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Security audit

git-master

Security checks across malware telemetry and agentic risk

Overview

This is a git workflow skill whose repository-changing commands are expected for its stated purpose, though users should supervise rebase, reset, fetch, and push steps.

Install only if you want an agent to help run substantial git workflows. Review plans before it stages, commits, rebases, fetches from remotes, resets history, or suggests force-with-lease pushes, and keep backups or stashes before destructive recovery commands.

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Excessive AgencyUnrestricted Tool Access, Autonomous Decision Making, Scope Creep
  • Tool MisuseTool Parameter Abuse, Chaining Abuse, Unsafe Defaults
  • Trigger AbuseOverly Broad Trigger, Shadow Command Trigger, Keyword Baiting Trigger
  • Prompt InjectionInstruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
  • Data ExfiltrationExternal Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
Findings (3)

Context-Inappropriate Capability

Medium
Confidence
88% confidence
Finding
The skill includes `git fetch origin` during rebase/update flows, which performs network access not clearly disclosed by the manifest's local git-assistance framing. Unexpected remote interaction can leak repository metadata, alter local refs based on untrusted remote state, and violate execution expectations in restricted environments.

Vague Triggers

Medium
Confidence
82% confidence
Finding
The trigger phrases are very broad ('commit', 'rebase', 'who wrote', 'find the commit that'), making unintended activation likely for ordinary conversations about git. Over-triggering increases the chance that the skill will push users into complex or risky git workflows, including history rewriting, when they only wanted advice or a simple lookup.

Tool Parameter Abuse

High
Category
Tool Misuse
Content
| Situation | Command | Notes |
|-----------|---------|-------|
| Rebase going wrong | `git rebase --abort` | Returns to pre-rebase state |
| Need original commits | `git reflog` -> `git reset --hard <hash>` | Reflog keeps 90 days |
| Accidentally force-pushed | `git reflog` -> coordinate with team | May need to notify others |
| Lost commits after rebase | `git fsck --lost-found` | Nuclear option |
</rebase_execution>
Confidence
95% confidence
Finding
Including `git reset --hard <hash>` as a recovery command is dangerous because it can irreversibly discard uncommitted work and rapidly rewrite the working tree and index. In a skill with broad git triggers and aggressive rewrite guidance, this raises the risk of accidental destructive execution or unsafe recommendation without sufficient safeguards.

VirusTotal

62/62 vendors flagged this skill as clean.

View on VirusTotal

Static analysis

No suspicious patterns detected.