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Security audit

Context Compactor

Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk

Overview

This skill is a local transcript-compaction CLI with clear consent, privacy, and output warnings; the main caveat is an optional npx install path that adds an external package trust boundary.

Use the reviewed local Python command when possible. Only use the optional npx path if you are comfortable trusting the npm package and publisher, and always review generated memos before sharing because redaction is best-effort.

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Insecure DependenciesIntroduces malicious components through unsafe dependency sources
  • Skill Instruction HijackingAlters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
  • Agent Memory PoisoningWrites attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
  • Remote Payload Retrieval and ExecutionFetches external code whose behavior can change after review
  • Embedded Malicious CodeShips malicious scripts inside the skill and executes them locally
Findings (1)

T08 · Insecure Dependencies

Warning
Location
README.md:51
Finding
External npm Package Execution Introduces an Unreviewed Supply-Chain Boundary## Vulnerability Details **File Location**: `README.md`, lines 51–54 **Vulnerability Type**: Third-party package retrieval and execution **Risk Level**: Medium **Vulnerable Code Snippet**: ```bash # npm — pinned release, version-synced with this repo (any OS with Python 3.8+). # The package ships the exact reviewed source: compactor.py, the bin/ wrapper and # SKILL.md (see package.json "files"). npx asks for confirmation before downloading. npx @vibo-dev/context-compactor@1.1.7 --input session.md ``` ### Technical Analysis The installation instructions offer an `npx` command that downloads and executes the externally hosted package `@vibo-dev/context-compactor@1.1.7`. The audited artifact does not contain the npm package's claimed `package.json`, executable wrapper, or package distribution contents. Consequently, the assertion that the registry package contains the reviewed source cannot be independently verified from this project artifact. Pinning the version limits unintended upgrades but does not establish the integrity or provenance of the registry artifact. If the publisher account, npm registry entry, or release process is compromised, the package associated with that version could contain code not represented in the reviewed repository. Executing it through `npx` places that external code within the user's local security context. This finding concerns the documented optional npm execution path. The included `compactor.py` itself has no third-party dependencies and does not perform network access, subprocess execution, persistence, telemetry, or privilege escalation. ### Attack Path 1. An attacker compromises the npm publisher account, package publication process, or another component of the package supply chain. 2. A malicious or otherwise divergent package is made available under the documented package identity and version. 3. A user follows the README and runs: ```bash npx @vibo-dev/context-compactor@ ...[truncated 761 chars]
Remediation
## Remediation Suggestions 1. Make direct execution of the reviewed local `compactor.py` file the primary and preferred installation method. 2. Include the complete npm packaging source in the audited repository, including `package.json`, the executable wrapper, lockfiles, and the exact file inclusion configuration. 3. Add reproducible packaging checks that compare the published npm tarball against repository-generated artifacts. 4. Publish and document cryptographic integrity information or verifiable npm provenance for each release. 5. In CI, download the published tarball without executing it, inspect its file list, compare hashes against expected build outputs, and only then approve the release. 6. Advise security-sensitive users to inspect the package with `npm pack` before execution and to avoid running package tooling under elevated privileges. 7. Minimize package lifecycle behavior and explicitly verify that no unnecessary installation scripts are present.
Vulnerability Patterns
  • Prompt InjectionInstruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
  • Data ExfiltrationExternal Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
  • Privilege EscalationExcessive Permissions, Sudo/Root Execution, Credential Access
  • Supply ChainUnpinned Dependencies, External Script Fetching, Obfuscated Code
  • Excessive AgencyUnrestricted Tool Access, Autonomous Decision Making, Scope Creep

Static analysis

No suspicious patterns detected.