T08 · Insecure Dependencies
- Location
SKILL.md:29- Finding
Automatic Installation of an Unpinned External Skill
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This skill is a coherent business-development workflow, but it asks agents to auto-install another skill and operationalizes contact scraping, enrichment, syncing, and outreach without enough user approval or privacy controls.
Review this skill before installing. Use it only with explicit approval for any dependency install, vetted and pinned external tools, lawful contact sources, approved business accounts, opt-out handling, and human review before enriching contacts, syncing them to Google/WhatsApp, or sending outreach.
SKILL.md:29Automatic Installation of an Unpinned External Skill
references/oe-requirements.md:130Unspecified Open-Source WhatsApp Detection Script
references/oe-requirements.md:87Personal Contact Data Replication Without Enforceable Privacy Controls
The skill instructs users to export names and phone numbers from Feishu into Google Contacts so they appear in WhatsApp for outreach, without any warning about contact-list exposure, account syncing, over-collection, or consent for messaging. This is more dangerous in context because it directly converts scraped or enriched personal data into actionable messaging targets on consumer/mobile platforms, increasing the risk of privacy violations, unauthorized processing, and spam or harassment.
The skill advertises outreach execution over email and WhatsApp, plus contact enrichment and background investigation, but does not present clear warnings about external communications, personal data handling, or consent/compliance obligations. This increases the risk of privacy violations, spam/abuse, and inadvertent transmission of sensitive or inaccurate data to third parties.
The skill claims it is only a passive reference repository, but elsewhere defines activation-time behavior that installs and loads another skill and delegates operational execution. This mismatch can mislead reviewers and users about the skill's actual capabilities, weakening trust boundaries and enabling unexpected dependency-mediated actions.
The documentation says the skill cannot execute without UTOS, yet instructs activation-time auto-installation of UTOS, effectively turning a nominally non-executing reference skill into a bootstrapper. Auto-installing a dependency expands the trust boundary to external code and can introduce unreviewed functionality at activation time.
Automatic dependency installation without clear warning or confirmation is risky because it can cause users to import additional code and privileges they did not intend to trust. In a skill ecosystem, this creates a supply-chain and consent problem: the referenced dependency may change behavior, access data, or perform actions beyond the user's expectations.
The entire skill file is written as Chinese-only operational guidance and does not provide any indication that users may choose another language or locale. Under the policy rule for natural-language violations, forcing a specific language without opt-in is in scope even when it appears in documentation rather than executable code.
The catalog explicitly includes collecting contact details, enriching them, and importing them into CRM/Feishu systems, but it provides no guardrails around lawful basis, consent, retention, minimization, or handling of personal data. In this skill context, the data pipeline is operationalized across collection, enrichment, and outreach, which increases the likelihood of privacy violations, unauthorized profiling, and misuse of personal/business contact information.
The skill defines WhatsApp number checking, persona-backed personalized messaging, and timed outreach SOP execution without any warnings about anti-spam rules, platform terms, consent, or account enforcement risk. In context, this is not merely drafting content; it describes a workflow for validating targets and automating contact at scale, which can facilitate unsolicited messaging, evasion of recipient expectations, and account or legal compliance issues.
The skill explicitly directs enrichment of personal contact data via third-party data brokers (e.g., Hunter.io/Apollo.io) and merges those results into a master dataset, but provides no consent, lawful-basis, minimization, retention, or disclosure controls. In the context of cross-border lead generation and outreach, this creates a real privacy and compliance risk because it operationalizes collection and use of personal data for unsolicited contact at scale.
All natural-language instructions and task descriptions in the file are presented only in Chinese, with no indication that users can opt into another language. Under SQP-3, forcing a single language without user choice can constitute a language-policy issue when no justification or opt-in is provided.
The schema explicitly requires 'project_name' to be translated into Chinese, which imposes a language choice in natural-language instructions. The document does not offer user opt-in or explain that the skill is restricted to a Chinese-language workflow.
No suspicious patterns detected.