T03 · Remote Payload Retrieval and Execution
- Location
SKILL.md:47- Finding
Unconditional Execution of Model-Supplied Remote Code
- Content
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\ --tensor-parallel-size \ --max-num-batched-tokens 4096 \ --max-num-seqs 256 \ --trust-remote-code \ --port 8000 \ ``` The benchmark client also enables the same behavior: ```python cmd = [ "vllm", "bench", "serve", "--host", "127.0.0.1", "--port", str(args.port), "--backend", "openai-chat", "--model", args.model, "--tokenizer", args.tokenizer, "--dataset-name", "random", "--endpoint", "/v1/chat/completions", "--ignore-eos", "--trust-remote-code", "--random-input-len", str(args.input_len), "--random-output-len", str(args.output_len), "--num-prompts", str(args.num_prompts), ] ``` ### Technical Analysis The Skill unconditionally supplies `--trust-remote-code` when starting vLLM and when loading the tokenizer through the benchmark client. This option permits model repositories to provide and execute custom Python implementations during model or tokenizer initialization. The model path or identifier originates from the user or preceding workflow context. If it refers to a malicious or compromised remote repository, repository-controlled Python can execute inside the container. The executable content may also change after the Skill itself has been reviewed unless the model repository and revision are pinned. This capability is unnecessary for models natively supported by vLLM and therefore exceeds the minimum privileges required for general performance benchmarking. ### Attack Path 1. An attacker supplies a malicious model repository identifier, or compromises a repository expected by the operator. 2. The operator or Agent passes that identifier as `MODEL_PATH` ...[truncated 1230 chars]- Remediation
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