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Security audit

Byted Las Video Edit

Security checks across malware telemetry and agentic risk

Overview

The skill appears to do the promised video clipping, but its setup automatically installs a remote SDK and one helper executes a local .env file as shell code, so it should be reviewed before use.

Install only if you trust the publisher and Volcengine SDK source. Review scripts/env_init.sh before running it, consider pinning/verifying the SDK wheel yourself, and avoid placing executable shell content in the project .env. Use a limited LAS API key, confirm the estimated cost before submission, and remember that local videos or reference images may be uploaded to Volcengine/TOS for processing.

SkillSpector

By NVIDIA
Vulnerability Patterns
  • Privilege EscalationExcessive Permissions, Sudo/Root Execution, Credential Access
  • Supply ChainUnpinned Dependencies, External Script Fetching, Obfuscated Code
  • Excessive AgencyUnrestricted Tool Access, Autonomous Decision Making, Scope Creep
  • Prompt InjectionInstruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
  • Data ExfiltrationExternal Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
Findings (4)

Context-Inappropriate Capability

Medium
Confidence
95% confidence
Finding
The script downloads a remote manifest and automatically upgrades/install an SDK from a remote wheel during environment initialization, without pinning trust via checksum/signature verification or requiring explicit approval. This creates a supply-chain execution path: if the remote host, manifest, or package is tampered with, arbitrary code can be introduced into the user's environment simply by sourcing the init script.

Missing User Warnings

Medium
Confidence
97% confidence
Finding
The script performs a silent remote fetch and package installation/upgrade with no explicit warning or consent, so users who only expect local environment setup may unknowingly trigger network activity and code changes. Because pip-installed packages can execute code during installation and later at runtime, this materially increases the risk of covert supply-chain compromise and unexpected environment mutation.

Credential Access

High
Category
Privilege Escalation
Content
SCRIPT_DIR="$(cd "$(dirname "${BASH_SOURCE[0]}")" && pwd)"
PROJECT_ROOT="$(cd "${SCRIPT_DIR}/../../.." && pwd)"

if [ -f "${PROJECT_ROOT}/.env" ]; then
  source "${PROJECT_ROOT}/.env"
  export LAS_API_KEY LAS_REGION
fi
Confidence
84% confidence
Finding
.env"

Credential Access

High
Category
Privilege Escalation
Content
PROJECT_ROOT="$(cd "${SCRIPT_DIR}/../../.." && pwd)"

if [ -f "${PROJECT_ROOT}/.env" ]; then
  source "${PROJECT_ROOT}/.env"
  export LAS_API_KEY LAS_REGION
fi
Confidence
84% confidence
Finding
.env"

VirusTotal

66/66 vendors flagged this skill as clean.

View on VirusTotal

Static analysis

No suspicious patterns detected.