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Security audit

salary-negotiator

Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk

Overview

This skill is a coherent offline salary negotiation helper with no evidence of hidden data access, persistence, or unsafe execution beyond running its bundled calculator script.

Before installing, understand that the skill may run a local Python calculator with compensation figures you provide. It appears offline and proportionate, but users should treat its outputs as educational negotiation support rather than legal, tax, financial, or employment advice.

A.I.G

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Skill Instruction HijackingAlters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
  • Agent Memory PoisoningWrites attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
  • Remote Payload Retrieval and ExecutionFetches external code whose behavior can change after review
  • Embedded Malicious CodeShips malicious scripts inside the skill and executes them locally
  • Unauthorized Access and Privilege EscalationObtains permissions beyond the task's legitimate needs

SkillSpector

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Behavioral ASTexec() Call, eval() Call, Dynamic Import
  • MCP Least PrivilegeUnderdeclared Capability, Wildcard Permission, Missing Permission Declaration
  • Prompt InjectionInstruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
  • Data ExfiltrationExternal Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
  • Privilege EscalationExcessive Permissions, Sudo/Root Execution, Credential Access
Findings (2)

Lp3

Medium
Category
MCP Least Privilege
Confidence
90% confidence
Finding
The skill instructs the agent to execute local shell commands (`python3 scripts/salary_negotiator.py ...`) but does not declare any explicit tool scope such as `permissions` or `allowed-tools`. That mismatch can lead to over-broad execution in environments where shell access is available by default, reducing reviewability and increasing the chance of unintended command execution if the skill or its companion files are later modified.

subprocess module call

Medium
Category
Dangerous Code Execution
Content
def run(args):
    return subprocess.run([sys.executable, str(SCRIPT)] + args,
                          capture_output=True, text=True)
Confidence
70% confidence
Finding
subprocess module calls execute external commands. Without careful input validation, this enables command injection.

Static analysis

Detected: suspicious.dynamic_code_execution

Dynamic code execution detected.

Critical
Code
suspicious.dynamic_code_execution
Location
scripts/test_salary_negotiator.py:13