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Security audit

social-value

Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk

Overview

This is a coherent Bitcoin micropayments wallet skill, but it asks an agent to use a seed phrase with real-funds transaction authority while relying on unpinned external wallet code.

Review this before installing. Use only a new, dedicated low-balance wallet, testnet first, set SOCIAL_VALUE_MAX_BALANCE to a conservative nonzero cap, and do not provide a mnemonic that controls other funds. Treat the mnemonic like a private key, inject it only through a protected secret mechanism, and require explicit user approval for every send, withdrawal, batch transfer, or drain operation. Prefer a pinned, hashed, reviewed package version or isolated runtime before using mainnet funds.

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Insecure DependenciesIntroduces malicious components through unsafe dependency sources
  • Skill Instruction HijackingAlters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
  • Agent Memory PoisoningWrites attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
  • Remote Payload Retrieval and ExecutionFetches external code whose behavior can change after review
  • Embedded Malicious CodeShips malicious scripts inside the skill and executes them locally
Findings (1)

T08 · Insecure Dependencies

Error
Location
SKILL.md:8
Finding

Unpinned Third-Party Financial Package Can Access Wallet Credentials and Funds

Content
View full analysis

Vulnerability Details

File Location: SKILL.md:8-17; corroborating dependency declaration in metadata.json:21-29
Vulnerability Type: Unpinned executable dependency with access to sensitive wallet credentials
Risk Level: High

Vulnerable Code

SKILL.md:8-17:

yaml
requires:
  bins:
    - pip
install:
  - kind: pip
    package: social-value
    extras: liquid
    bins: []
  - kind: uv
    package: social-value
    extras: liquid
    bins: []

metadata.json:21-29:

json
"install": {
  "pip": "social-value"
},
"requires": {
  "python": ">=3.10"
},
"dependencies": [
  "breez-sdk-liquid>=0.11.0"
],

Technical Analysis

The Skill directs the environment to install the mutable social-value package from an external Python package registry without an exact version, package hash, signature, or lockfile. It also declares breez-sdk-liquid>=0.11.0, which allows dependency resolution to select any compatible future release.

The audited artifact contains only SKILL.md and metadata.json; it does not include the installed package's implementation. Consequently, the executable code that handles the BIP39 mnemonic, Breez API key, wallet state, and real-value transactions cannot be verified from this artifact. Claims such as “no telemetry” therefore cannot be validated locally.

This is particularly sensitive because the documentation instructs operators to expose SOCIAL_VALUE_MNEMONIC to the installed package. A BIP39 mnemonic provides control over the wallet. Any malicious or compromised package release selected during installation could read and exfiltrate that mnemonic, submit unauthorized transactions, or execute arbitrary code with the privileges of the Agent process.

Attack Path

  1. An attacker compromises the package publisher account, package registry entry, build process, or an allowed transitive dependency.
  2. The attacker publishes a mal ...[truncated 1750 chars]
Remediation
View remediation

Remediation Suggestions

  1. Pin social-value and every direct dependency to exact, reviewed versions rather than using an unconstrained package name or a lower-bound-only constraint.
  2. Generate and commit a lockfile covering all transitive dependencies for each supported backend and Python version.
  3. Require package hashes during installation, such as through pip hash-checking mode, and reject artifacts whose integrity does not match the reviewed lockfile.
  4. Prefer signed releases, attestations, reproducible builds, and a controlled internal package mirror.
  5. Include or vendor the wallet implementation in the reviewed artifact so its credential access, network destinations, transaction authorization, and telemetry behavior can be audited.
  6. Run wallet code in a dedicated, least-privileged process or container with a strict network allowlist and no access to unrelated credentials or files.
  7. Use a newly generated wallet dedicated to this Skill; never provide a mnemonic that controls unrelated or high-value funds.
  8. Default to testnet and require explicit operator confirmation before enabling mainnet.
  9. Set a conservative, nonzero SOCIAL_VALUE_MAX_BALANCE by default and enforce transaction-level and daily spending limits independently of the package.
  10. Require explicit operator approval for transfers, withdrawals, new destinations, and transactions above a small threshold.
  11. Rotate the wallet mnemonic and move all remaining funds immediately if package compromise or mnemonic exposure is suspected; merely uninstalling the package is insufficient.
Vulnerability Patterns
  • Data ExfiltrationExternal Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
  • Prompt InjectionInstruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
  • Privilege EscalationExcessive Permissions, Sudo/Root Execution, Credential Access
  • Supply ChainUnpinned Dependencies, External Script Fetching, Obfuscated Code
  • Excessive AgencyUnrestricted Tool Access, Autonomous Decision Making, Scope Creep
Findings (2)

Missing User Warnings

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
91% confidence
Finding

The setup flow instructs the operator to place a BIP39 mnemonic directly into an environment variable example without a strong warning not to paste, log, commit, screenshot, or otherwise store the seed insecurely. Because the mnemonic fully controls the wallet funds, normal copy/paste, shell history, process inspection, CI logs, dotenv files, or shared hosting environments can expose it and lead to irreversible theft.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Missing User Warnings

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
89% confidence
Finding

The manifest requests highly sensitive financial secrets, including a wallet BIP39 mnemonic and API key, but does not present any explicit user-facing warning about fund theft risk, irreversible transactions, or secure handling expectations. In a payment wallet skill, this omission materially increases the chance that users or downstream agents will supply real credentials without understanding the financial consequences of compromise.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.