T08 · Insecure Dependencies
- Location
SKILL.md:27- Finding
Automatic Installation of an Unpinned External Skill
- Content
View full analysis
Vulnerability Details
File Location:
SKILL.md, lines 27–35
Vulnerability Type: Supply-chain risk caused by automatic installation of an unverified dependency
Risk Level: HighVulnerable Code Snippet
markdown ## Dependency Declaration This skill strongly depends on Universal Task OS (`universal-task-os`). Without UTOS, this skill only supports reference lookup and cannot perform marketing analysis tasks. Loading check process (executed every time the skill is activated): 1. Detect whether the `universal-task-os` skill is installed. 2. If it is not installed, automatically install the `universal-task-os` skill. 3. If installation succeeds, load UTOS and execute according to this skill's usage rules. 4. If installation fails, downgrade to read-only reference mode.Technical Analysis
The activation workflow directs the agent to install and load an external skill automatically when
universal-task-osis absent. The dependency declaration does not specify:- An authoritative registry or repository
- A verified publisher identity
- An immutable version or commit
- A cryptographic checksum or signature
- A dependency review policy
- Explicit user approval before installation and loading
Consequently, the content executed by the agent is not fully represented by the audited project. Package-name ambiguity, dependency confusion, registry compromise, publisher compromise, or a malicious future release could cause an unintended implementation of
universal-task-osto be installed.The risk is amplified because successful installation is immediately followed by loading the dependency. This creates a direct path from dependency resolution to execution of third-party skill instructions without an intervening integrity check or approval boundary.
No malicious implementation of
universal-task-osis included in the audited project, so exploitation depends on the external package source or resolution mechanism being compromised or un ...[truncated 1704 chars]- Remediation
View remediation
Remediation Suggestions
- Remove automatic dependency installation from the activation workflow.
- When the dependency is missing, remain in the documented read-only mode and ask the user for explicit approval before any installation.
- Identify one authoritative repository or registry and reject dependencies resolved from any other source.
- Pin
universal-task-osto an immutable version or commit identifier. - Record and verify a cryptographic checksum or trusted publisher signature before installation.
- Audit the exact pinned dependency version and its transitive dependencies before allowing it to load.
- Separate installation from activation so that successful installation does not automatically authorize execution.
- Display the dependency source, publisher, version, requested capabilities, and integrity result in the approval prompt.
- Restrict the dependency to the minimum required tools, filesystem paths, network destinations, and data.
- Fail closed when identity or integrity verification cannot be completed, preserving only safe reference lookup functionality.
