T08 · Insecure Dependencies
- Location
package.json:22- Finding
Unbounded Third-Party Dependency Without Lockfile Integrity Pinning
- Content
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Vulnerability Details
File Location:
package.json, lines 22–23
Vulnerability Type: Unbounded dependency version range and mutable supply-chain resolution
Risk Level: MediumComplete Code Snippet:
json "dependencies": { "coze-api": ">=1.0.0" }Technical Analysis
The dependency constraint accepts every
coze-apirelease from version1.0.0onward, including future major versions. The project also contains no package lockfile or integrity-pinned dependency resolution. As a result, installing the same project at different times can retrieve materially different third-party code that was not part of this audit.Package installation may execute dependency lifecycle scripts, while imported dependency code executes with the privileges of the application process. If the package publisher account or distribution channel is compromised, or if a future accepted release is malicious, an installation can introduce attacker-controlled code without any change to this repository. The broad range also permits unreviewed breaking changes that could weaken security assumptions.
Attack Path
- An attacker compromises the
coze-apipublishing account or otherwise causes a malicious version greater than or equal to1.0.0to be distributed through the configured package registry. - A user or automated build installs this project without a pre-existing integrity-pinned lockfile.
- The package manager resolves the open-ended range to the attacker-controlled release.
- Malicious lifecycle scripts may execute during installation, or malicious module logic may execute when the dependency is loaded at runtime.
- The payload operates with the permissions and environmental access of the installer, build worker, or application process.
This path requires compromise or malicious control of an accepted dependency release; the audited repository itself does not contain a malicious payload.
Impact
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- An attacker compromises the
- Remediation
View remediation
Remediation Suggestions
- Replace the open-ended range with an exact version that has been reviewed, for example
"coze-api": "1.0.0"or another specifically audited release. - Generate and commit the package manager's lockfile so transitive versions and registry integrity hashes are reproducible.
- Use deterministic installation commands such as
npm ciin CI/CD pipelines, and fail builds when the lockfile and manifest differ. - Review the dependency's ownership, release history, lifecycle scripts, provenance, and transitive dependency tree before adoption.
- Disable package lifecycle scripts where operationally feasible, such as with
npm ci --ignore-scripts, and explicitly allow only scripts that are required and reviewed. - Run dependency installation and application execution with least privilege, isolated credentials, restricted filesystem access, and constrained outbound network access.
- Apply dependency updates through a controlled review process with automated vulnerability scanning and tests rather than accepting future releases automatically.
- Replace the open-ended range with an exact version that has been reviewed, for example
