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Security audit

warranty-vault

Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk

Overview

The skill is a local warranty tracker that clearly matches its stated purpose, with the main caution being that it stores purchase and card-label details in a plain JSON file.

Install only if you are comfortable keeping a household purchase and warranty inventory in a local plain JSON file. Avoid storing full card numbers, credentials, or highly sensitive notes; use a private machine/account, restrict the vault file permissions if needed, and confirm your jurisdiction and actual warranty terms before sending generated claim letters.

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Insecure Skill Coding PracticesFinds exploitable flaws such as hardcoded secrets or command injection
  • Skill Instruction HijackingAlters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
  • Agent Memory PoisoningWrites attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
  • Remote Payload Retrieval and ExecutionFetches external code whose behavior can change after review
  • Embedded Malicious CodeShips malicious scripts inside the skill and executes them locally
Findings (1)

T09 · Insecure Skill Coding Practices

Note
Location
scripts/warranty_vault.py:60
Finding

Vault File Is Created Without Restrictive Permissions

Content
View full analysis
{path}") ``` ### Technical Analysis The `save()` function creates the warranty vault using Python's default `open()` behavior without explicitly setting restrictive file permissions. Consequently, the permissions of a newly created vault depend on the process umask. For example, a typical umask of `022` can result in a mode of `0644`, making the file readable by other local users when its parent directories permit traversal. The vault may contain purchase history, item values, receipt locations, card program names, product serial numbers, registration dates, and free-form notes. Although the application does not inherently collect payment credentials and does not transmit the data externally, this information can disclose a user's possessions and purchasing activity. The function also does not inspect or correct the permissions of an existing vault file. Therefore, a vault that is already accessible to group or other users remains insecure after subsequent updates. ### Attack Path 1. A user runs a modifying command such as `add`, `update`, `remove`, or `meta`. 2. The command invokes `save()` to create or update the JSON vault. 3. The vault is created according to the process umask rather than an explicit owner-only mode. 4. If the resulting permissions and parent-directory permissions permit access, another local account reads the vault. 5. The local account obtains the stored household inventory and purchase metadata. Exploitation requires local system access and sufficient permission to traverse the vault's parent directories. It does not provide remote access or privilege escalation. ### Impact Assessment The issue c ...[truncated 572 chars]
Remediation
View remediation
{path}") ``` ]]>
Vulnerability Patterns
  • Behavioral ASTexec() Call, eval() Call, Dynamic Import
  • MCP Least PrivilegeUnderdeclared Capability, Wildcard Permission, Missing Permission Declaration
  • Prompt InjectionInstruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
  • Data ExfiltrationExternal Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
  • Privilege EscalationExcessive Permissions, Sudo/Root Execution, Credential Access
Findings (7)

Undeclared Tool Scope

Medium
Category
MCP Least Privilege
Confidence
84% confidence
Finding

The skill instructs use of shell commands and writes to a local JSON vault, but it declares no explicit tool scope or permissions boundaries. In an agent platform, this can cause the runtime to grant broader-than-expected capabilities or make reviewers/users unaware that the skill needs shell and file-write access, increasing the risk of unintended file modification or command execution.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

subprocess module call

Medium
Category
Dangerous Code Execution
Confidence
70% confidence
Finding

subprocess module calls execute external commands. Without careful input validation, this enables command injection.

Content

Scanner excerpt · scripts/test_warranty_vault.py (reported line 17)May include surrounding context.

python
def run_cli(args, f):
    return subprocess.run([sys.executable, ENGINE] + args + ["--file", f],
                          capture_output=True, text=True)

Natural-Language Policy Violations

Low
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
76% confidence
Finding

The README heavily foregrounds UK and EU legal regimes and presents UK-specific examples as the primary usage context. While US is mentioned, the document does not clearly state that users should select or confirm their jurisdiction before relying on the guidance, creating a mild locale-policy concern in natural-language framing.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Missing User Warnings

Low
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
88% confidence
Finding

The README explicitly states that purchase records, receipt references, card information, and warranty details are stored in a plain JSON file in the user's home directory, but it does not warn that this data can be sensitive. While this is not an exploit by itself, it can lead users to store financial and household inventory data insecurely, increasing exposure if the host is shared, backed up insecurely, or compromised.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Natural-Language Policy Violations

Low
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
78% confidence
Finding

The file constrains operation to US, UK, and EU via a fixed jurisdiction list, which is a locale-specific limitation expressed in natural language and program behavior. There is no opt-in path for users outside those locales, and the tool presents legal guidance as if those are the only supported regions.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Dynamic attribute access via getattr()

Low
Category
Dangerous Code Execution
Confidence
50% confidence
Finding

Dynamic getattr() with a non-literal attribute name can access arbitrary object attributes, potentially bypassing access controls.

Content

Scanner excerpt · scripts/warranty_vault.py (reported line 179)May include surrounding context.

python
changed = False
    for k in ("name", "category", "receipt", "card", "serial", "notes",
              "extended_by", "registered"):
        v = getattr(a, k, None)
        if v:
            e[k] = v
            changed = True

Dynamic attribute access via getattr()

Low
Category
Dangerous Code Execution
Confidence
50% confidence
Finding

Dynamic getattr() with a non-literal attribute name can access arbitrary object attributes, potentially bypassing access controls.

Content

Scanner excerpt · scripts/warranty_vault.py (reported line 184)May include surrounding context.

python
changed = False
    for k in ("name", "category", "receipt", "card", "serial", "notes",
              "extended_by", "registered"):
        v = getattr(a, k, None)
        if v:
            e[k] = v
            changed = True

Static analysis

No suspicious patterns detected.