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Security audit

commute-time-optimizer

Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk

Overview

This skill is a local commute cost calculator with no network access, persistence, credential use, or hidden behavior found in the inspected artifacts.

Before installing, treat the commute outputs as planning estimates rather than live traffic predictions. Review or edit the assumptions in the local script if your city, mode costs, or schedule differs from the defaults.

A.I.G

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Skill Instruction HijackingAlters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
  • Agent Memory PoisoningWrites attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
  • Remote Payload Retrieval and ExecutionFetches external code whose behavior can change after review
  • Embedded Malicious CodeShips malicious scripts inside the skill and executes them locally
  • Unauthorized Access and Privilege EscalationObtains permissions beyond the task's legitimate needs

SkillSpector

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Behavioral ASTexec() Call, eval() Call, Dynamic Import
  • MCP Least PrivilegeUnderdeclared Capability, Wildcard Permission, Missing Permission Declaration
  • Prompt InjectionInstruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
  • Data ExfiltrationExternal Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
  • Privilege EscalationExcessive Permissions, Sudo/Root Execution, Credential Access
Findings (2)

Lp3

Medium
Category
MCP Least Privilege
Confidence
89% confidence
Finding
The skill exposes shell-based commands (`python3 scripts/commute_opt.py ...`) but does not declare any `permissions` or `allowed-tools` scope to constrain execution. In an agent ecosystem, missing tool scoping can let the agent invoke shell access more broadly than intended, increasing the chance of unintended command execution or abuse if inputs are later incorporated unsafely.

subprocess module call

Medium
Category
Dangerous Code Execution
Content
def run_cli(args):
    return subprocess.run([sys.executable, ENGINE] + args,
                          capture_output=True, text=True)
Confidence
70% confidence
Finding
subprocess module calls execute external commands. Without careful input validation, this enables command injection.

Static analysis

No suspicious patterns detected.