T05 · Unauthorized Access and Privilege Escalation
Warning
- Location
scripts/analyze-repo.sh:248- Finding
Analyzer Reads Secret-Bearing Environment Files in Full
- Content
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/dev/null || true)" done < <(find . -maxdepth 5 \( -name "*.js" -o -name "*.ts" -o -name "*.py" \ -o -name "*.go" -o -name "*.java" -o -name "*.rs" -o -name "*.rb" -o -name "*.php" \ -o -name "*.env" -o -name "*.env.example" \ -o -name "application.yml" -o -name "application.properties" \) 2>/dev/null | head -100) ``` ```bash # Config files for f in compose.yaml compose.yml docker-compose.yml docker-compose.yaml .env .env.example \ .env.sample config.yml config.yaml application.yml application.properties \ appsettings.json; do [ -f "$f" ] && search_content="$search_content $(cat "$f" 2>/dev/null || true)" done ``` ### Technical Analysis The repository analyzer reads the complete contents of `.env` files into shell variables while detecting ports and runtime dependencies. Real `.env` files commonly contain database passwords, API credentials, access tokens, private endpoints, and other production secrets. Reading all values violates least-privilege principles because the analyzer only needs deployment metadata, such as variable names, non-sensitive port settings, and dependency indicators. Secret values are not required for this analysis. The reviewed code does not transmit or print the collected values, so direct exfiltration is not confirmed. Nevertheless, placing secrets in process memory unnecessarily expands their exposure to shell tracing, debugging facilities, crash diagnostics, process inspection available to sufficiently privileged local users, and future modifications that might log the analysis buffers. ### Attack Path 1. A user invokes the Skill against a repository containing a real `.env` file. 2. The port-de ...[truncated 1194 chars]- Remediation
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