Tp2
- Category
- MCP Tool Poisoning
- Confidence
- 85% confidence
- Finding
Mixing characters from multiple Unicode scripts in a single identifier is a common technique to create visually ambiguous tool names.
- Content
Security audit
Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk
This skill is a legitimate-looking Hermes CLI wrapper, but it understates file access and enables broad agent capabilities without clear approval boundaries.
Review this skill before installing. Use it only if you trust the installed Hermes CLI and its configured model provider, and avoid passing sensitive files through --context-file unless you intend their contents to be processed by Hermes. Treat memory notes, created skills, and ~/.hermes/ configuration changes as persistent state that should be reviewed periodically.
Mixing characters from multiple Unicode scripts in a single identifier is a common technique to create visually ambiguous tool names.
Mixing characters from multiple Unicode scripts in a single identifier is a common technique to create visually ambiguous tool names.
The skill advertises powerful capabilities including browser automation, code execution, sub-agent delegation, MCP integration, and persistent memory without corresponding safety warnings or operational constraints. This is dangerous because users or orchestrating agents may invoke the skill without understanding that it can affect local state, access external systems, retain data across sessions, or execute untrusted actions indirectly through Hermes.
The skill asserts Hermes only operates within '~/.hermes/' and performs no file operations outside that scope, but the documented '--context-file ./ctx.md' usage explicitly passes an arbitrary external file to the CLI. This is dangerous because it misleads users and downstream agents about the real file-access boundary, which can cause unintended disclosure of local file contents to the Hermes tool and its configured LLM/provider.
The documented 'hermes skills create' capability indicates the tool can create persistent artifacts that may influence future agent behavior, yet the skill does not warn about session persistence or trust implications. This is dangerous because persistent skills or notes can survive the current task, accumulate unreviewed instructions, and become a vehicle for prompt persistence or later unintended execution.
hermes skills list
hermes skills create "name" --description "desc"
The 'File Access Scope' section claims 'No direct file operations' and '/.hermes/ only', yet the skill also instructs editing '/.hermes/.env', editing '~/.hermes/config.yaml', and supplying arbitrary context files outside that boundary. This inconsistency is dangerous because it understates the tool's ability to read user-selected files and alter persistent configuration, increasing the chance of unsafe invocation under false assumptions.
The manifest includes trigger phrases in Chinese alongside English phrases, but there is no explanation of language handling, user opt-in, or locale scope. For language/locale policy, hard-coded language behavior should either offer a choice or clearly document the intended locale context.
No suspicious patterns detected.