T08 · Insecure Dependencies
Note
- Location
- requirements.txt:1
- Finding
- Unbounded Third-Party Dependency Produces Non-Reproducible Builds<![CDATA[ ## Vulnerability Details **File Location**: `requirements.txt:1` **Vulnerability Type**: Unbounded third-party dependency **Risk Level**: Low ### Vulnerable Code ```text requests>=2.28.0 ``` The related installation instructions in `README.md:24-27` and `SKILL.md:43-46` direct users to install `requests` without a lock file or integrity verification: ```bash pip install requests ``` ### Technical Analysis The dependency specification accepts every `requests` release from version 2.28.0 onward. No upper bound, exact version, lock file, or package hash is provided. Consequently, separate installations may resolve to different dependency versions, including versions published after the Skill was audited. This is a supply-chain hardening weakness rather than evidence that the current `requests` package is malicious. The package name and documented PyPI installation method are legitimate, with no observed typosquatting or untrusted package index. Nevertheless, unrestricted future versions make installations non-reproducible and expand exposure to a future compromised, malicious, or incompatible release. ### Attack Path 1. An attacker compromises the upstream package publishing process or an allowed future dependency release. 2. A user follows the documented installation command or installs from `requirements.txt`. 3. The package resolver selects the compromised release because it satisfies `requests>=2.28.0`. 4. Malicious package installation or import-time code executes with the privileges of the user running `pip` or the Skill. 5. Because the Skill imports `requests` while holding `MINIMAX_CODING_KEY` in its process environment, malicious dependency code could access that credential or tamper with the authenticated API request. This path requires an upstream supply-chain compromise or malicious future release; no such compromise was identified during this audit. ### Impact Assessment Exploitation could execute code with the privileges of the ...[truncated 475 chars]
- Remediation
- <![CDATA[ ## Remediation Suggestions 1. Pin `requests` to a specifically reviewed version instead of accepting all future versions: ```text requests==<reviewed-version> ``` 2. Generate and commit a lock file containing exact transitive dependency versions. 3. Require package hashes during installation, such as with a hash-pinned requirements file and: ```bash pip install --require-hashes -r requirements.txt ``` 4. Review and deliberately update dependency pins on a controlled schedule after vulnerability and compatibility testing. 5. Install dependencies in a dedicated virtual environment under a non-administrative account. 6. Document the trusted package index explicitly if automated installation occurs in a managed environment. ]]>