T03 · Remote Payload Retrieval and Execution
- Location
references/cli-usage.md:58- Finding
Unverified Remote Installation Scripts Are Downloaded and Executed
- Content
View full analysis
- Remediation
View remediation
Security audit
Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk
This skill is mostly coherent documentation for Antigravity CLI, but its install instructions ask users to execute remote installer scripts directly without verification.
Install only if you trust the publisher and the Antigravity CLI distribution path. Before running the documented installer commands, prefer downloading the script first, reviewing it, and verifying an official checksum or signature; do not run the installer with elevated privileges unless the vendor explicitly requires it. Keep sandboxing and permission prompts enabled for unfamiliar repositories.
references/cli-usage.md:58Unverified Remote Installation Scripts Are Downloaded and Executed
The documentation explicitly instructs users to fetch and execute a shell script from the network in one step. This is dangerous because it bypasses meaningful inspection and makes compromise of the hosting endpoint, DNS/TLS trust chain, or accidental URL substitution immediately lead to arbitrary code execution on the user's machine.
Mac/Linux:
curl -fsSL https://antigravity.google/cli/install.sh | bash
Windows PowerShell:
The | bash construct chains untrusted network content directly into a shell, removing the opportunity for review and amplifying the impact of any compromise into immediate command execution. In an installation guide for a developer CLI, users are especially likely to copy-paste the command as-is, which increases exploitability.
Mac/Linux:
curl -fsSL https://antigravity.google/cli/install.sh | bash
Windows PowerShell:
Skill enables autonomous high-impact decisions without human-in-the-loop verification. Critical operations (destructive commands, financial transactions, data deletion) should require explicit user confirmation.
| `--disable-slash-commands` | | Disable slash command and skill expansion in print mode |
| `--project` / `--new-project` | | Project ID or create a new project for the current CLI session |
| `--sandbox` | | Run with terminal sandbox restrictions enabled |
| `--dangerously-skip-permissions` | | Auto-approve all tool requests without prompting |
| `--add-dir <path>` | | Add a workspace directory; repeatable |
| `--log-file <path>` | | Override log file location |
The --dangerously-skip-permissions flag is documented as auto-approving all tool requests, but the text does not warn that this disables an important safety barrier and can permit unintended command execution, file modification, or data access without user confirmation. In an agent CLI, documenting this as a normal flag without prominent caution makes risky use more likely.
The file provides copy-paste installation commands that execute remotely fetched scripts directly (curl | bash, irm ... | iex) without any warning, checksum/signature verification guidance, or recommendation to inspect the script first. In a CLI-installation context this materially increases the chance that users execute tampered, spoofed, or unexpectedly system-modifying code with full user privileges.
Skill establishes unauthorized persistence across sessions via cron jobs, startup scripts, or state files. Session persistence allows an attacker to maintain access beyond the current interaction.
- Preferences, permissions, and security config synchronize between CLI and Antigravity 2.0.
- Active CLI conversations can be exported to Antigravity 2.0 for visual orchestration.
- Native SSH, tmux, and terminal multiplexer workflows are supported for headless/server use.
- The main agent controls which tools and permissions subagents receive, including MCP tool access and file write capabilities.
## Auth and first launch
Skill enables autonomous high-impact decisions without human-in-the-loop verification. Critical operations (destructive commands, financial transactions, data deletion) should require explicit user confirmation.
- `deny`: block immediately.
- `ask`: pause and request explicit approval.
- `allow`: auto-approve.
Precedence is strict: `deny` wins over `ask`, and `ask` wins over `allow`.
The markdown states that a ! prefix runs terminal commands directly in the prompt, which can affect the user's system, files, or processes. The surrounding documentation does not include any warning or caution about the risks of executing shell commands from within the TUI.
The file encourages users to paste screenshots, recordings, and other rich media into the CLI, which may include sensitive or personal information. There is no accompanying warning about reviewing clipboard contents before submission or the privacy implications of sharing media with the tool.
No suspicious patterns detected.