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Security audit

tiktok-downloader

Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk

Overview

This skill does what it says: it sends TikTok links to a disclosed third-party downloader API and returns download links, with no evidence of hidden persistence or unrelated access.

Before installing, understand that TikTok URLs you ask the agent to process will be sent to tk.seekubo.com and returned CDN links may be fetched with curl. Use it only for public content you have the right to download, and avoid submitting sensitive or private links unless you accept that third-party service handling them.

A.I.G

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Skill Instruction HijackingAlters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
  • Agent Memory PoisoningWrites attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
  • Remote Payload Retrieval and ExecutionFetches external code whose behavior can change after review
  • Embedded Malicious CodeShips malicious scripts inside the skill and executes them locally
  • Unauthorized Access and Privilege EscalationObtains permissions beyond the task's legitimate needs

SkillSpector

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Data ExfiltrationExternal Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
  • Prompt InjectionInstruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
  • Privilege EscalationExcessive Permissions, Sudo/Root Execution, Credential Access
  • Supply ChainUnpinned Dependencies, External Script Fetching, Obfuscated Code
  • Excessive AgencyUnrestricted Tool Access, Autonomous Decision Making, Scope Creep
Findings (2)

Missing User Warnings

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
93% confidence
Finding

The skill explicitly directs the agent to send user-supplied TikTok URLs to a third-party service but does not disclose that the link, associated metadata, and the user's request context may be transmitted off-platform. This is a real privacy and data-handling issue because users may assume the assistant is processing the link locally, while the skill depends on an external API outside the primary trust boundary.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Confidence
91% confidence
Finding

The curl example performs an outbound POST to a third-party API, which confirms external transmission of user-provided content. In this skill's context, that behavior is core functionality rather than covert exfiltration, but it still creates a genuine data exposure risk because user input is shared with an external operator and may be logged, profiled, or retained.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 29)May include surrounding context.

Parse a URL

bash
curl -s -X POST "https://tk.seekubo.com/api/v2/parse" \
  -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
  -d '{"url":"https://www.tiktok.com/@scout2015/video/6718335390845095173"}'

Static analysis

No suspicious patterns detected.