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Security audit

Wayne Sonoscli

Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk

Overview

This skill is a small, coherent Sonos CLI helper; its main caution is that it installs an unpinned third-party Go CLI at install time.

Install only if you trust the upstream wayne-sonoscli Go module and are comfortable allowing a CLI to discover and control Sonos devices on your local network. Prefer a pinned or reviewed module version if available, and provide Spotify credentials only when you intend to use Spotify-related search features.

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Insecure DependenciesIntroduces malicious components through unsafe dependency sources
  • Skill Instruction HijackingAlters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
  • Agent Memory PoisoningWrites attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
  • Remote Payload Retrieval and ExecutionFetches external code whose behavior can change after review
  • Embedded Malicious CodeShips malicious scripts inside the skill and executes them locally
Findings (1)

T08 · Insecure Dependencies

Warning
Location
SKILL.md:5
Finding

Unpinned Third-Party Executable Dependency

Content
View full analysis

Vulnerability Details

File Location: SKILL.md, line 5
Vulnerability Type: Mutable third-party dependency installed from an unsafe version reference
Risk Level: Medium

Complete Code Snippet:

yaml
metadata: {"clawdbot":{"emoji":"🔊","requires":{"bins":["sonos"]},"install":[{"id":"go","kind":"go","module":"github.com/steipete/wayne-sonoscli/cmd/sonos@latest","bins":["sonos"],"label":"Install wayne-sonoscli (go)"}]}}

Technical Analysis

The installation configuration retrieves and compiles the third-party Go command github.com/steipete/wayne-sonoscli/cmd/sonos using the mutable @latest reference. Consequently, the installed source can differ over time without any modification to this Skill package.

Because the dependency's executable code is not included in the audited artifact, the effective installation payload cannot be fully verified from the package. Although no malicious behavior is demonstrated in the reviewed files, an upstream repository compromise, maintainer-account compromise, or malicious future release could cause attacker-controlled code to be selected during installation.

Attack Path

  1. An attacker compromises the upstream repository, its release process, or a maintainer account.
  2. The attacker publishes a malicious Go module version that becomes the version resolved by @latest.
  3. A user or agent installs this Skill's required CLI.
  4. The installation process downloads and compiles the malicious module.
  5. The resulting sonos executable runs with the installing or invoking user's privileges.
  6. The executable can abuse those privileges and the Skill's expected local-network access.

Impact Assessment

Successful exploitation could permit arbitrary code execution under the account that installs or invokes the dependency. The resulting access is bounded by that account's operating-system permissions and network reachability, but may include access to local fil ...[truncated 502 chars]

Remediation
View remediation

Remediation Suggestions

  • Replace @latest with a specific, reviewed semantic version or immutable commit reference.
  • Review the selected upstream source and its transitive dependencies before approving upgrades.
  • Retain Go checksum database verification and avoid disabling checksum validation through settings such as GOSUMDB=off.
  • Record the approved module version and expected checksum in release documentation or a dependency lock manifest.
  • Perform dependency updates through a controlled review process rather than resolving the newest release during installation.
  • Where feasible, distribute a reproducibly built artifact and verify its cryptographic digest or signature before execution.
  • Re-audit the dependency whenever the pinned version changes.
Vulnerability Patterns
  • Prompt InjectionInstruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
  • Data ExfiltrationExternal Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
  • Privilege EscalationExcessive Permissions, Sudo/Root Execution, Credential Access
  • Supply ChainUnpinned Dependencies, External Script Fetching, Obfuscated Code
  • Excessive AgencyUnrestricted Tool Access, Autonomous Decision Making, Scope Creep