T08 · Insecure Dependencies
- Location
scripts/enhanced_search_service.py:28- Finding
Unverified Dependency Loading Through Python Import-Path Precedence
- Content
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Vulnerability Details
File Location:
scripts/enhanced_search_service.py, lines 28–37
Vulnerability Type: Insecure dependency loading and local module hijacking
Risk Level: MediumVulnerable Code:
python try: # Try to import co-occurrence adapter sys.path.insert(0, '/root/.openclaw/workspace/integration/adapter') from co_occurrence_adapter import CoOccurrenceAdapter self.co_occurrence_adapter = CoOccurrenceAdapter() logger.info("Co-occurrence adapter initialized") except ImportError as e: logger.warning(f"Could not import co-occurrence adapter: {e}") try: # Try to import semantic vector adapter from semantic_vector_adapter import SemanticVectorAdapterTechnical Analysis
The service inserts the hard-coded external directory
/root/.openclaw/workspace/integration/adapterat index zero ofsys.path. This gives modules in that directory precedence over modules from standard package locations. It then importsco_occurrence_adapterandsemantic_vector_adapterwithout validating their paths, ownership, permissions, provenance, or integrity.Python executes module-level code as soon as a module is imported. Consequently, either adapter file becomes an implicit code-execution boundary outside the audited project. The second import is also affected because the modified search path remains active process-wide. Catching
ImportErrordoes not mitigate malicious module execution because attacker-controlled code runs before normal adapter initialization completes.Attack Path
- An attacker obtains write access to
/root/.openclaw/workspace/integration/adapter, or compromises a process or deployment mechanism that populates that directory. - The attacker creates or replaces
co_occurrence_adapter.pyorsemantic_vector_adapter.pywith a module containing malicious top-level Python code. - The application instantiates
EnhancedSearchService.
...[truncated 1210 chars]
- An attacker obtains write access to
- Remediation
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Remediation Suggestions
- Remove the runtime
sys.path.insert()call and load adapters through normal, fully qualified package imports. - Package the adapters as reviewed dependencies with pinned versions and reproducible integrity hashes.
- Install dependencies into a controlled virtual environment rather than importing code from a mutable workspace directory.
- Verify that dependency directories and files are owned by a trusted administrative account and are not writable by the service account or untrusted users.
- If dynamic local loading is unavoidable, resolve the configured path to a canonical location and enforce an allowlist of approved directories and module filenames.
- Authenticate module contents against trusted cryptographic hashes or signatures before loading them.
- Validate the imported module's resolved
__file__path before instantiating its classes, while recognizing that post-import validation alone cannot prevent top-level code execution. - Run the service under a dedicated least-privileged account with restricted filesystem and network access to limit the consequences of dependency compromise.
- Add deployment checks that fail closed when adapter provenance, ownership, permissions, or integrity cannot be established.
- Remove the runtime
