T09 · Insecure Skill Coding Practices
- Location
main.py:55- Finding
Configurable API Base URL Enables Credential Redirection
- Content
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Vulnerability Details
File Location:
main.py:55-58,main.py:128-132, andmain.py:201-219
Vulnerability Type: Unrestricted transmission of authentication credentials to a configurable endpoint
Risk Level: MediumVulnerable Code
python BASE_URL = os.getenv("BYTEPLAN_BASE_URL", "https://uatapp.byteplan.com") PUBLIC_KEY_URL = f"{BASE_URL}/base/util/get/publicKey" LOGIN_URL = f"{BASE_URL}/base/login" AI_BASE_URL = f"{BASE_URL}/ai/api/ai"python response = requests.get( PUBLIC_KEY_URL, headers=headers, timeout=10 )python raw_password = os.getenv("BYTEPLAN_PASSWORD", "") encrypted_password = rsa_encrypt_password(raw_password, public_key_pem) if not encrypted_password: print("Password encryption failed") return None login_payload = LOGIN_PAYLOAD_TEMPLATE.copy() login_payload["password"] = encrypted_password login_payload["publicKeyId"] = key_id headers = { "Content-Type": "application/x-www-form-urlencoded" } try: response = requests.post( LOGIN_URL, data=login_payload, headers=headers, auth=(AUTH_USER, AUTH_PASS), timeout=10 )Technical Analysis
The program permits
BYTEPLAN_BASE_URLto control the destination of both the public-key request and the login request without validating that the URL belongs to an authorized BytePlan host.RSA encryption does not protect the password from a malicious destination in this design. The public key is retrieved from the same configurable server that receives the encrypted password. An attacker controlling the configured server can return an attacker-generated public key and subsequently decrypt
BYTEPLAN_PASSWORDusing the corresponding private key.The login request also transmits
BYTEPLAN_AUTH_USERandBYTEPLAN_AUTH_PASSthrough HTTP Basic authentication. These credentials are not protected by the application-level RSA operation and are directly available to the configured HTTPS endpoint.B ...[truncated 1991 chars]
- Remediation
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Remediation Suggestions
- Require HTTPS and validate the parsed URL before making any credential-bearing request.
- Allowlist the exact expected BytePlan hostname, such as
uatapp.byteplan.com, rather than accepting arbitrary hosts. - Reject URLs containing embedded credentials, unexpected ports, fragments, or non-HTTPS schemes.
- Maintain separate explicit allowlists for approved test and production BytePlan endpoints.
- Do not retrieve the password-encryption public key from an unrestricted destination. Pin an expected public-key fingerprint or validate the key through a trusted BytePlan certificate or signed key-distribution mechanism.
- Separate the public-key endpoint, login endpoint, and AI endpoint configuration if operational flexibility is required, and validate each endpoint independently.
- Warn the user and require explicit confirmation before sending credentials to any non-default approved environment.
- Request a read-only API scope instead of
writewhen chart generation does not require mutation. - Protect
.envand deployment configuration with restrictive file permissions and prevent untrusted users from controlling inherited environment variables. - Avoid logging complete error responses from authentication endpoints because they may contain sensitive diagnostic information.