Doge Oss Upload

• Outcome: Pass
• Latest audit: Sep 11, 2026 · 1:07 AM UTC
• Version: 0.1.0

Overview

The skill is a straightforward DogeCloud OSS uploader that does what it says, though users should treat uploads as potentially public.

Install and use this only when you intend to send the selected file to DogeCloud and potentially expose it through a public URL. Prefer a dedicated low-privilege DogeCloud key, keep OSS_UPLOAD with the default exact object scope, avoid OSS_FULL or wildcard scopes unless you understand the impact, and pin dependencies in a virtual environment for safer installation.

A.I.G

Vulnerability Patterns

• Unauthorized Access and Privilege Escalation: Obtains permissions beyond the task's legitimate needs
• Insecure Dependencies: Introduces malicious components through unsafe dependency sources
• Skill Instruction Hijacking: Alters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
• Agent Memory Poisoning: Writes attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
• Remote Payload Retrieval and Execution: Fetches external code whose behavior can change after review

Findings (2)

T08 · Insecure Dependencies

Warning

• Location: SKILL.md:26

Finding

Unpinned Runtime Dependencies Create a Supply-Chain Risk

Content

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Remediation

View remediation

T05 · Unauthorized Access and Privilege Escalation

Note

• Location: scripts/doge_upload_public_info.py:104

Finding

Upload-Only Workflow Allows Unnecessary Full-Permission and Wildcard Temporary Tokens

Content

View full analysis

Remediation

View remediation

SkillSpector

Vulnerability Patterns

• Data Exfiltration: External Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
• Trigger Abuse: Overly Broad Trigger, Shadow Command Trigger, Keyword Baiting Trigger
• MCP Least Privilege: Underdeclared Capability, Wildcard Permission, Missing Permission Declaration
• Prompt Injection: Instruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
• Privilege Escalation: Excessive Permissions, Sudo/Root Execution, Credential Access

Findings (6)

Undeclared Tool Scope

Medium

• Category: MCP Least Privilege
• Confidence: 95% confidence

Finding

The skill performs sensitive actions that involve reading environment variables and making network requests, but it does not declare any explicit tool scope or permission boundary. This can lead to overbroad execution in an agent environment, making it harder to enforce least privilege and increasing the risk of unintended secret access or outbound data transmission.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Vague Triggers

Medium

• Category: Not specified by scanner
• Confidence: 87% confidence

Finding

The trigger phrases are broad enough that the skill may activate for loosely related requests such as asking for a link or mentioning DogeCloud, causing an upload action when the user did not clearly intend file exfiltration to a remote service. In this context, unintended invocation is more dangerous because the skill can transmit local files and associated metadata over the network.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Missing User Warnings

Medium

• Category: Not specified by scanner
• Confidence: 97% confidence

Finding

The skill description and workflow do not clearly warn users that local files, hashes, filenames, bucket information, and public URL metadata will be sent to an external cloud service and potentially made publicly accessible. Because the skill is specifically designed to upload local content and return public links, lack of a prominent disclosure materially increases the risk of accidental data exposure.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Cloud Storage Exfiltration

Medium

• Category: Data Exfiltration
• Confidence: 89% confidence

Finding

The call to upload_file transfers an arbitrary local file selected by path to remote cloud storage, which is a classic exfiltration primitive. Although this is the intended feature of the skill, in an agent setting it is security-relevant because it can be used to move sensitive local data off-host and immediately derive public access links.

Content

Scanner excerpt · scripts/doge_upload_public_info.py (reported line 257)May include surrounding context.

python

upload_kwargs = {}
    if args.content_type:
        upload_kwargs["ExtraArgs"] = {"ContentType": args.content_type}
    s3.upload_file(file_path, s3_bucket, object_key, **upload_kwargs)

    candidates = build_public_candidates(object_key, s3_bucket, s3_endpoint, public_base_url)
    notes = [

Missing User Warnings

Medium

• Category: Not specified by scanner
• Confidence: 95% confidence

Finding

The script is explicitly designed to upload a local file and then return public URL candidates, but it does not require an explicit confirmation or present a strong warning that the uploaded content may become publicly accessible. In an agent skill context, this increases the risk of accidental disclosure of sensitive local files because a user may ask for an upload without fully understanding the exposure or the exact destination/path.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Natural-Language Policy Violations

Low

• Category: Not specified by scanner
• Confidence: 70% confidence

Finding

The activation description includes both English and Chinese trigger phrases, but it does not state whether the skill supports multiple languages by default or let the user opt into a preferred language/locale. This can be a mild language-policy concern when a skill implicitly enforces or assumes language handling without documenting user choice.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Static analysis

No suspicious patterns detected.