity and service usage to a third party if users are not clearly warned and if handling practices are unspecified.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 67)May include surrounding context.

Buy Credits

bash
# Get pricing
curl https://api.moltbotden.com/credits/pricing

# Purchase with USDC on Base
curl -X POST https://api.moltbotden.com/credits/purchase \

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Confidence
75% confidence
Finding

The credits workflow contacts an external API and the purchase call submits payment-related metadata such as a transaction hash. This can expose financial activity and service usage to a third party if users are not clearly warned and if handling practices are unspecified.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 67)May include surrounding context.

Buy Credits

bash
# Get pricing
curl https://api.moltbotden.com/credits/pricing

# Purchase with USDC on Base
curl -X POST https://api.moltbotden.com/credits/purchase \

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Confidence
88% confidence
Finding

The credit purchase request sends payment-related metadata, including a transaction hash, to the provider's API. Even if operationally necessary, this is security-relevant because it links account activity and blockchain payment data to the user or agent and lacks explicit handling disclosures.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 70)May include surrounding context.

md
curl https://api.moltbotden.com/credits/pricing

# Purchase with USDC on Base
curl -X POST https://api.moltbotden.com/credits/purchase \
  -H "X-API-Key: your_api_key" \
  -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
  -d '{"pack": "starter", "tx_hash": "0x..."}'

Static analysis

No suspicious patterns detected.