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Security audit

volcengine-billing-and-cost-management

Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk

Overview

ClawScan’s verdict is benign with medium confidence: most assessed areas are acceptable, while the skill’s instruction scope needs review and one referenced file was only partially inspected.

The verdict is benign, but confidence is medium and inspection was incomplete: one of eight components was only partially inspected. Consider whether the flagged language constraint and undeclared tool scope suit your needs, and weigh the incomplete review before installing.

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Skill Instruction HijackingAlters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
  • Agent Memory PoisoningWrites attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
  • Remote Payload Retrieval and ExecutionFetches external code whose behavior can change after review
  • Embedded Malicious CodeShips malicious scripts inside the skill and executes them locally
  • Unauthorized Access and Privilege EscalationObtains permissions beyond the task's legitimate needs
Vulnerability Patterns
  • Data ExfiltrationExternal Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
  • Output HandlingUnvalidated Output Injection, Cross-Context Output, Unbounded Output
  • Behavioral ASTexec() Call, eval() Call, Dynamic Import
  • MCP Least PrivilegeUnderdeclared Capability, Wildcard Permission, Missing Permission Declaration
  • Prompt InjectionInstruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
Findings (10)

Incomplete referenced artifact analysis

High
Category
analysis-evasion
Confidence
100% confidence
Finding

Referenced artifact was not completely inspected

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 189)May include surrounding context.

md
、`progress_signals`、`stop_condition`、`dedup` 等顶层字段。完整 JSON Schema、字段说明和状态迁移示例见 `references/analysis_state.md`。

Env Variable Harvesting

High
Category
Data Exfiltration
Confidence
60% confidence
Finding

Code enumerates, copies, or searches environment variables for secrets. Bulk environment access can collect credentials unrelated to the skill's stated purpose.

Content

Scanner excerpt · scripts/call_openapi.py (reported line 254)May include surrounding context.

python
command.extend(["--" + field, getattr(config, field)])
    # Runtime routing/profile inputs were captured at init. Do not let later
    # environment changes override saved defaults; authentication stays in ve.
    child_env = dict(os.environ)
    for field in ("region", "endpoint", "profile"):
        child_env.pop("VOLCENGINE_" + field.upper(), None)
    try:

Skill declares no tool scope ('permissions' or 'allowed-tools') but code capabilities were detected: env, file_read, file_write, network, shell.

Medium
Category
MCP Least Privilege
Confidence
70% confidence
Finding

Without declared permissions the skill's intent is opaque and cannot be validated.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

The draft-answer hook specifies Simplified Chinese output without user opt-in.

Medium
Category
Output Handling
Confidence
94% confidence
Finding

The draft_answer input sets constraints.language to zh-CN, explicitly constraining the final answer's language. The document provides no user language choice or justification for requiring this locale.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Final-answer generation forces Simplified Chinese without user opt-in.

Medium
Category
Output Handling
Confidence
99% confidence
Finding

The draft-answer hook hardcodes the language constraint to zh-CN regardless of the user's language or preferences. No language choice, opt-in, or region-specific justification is provided in this file.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Dynamic attribute access via getattr()

Low
Category
Dangerous Code Execution
Confidence
50% confidence
Finding

Dynamic getattr() with a non-literal attribute name can access arbitrary object attributes, potentially bypassing access controls.

Content

Scanner excerpt · scripts/call_openapi.py (reported line 57)May include surrounding context.

python
or not math.isfinite(self.timeout_seconds) or self.timeout_seconds <= 0):
            raise AdapterError("timeout_seconds must be a positive finite number")
        for field in ("region", "endpoint", "profile"):
            value = getattr(self, field)
            if value is not None and (not isinstance(value, str) or not value.strip() or value.startswith("-")
                                      or any(ch.isspace() for ch in value)):
                raise AdapterError(f"invalid {field}")

Dynamic attribute access via getattr()

Low
Category
Dangerous Code Execution
Confidence
50% confidence
Finding

Dynamic getattr() with a non-literal attribute name can access arbitrary object attributes, potentially bypassing access controls.

Content

Scanner excerpt · scripts/call_openapi.py (reported line 85)May include surrounding context.

python
runtime_file = getattr(args, "runtime_config_file", None)
    fields = ("environment", "region", "endpoint", "profile", "timeout_seconds")
    if runtime_file:
        if any(getattr(args, key, None) is not None for key in fields):
            raise AdapterError("runtime-config-file cannot be combined with runtime overrides; start a new task")
        try:
            data = json.loads(Path(runtime_file).read_text(encoding="utf-8"))

Dynamic attribute access via getattr()

Low
Category
Dangerous Code Execution
Confidence
50% confidence
Finding

Dynamic getattr() with a non-literal attribute name can access arbitrary object attributes, potentially bypassing access controls.

Content

Scanner excerpt · scripts/call_openapi.py (reported line 96)May include surrounding context.

python
raise AdapterError("invalid or missing runtime config file") from exc
    values = {}
    for key in fields:
        value = getattr(args, key, None)
        if value is None:
            value = os.environ.get("RCA_OPENAPI_" + key.upper())
        if value is None and key in {"region", "endpoint", "profile"}:

Dynamic attribute access via getattr()

Low
Category
Dangerous Code Execution
Confidence
50% confidence
Finding

Dynamic getattr() with a non-literal attribute name can access arbitrary object attributes, potentially bypassing access controls.

Content

Scanner excerpt · scripts/call_openapi.py (reported line 250)May include surrounding context.

python
"--method", "POST", "--header", "Content-Type=application/json", "--output", "json",
               "--body", json.dumps(payload, ensure_ascii=False, separators=(",", ":"))]
    for field in ("region", "endpoint", "profile"):
        if getattr(config, field):
            command.extend(["--" + field, getattr(config, field)])
    # Runtime routing/profile inputs were captured at init. Do not let later
    # environment changes override saved defaults; authentication stays in ve.

Dynamic attribute access via getattr()

Low
Category
Dangerous Code Execution
Confidence
50% confidence
Finding

Dynamic getattr() with a non-literal attribute name can access arbitrary object attributes, potentially bypassing access controls.

Content

Scanner excerpt · scripts/call_openapi.py (reported line 251)May include surrounding context.

python
"--body", json.dumps(payload, ensure_ascii=False, separators=(",", ":"))]
    for field in ("region", "endpoint", "profile"):
        if getattr(config, field):
            command.extend(["--" + field, getattr(config, field)])
    # Runtime routing/profile inputs were captured at init. Do not let later
    # environment changes override saved defaults; authentication stays in ve.
    child_env = dict(os.environ)