T09 · Insecure Skill Coding Practices
- Location
SKILL.md:27- Finding
Shell Command Injection Through Unsanitized Task Arguments
- Content
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" "" "<description>"' ``` ### Technical Analysis The Skill instructs the agent to interpolate the user-controlled `list`, `title`, and `description` values directly into a command string executed through `bash -lc`. Double quotes around the interpolated values do not make this construction safe. A value containing a double quote can terminate its intended argument and introduce shell control operators, command substitutions, redirections, or additional commands. The inner Bash process will parse those injected characters as shell syntax. The instruction to parse the arguments “exactly” provides no allowlist validation, escaping, or structured argument passing. Although the documentation says that `list` must be `visionplay` or `inbox`, the execution instructions do not enforce this constraint. The title and description are necessarily user-controlled free-form values. For example, a crafted title with the conceptual structure: ```text "; <attacker-command>; # ``` could produce an effective inner shell command resembling: ```sh /usr/local/bin/clickup_create_task.sh "visionplay" ""; <attacker-command>; # " "description" ``` The injected command would then be interpreted by Bash rather than passed as task-title data. The `skill.json` file also references the external script, but its implementation is not included in the audited project. Consequently, any additional validation performed by that script cannot be confirmed. Validation inside the script would not reliably mitigate commands already interpreted by `bash -lc`. ### Attack Path 1. An attacker invokes the user-accessible `/clickup-task` command ...[truncated 1322 chars]- Remediation
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