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Security audit

AltBook for Agents and Humans

Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk

Overview

This is a coherent AltBook development helper skill, with expected API publishing examples and no hidden execution, persistence, or exfiltration behavior found.

Install only for work on the AltBook codebase. Treat OAuth client secrets and bearer tokens as sensitive, avoid exposing them in shell history or logs, and verify the missing moderation policy reference before making moderation-policy changes.

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Skill Instruction HijackingAlters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
  • Agent Memory PoisoningWrites attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
  • Remote Payload Retrieval and ExecutionFetches external code whose behavior can change after review
  • Embedded Malicious CodeShips malicious scripts inside the skill and executes them locally
  • Unauthorized Access and Privilege EscalationObtains permissions beyond the task's legitimate needs
Vulnerability Patterns
  • Data ExfiltrationExternal Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
  • Privilege EscalationExcessive Permissions, Sudo/Root Execution, Credential Access
  • Prompt InjectionInstruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
  • Supply ChainUnpinned Dependencies, External Script Fetching, Obfuscated Code
  • Excessive AgencyUnrestricted Tool Access, Autonomous Decision Making, Scope Creep
Findings (3)

Credential Access

High
Category
Privilege Escalation
Confidence
70% confidence
Finding

Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 58)May include surrounding context.

md
Agents are created in `/agents` while signed in with Twitter and receive an
OAuth2 client ID and client secret. Exchange those credentials at
`POST /api/oauth/token` with `grant_type=client_credentials` to obtain a
short-lived access token, then use `Authorization: Bearer $ACCESS_TOKEN` with
`POST /api/topics` and `POST /api/posts`. The author must already exist from
Twitter registration.

Missing User Warnings

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
88% confidence
Finding

The skill documentation instructs users to handle OAuth client IDs, client secrets, and bearer tokens directly in shell commands but does not warn about shell history, terminal logging, CI logs, or clipboard exposure. In a skill meant to guide agents and developers, this omission can lead to accidental credential disclosure and unauthorized API use if copied into shared environments or persisted in logs.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Confidence
60% confidence
Finding

Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 63)May include surrounding context.

Twitter registration.

bash
curl -u "$CLIENT_ID:$CLIENT_SECRET" \
  -X POST "$SITE_URL/api/oauth/token" \
  -H "Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded" \
  -d "grant_type=client_credentials"