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Security audit

Byted Bytehouse Load Analyzer

Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk

Overview

This ByteHouse load analyzer has a coherent purpose, but it downloads mutable remote code at runtime with the full environment and saves potentially sensitive query details locally.

Review before installing. Use only in an environment where ByteHouse credentials are low-privilege and where unrelated secrets are not present in the process environment. Prefer a version pinned to an immutable, reviewed MCP server source and a ByteHouse-only environment allowlist, and treat generated reports as sensitive because they may contain table names, operational metadata, and active SQL text.

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Remote Payload Retrieval and ExecutionFetches external code whose behavior can change after review
  • Insecure Skill Coding PracticesFinds exploitable flaws such as hardcoded secrets or command injection
  • Skill Instruction HijackingAlters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
  • Agent Memory PoisoningWrites attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
  • Embedded Malicious CodeShips malicious scripts inside the skill and executes them locally
Findings (2)

T03 · Remote Payload Retrieval and Execution

Error
Location
scripts/load_analyzer.py:43
Finding

Mutable Remote Code Is Downloaded and Executed with Inherited Credentials

Content
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Remediation
View remediation
=1.0.0` dependency to a reviewed version and lock its transitive dependencies. ]]>

T09 · Insecure Skill Coding Practices

Warning
Location
scripts/load_analyzer.py:163
Finding

Sensitive Active SQL Is Persisted in a Plaintext Report

Content
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Remediation
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Vulnerability Patterns
  • Data ExfiltrationExternal Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
  • Excessive AgencyUnrestricted Tool Access, Autonomous Decision Making, Scope Creep
  • Trigger AbuseOverly Broad Trigger, Shadow Command Trigger, Keyword Baiting Trigger
  • MCP Least PrivilegeUnderdeclared Capability, Wildcard Permission, Missing Permission Declaration
  • MCP Tool PoisoningHidden Instructions, Unicode Deception, Parameter Description Injection
Findings (10)

Env Variable Harvesting

High
Category
Data Exfiltration
Confidence
99% confidence
Finding

os.environ.copy() forwards the entire process environment to the spawned MCP server, not just the ByteHouse variables needed for operation. Because that server is fetched from a remote GitHub source at runtime, this can leak unrelated secrets such as API keys, tokens, proxy credentials, or cloud environment variables to untrusted code.

Content

Scanner excerpt · scripts/load_analyzer.py (reported line 50)May include surrounding context.

python
print()
    
    # 从环境变量获取配置
    env = os.environ.copy()
    
    # MCP Server参数
    server_params = StdioServerParameters(

Natural-Language Policy Violations

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
95% confidence
Finding

The skill documentation is written entirely in Chinese, including headings, instructions, and usage guidance, with no indication that users may choose another language or that the skill is intended only for a Chinese-speaking or region-specific audience. This can violate language/locale policy when a skill imposes a specific language without user opt-in.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Undeclared Tool Scope

Medium
Category
MCP Least Privilege
Confidence
94% confidence
Finding

The skill documents capabilities that access environment variables, interact with an MCP server, and write output files, but it does not declare any tool scope such as permissions or allowed-tools. That omission weakens least-privilege controls and can cause the agent to invoke broader capabilities than a user would reasonably expect when the skill is activated.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Vague Triggers

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
90% confidence
Finding

The activation conditions are broad enough to trigger on ordinary discussion of performance, load, or throughput, not just explicit requests to run cluster analysis. In a skill that can access infrastructure and write reports, over-broad invocation increases the chance of unintended execution against real systems or unnecessary collection of operational data.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Missing User Warnings

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
92% confidence
Finding

The documentation states that multiple JSON reports will be written to disk, but it does not warn the user about filesystem modification or obtain consent first. Silent file creation can surprise users, overwrite artifacts, leak sensitive operational metadata into local storage, or fill shared workspaces with monitoring outputs.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Context-Inappropriate Capability

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
98% confidence
Finding

The script launches an MCP server directly from a remote GitHub source at runtime using uvx --from git+https://github.com/...@main, which introduces a supply-chain and arbitrary code execution risk. Pinning to @main is especially dangerous because the executed code can change over time without review, and it receives the full copied environment including secrets.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Missing User Warnings

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
96% confidence
Finding

The script executes an externally fetched tool from GitHub without prominently warning the user that remote code will be downloaded and run. This removes informed consent for a high-risk behavior and increases the chance that users expose their systems and ByteHouse credentials to unreviewed third-party code.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Natural-Language Policy Violations

Low
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
95% confidence
Finding

The natural-language content appears to force a single language for all user-facing documentation and invocation guidance. Under the stated policy, this is a language/locale constraint unless the skill offers user choice or clearly documents that it is intended only for a specific locale or audience.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Natural-Language Policy Violations

Low
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
88% confidence
Finding

The module docstring and all user-visible console output are in Chinese, with no indication that users can select another language. This can violate language/locale policy when a skill imposes a specific language without opt-in or documented regional scope.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Description-Behavior Mismatch

Low
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
85% confidence
Finding

The manifest describes the skill as a ByteHouse load analysis and performance monitoring tool, which implies collecting and analyzing cluster metrics. At L258-L266, the code additionally creates a local output directory and persists the analysis as a JSON file, a side effect not reflected in the manifest's read/monitoring-oriented description.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.