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Security audit

Hologres Bsi Profile Analysis

Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk

Overview

This skill is a disclosed Hologres BSI analytics guide with expected database write examples, but users should treat its CLI install and write-mode SQL carefully.

Before installing, use a virtual environment, pin or verify the `hologres-cli` package, and run SQL with a database identity scoped to the task. Review any `hologres sql run --write` command before execution because the examples can create extensions, create tables, and insert data.

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Insecure DependenciesIntroduces malicious components through unsafe dependency sources
  • Skill Instruction HijackingAlters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
  • Agent Memory PoisoningWrites attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
  • Remote Payload Retrieval and ExecutionFetches external code whose behavior can change after review
  • Embedded Malicious CodeShips malicious scripts inside the skill and executes them locally
Findings (1)

T08 · Insecure Dependencies

Warning
Location
SKILL.md:17
Finding
Unpinned Third-Party CLI Dependency## Vulnerability Details **File Location**: `SKILL.md`, line 17 **Vulnerability Type**: Unpinned executable dependency and insufficient supply-chain integrity controls **Risk Level**: Medium ### Vulnerable Code ```bash pip install hologres-cli ``` ### Technical Analysis The installation instruction resolves and installs the current package release named `hologres-cli` without: - Pinning an exact, reviewed version - Verifying package hashes - Specifying an explicitly trusted package index - Using a lock file or other reproducible dependency manifest Python packages can execute package-controlled code during installation and when their command-line entry points are invoked. Because dependency resolution occurs at installation time, the effective code can change after this Skill has been reviewed. This creates a supply-chain exposure if the package, its publishing account, its transitive dependencies, or the package source is compromised. The audit found no evidence that `hologres-cli` is currently malicious; the issue is the absence of controls ensuring that users receive the same reviewed artifact. ### Attack Path 1. An attacker compromises the package publisher, package-index account, distribution channel, or a transitive dependency. 2. The attacker publishes a malicious release that resolves under the `hologres-cli` package name. 3. A user follows the prerequisite instruction in `SKILL.md` and runs `pip install hologres-cli`. 4. `pip` retrieves and installs the attacker-controlled release. 5. Malicious code runs through installation behavior or when the installed `hologres` command is invoked. 6. The code operates with the privileges and environmental access of the user running the installation or CLI. ### Impact Assessment Successful exploitation could execute arbitrary code with the installing user's privileges. Depending on that user's environment, the malicious package could access: - Local files readable or writable by the user - Environment v ...[truncated 590 chars]
Remediation
## Remediation Suggestions 1. Pin `hologres-cli` to an exact version that has been reviewed: ```bash python -m pip install "hologres-cli==X.Y.Z" ``` 2. Publish a reviewed requirements file containing cryptographic hashes and require hash verification: ```bash python -m pip install --require-hashes -r requirements.txt ``` 3. Explicitly specify an approved package index or internal artifact repository rather than relying on ambient `pip` configuration. 4. Pin and verify transitive dependencies, preferably through a generated lock file or fully hashed requirements file. 5. Document the expected package publisher, artifact provenance, supported version, and integrity-verification procedure. 6. Install and run the CLI in an isolated virtual environment with least-privilege filesystem and database credentials. 7. Use separate database identities for read-only analysis and write operations. Grant DDL and DML permissions only when required, and review write commands before execution.
Vulnerability Patterns
  • Trigger AbuseOverly Broad Trigger, Shadow Command Trigger, Keyword Baiting Trigger
  • Prompt InjectionInstruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
  • Data ExfiltrationExternal Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
  • Privilege EscalationExcessive Permissions, Sudo/Root Execution, Credential Access
  • Supply ChainUnpinned Dependencies, External Script Fetching, Obfuscated Code
Findings (3)

Vague Triggers

Medium
Confidence
92% confidence
Finding
The trigger list contains broad generic phrases such as 用户画像, 标签计算, and 行为标签 that can match many unrelated requests, causing unintended invocation of a skill that can guide SQL execution and write-capable database operations. In this context, accidental activation is more dangerous because the skill explicitly documents use of write-enabled CLI commands and database-modifying workflows, increasing the chance of inappropriate or over-privileged actions being surfaced to the agent.

Vague Triggers

Medium
Confidence
96% confidence
Finding
The description embeds a trigger list containing broad, generic phrases such as '画像分析', '用户画像', '标签计算', and '行为标签', which are common terms likely to appear in many unrelated conversations. This can cause unintended invocation of the skill, exposing users to incorrect domain-specific guidance or causing the agent to route requests to this skill when the user did not intend it.

Natural-Language Policy Violations

Low
Confidence
84% confidence
Finding
The skill metadata and body are written entirely in Chinese and present the skill as Chinese-language by default, without any opt-in, language selection, or note that it is intentionally limited to a specific locale or audience. Under the language/locale policy, a skill should not implicitly force a language unless the constraint is clearly documented and justified.

Static analysis

No suspicious patterns detected.