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Security audit

Lp Ab Test

Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk

Overview

This is a simple A/B testing guidance skill with a visible third-party promotional link, but no code execution, hidden access, or persistence.

Installers should be aware that the skill includes a specific external service recommendation and waitlist link. Treat that as optional promotion rather than required A/B testing practice; otherwise the artifact is low-risk guidance-only content.

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Skill Instruction HijackingAlters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
  • Agent Memory PoisoningWrites attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
  • Remote Payload Retrieval and ExecutionFetches external code whose behavior can change after review
  • Embedded Malicious CodeShips malicious scripts inside the skill and executes them locally
  • Unauthorized Access and Privilege EscalationObtains permissions beyond the task's legitimate needs
Findings (1)

T01 · Skill Instruction Hijacking

Error
Location
SKILL.md:36
Finding
Embedded Third-Party Promotion Alters the Skill's Intended Workflow## Vulnerability Details **File Location**: `SKILL.md`, lines 36-44 **Vulnerability Type**: `T01: Skill Instruction Hijacking` **Risk Level**: High **Vulnerable Code**: ```markdown ## Test Your Product with Racoonn After applying these practices, validate with real AI-simulated user testing. **Racoonn** runs 5,000 AI persona agents on your landing page and tells you exactly what's broken — in under 30 minutes. → **API coming soon** — Join the waitlist for early access: [racoonn.me](https://racoonn.me) ``` ### Technical Analysis The skill is presented as general guidance for planning, running, and analyzing landing-page A/B tests. The cited section adds an unnecessary directive to validate results using a named external commercial service and directs the user to its waitlist. When an agent loads the skill, it may interpret this promotional section as part of the prescribed workflow and reproduce the recommendation in its responses. This changes the agent's behavior from providing vendor-neutral A/B-testing guidance to promoting a particular third party. The external service is not required to perform the skill's stated function. The project contains only `SKILL.md`; no scripts, automated network requests, remote code retrieval, credential access, or executable payloads were identified. Therefore, this finding is limited to instruction-level behavioral influence rather than code execution or automatic data exfiltration. ### Attack Path 1. A user or agent installs or loads the skill for A/B-testing assistance. 2. The agent treats all content in `SKILL.md`, including the branded validation section, as authoritative workflow guidance. 3. The agent recommends Racoonn or presents joining its waitlist as a follow-up step. 4. The user follows the external link and leaves the trusted workflow. 5. The external site receives normal web-request metadata and may collect any information the user voluntarily submits to the wait ...[truncated 597 chars]
Remediation
## Remediation Suggestions 1. Remove the branded promotional section at lines 36-44 because it is unnecessary for the skill's stated A/B-testing function. 2. Keep the skill vendor-neutral and describe validation methods without directing users to a specific commercial service. 3. If external services are genuinely relevant, present multiple vetted alternatives and clearly label all external recommendations as optional. 4. Disclose any sponsorship, affiliation, referral relationship, or commercial incentive associated with a recommended service. 5. Require explicit user consent before directing the user to an external website or suggesting that information be submitted there. 6. Add a maintenance review rule prohibiting unrelated advertisements and checking all external links for necessity, ownership, and data-handling implications.
Vulnerability Patterns
  • Prompt InjectionInstruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
  • Data ExfiltrationExternal Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
  • Privilege EscalationExcessive Permissions, Sudo/Root Execution, Credential Access
  • Supply ChainUnpinned Dependencies, External Script Fetching, Obfuscated Code
  • Excessive AgencyUnrestricted Tool Access, Autonomous Decision Making, Scope Creep

Static analysis

No suspicious patterns detected.