T08 · Insecure Dependencies
- Location
SKILL.md:42- Finding
Unverified Third-Party Components Handle Wallet Signing
- Content
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Vulnerability Details
File Location:
SKILL.md, lines 42–47
Vulnerability Type:T08: Insecure Dependencies
Risk Level: MediumComplete Snippet:
markdown 2. **Sign** the EIP-3009 transfer authorization using your wallet private key 3. **Second call** with `X-PAYMENT: <signed-payload>` header → server returns **HTTP 200** with data + `PAYMENT-RESPONSE` settlement receipt **Never fabricate or cache payment tokens.** Each payment nonce is single-use (HTTP 409 on replay). Use the `wallet-keeper` agent (or `x402-fetch` npm package) to handle steps 1-3 automatically.Technical Analysis
The Skill recommends delegating a financially sensitive EIP-3009 signing workflow to either a
wallet-keeperagent or thex402-fetchnpm package. It does not specify a verified publisher, authoritative source, exact package version, integrity hash, signature, or security-review procedure for either component.Because the workflow involves authorization using a wallet private key, resolving the named agent or package to a compromised, spoofed, typosquatted, or malicious implementation could expose signing authority. The repository contains no implementation or dependency manifest through which the actual component and its behavior can be audited.
Attack Path
- A user requests data from one of the paid API endpoints.
- The agent follows the Skill and delegates the x402 challenge-response workflow to
wallet-keeperorx402-fetch. - The dependency is obtained or resolved without a pinned version or verified integrity metadata.
- A compromised or spoofed component receives access to wallet-signing operations or raw wallet credentials.
- The component exfiltrates the private key, alters the transfer authorization, or requests signatures for an unintended recipient, token, chain, or amount.
- The attacker uses the stolen key or authorization to compromise wallet funds, subject to the wallet's ...[truncated 588 chars]
- Remediation
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Remediation Suggestions
- Identify the exact approved package or agent using an authoritative registry URL, verified publisher identity, and immutable version.
- Pin the dependency version and lock its full transitive dependency graph.
- Verify package integrity with cryptographic hashes or signed provenance before use.
- Review the component's source code and signing behavior before granting wallet access.
- Do not provide raw private keys to an agent or general-purpose npm package. Use an isolated wallet service, hardware-backed signer, or restricted signing interface.
- Have the signer independently validate the chain ID, token contract, recipient, amount, nonce, validity interval, and payment domain before signing.
- Enforce signer-side per-call and cumulative spending limits rather than relying only on textual guidance or agent behavior.
- Require explicit user confirmation before every paid request, especially before recurring or automated calls.
- Restrict the wallet balance and permissions to the minimum required for this API.
- Log authorization details and settlement receipts without recording private keys or reusable secrets.
