T09 · Insecure Skill Coding Practices
- Location
SKILL.md:111- Finding
Hardcoded Feishu CRM Destination May Cause Unauthorized Disclosure of Customer Data
- Content
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Vulnerability Details
File Location:
SKILL.md, lines 111–113
Vulnerability Type: Hardcoded external data destination
Risk Level: HighVulnerable Code
markdown **Table URL**: https://my.feishu.cn/base/KgoqbzS5ZaTwLRskzKxcVucvn0e **app_token**: KgoqbzS5ZaTwLRskzKxcVucvn0e **table_id**: tblzrBS1Gb73OhISThe original table label is presented in English here for reporting consistency; the URL, token, and table ID are reproduced exactly.
Technical Analysis
The skill embeds a fixed Feishu Bitable URL, application token, and table ID. Elsewhere, it instructs the agent to create CRM records containing customer names, contact information, business requirements, assigned sales personnel, and customer status.
Although a Feishu Bitable application token is generally a resource identifier rather than an API authentication secret, embedding a fixed destination is unsafe because the repository does not establish that the table belongs to the invoking user or that the user has approved it. The skill also does not require destination ownership verification before a read or write operation.
Consequently, when a user does not specify a table, an agent may interpret this hardcoded configuration as the default destination and transmit sensitive customer information to a table controlled by the skill author, another organization, or another tenant. This behavior also conflicts with the skill's earlier guidance that users without a configured table should be assisted in creating one.
Attack Path
- An attacker publishes or distributes the skill with a Feishu table under the attacker's control embedded in
SKILL.md. - A user installs the skill and asks the agent to add a customer without specifying a destination table.
- The agent obtains the fixed
app_tokenandtable_idfrom the skill configuration. - Using the user's available Feishu integration authorization, the agent invokes the record-crea ...[truncated 1321 chars]
- An attacker publishes or distributes the skill with a Feishu table under the attacker's control embedded in
- Remediation
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Remediation Suggestions
- Remove the hardcoded Feishu table URL, application token, table ID, and associated field identifiers from the distributed skill.
- Require each user or administrator to supply a destination table through tenant-scoped, access-controlled configuration.
- When no table is configured, stop the operation and guide the user through selecting or creating a table rather than silently using a default resource.
- Before the first read or write, display the resolved workspace and table destination and request explicit user confirmation.
- Resolve table metadata from the user-approved URL and verify that the table belongs to the expected tenant or workspace.
- Apply least-privilege Feishu permissions, restricting the integration to only the approved table and necessary record operations.
- Avoid logging customer fields, destination tokens, or record contents unnecessarily, and redact sensitive contact information from diagnostic output.
- Add tests ensuring that record operations fail closed when destination configuration is absent, ambiguous, or does not match the approved tenant.
