T08 · Insecure Dependencies
- Location
SKILL.md:51- Finding
Automatic Installation and Execution of an Unpinned External Skill
- Content
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- Remediation
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Security audit
Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk
This Vipshop promotion skill has a legitimate shopping-purpose workflow, but it automatically reads account tokens, sends an authenticated request, and can install or execute another login skill without a clear user approval boundary.
Review this skill before installing. It should only be used if you are comfortable with an agent reading Vipshop login tokens from your home directory, sending an authenticated request to Vipshop, and potentially installing or running a separate login skill. Prefer a version that requires explicit approval before login, pins the login dependency, and scopes file and network access clearly.
SKILL.md:51Automatic Installation and Execution of an Unpinned External Skill
The skill instructs the AI to install another skill and execute subprocess commands automatically without a clear upfront warning or consent for system modifications. That is dangerous because it can alter the environment and run additional code under the guise of a simple user query, violating user expectations and increasing attack surface.
The skill directs execution of a Python script from a sibling skill directory, which is cross-skill code execution outside the declared promotion-search function. This bypasses clear trust boundaries and can execute code that was not reviewed as part of this skill, potentially accessing credentials or performing unintended actions.
The skill performs sensitive capabilities—reading login state from the user's home directory and calling an external API—but does not declare an explicit tool or permission scope. That weakens least-privilege boundaries and makes it harder for a host system or reviewer to understand and constrain what the skill is allowed to access.
The trigger scope is overly broad and claims overlap with generic shopping or promotion queries across multiple platforms, increasing the chance of unintended invocation. In this skill's context, accidental activation is more dangerous because activation can lead to token-file access, external requests, and even installation/execution of another skill.
The overview repeats ambiguous activation conditions without defining when the skill must not run. Because this skill includes privileged behaviors like reading login artifacts and initiating login flows, ambiguous routing materially increases the risk of unnecessary sensitive actions.
The skill reads a login token file from the user's home directory without a clear privacy disclosure or consent step. Accessing authentication material is sensitive even if only checking existence/validity, and in this context it may happen automatically on broad triggers.
The skill instructs the agent to automatically install another skill via clawhub as part of normal execution. Auto-installing code changes the system state and extends trust to unreviewed external content, creating a supply-chain and arbitrary capability expansion risk beyond a simple promotion lookup.
The skill does not clearly warn users that it sends requests to an external Vipshop API and may use authenticated session data. In a login-dependent workflow, omission of this disclosure can lead to users unknowingly authorizing external transmission tied to their account context.
Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.
- 未登录时提示用户先登录
### 促销活动接口
**URL:** `https://api.union.vip.com/vsp/common/getActListForAI`
**方式:** POST
**请求体:** 空对象 `{}`
**返回:** code, msg, data.actList[]
The skill reads persisted login material from the user's home directory and uses it to perform network requests, but the manifest only describes promotion lookup behavior and does not disclose access to local authentication state. This creates an authorization-boundary and privacy issue because a seemingly simple query skill can silently leverage account credentials without explicit user awareness or scoped consent.
The code loads stored cookies, extracts PASSPORT_ACCESS_TOKEN, and transmits it to a remote service with no user-facing confirmation or runtime warning. Even if sent to a legitimate vendor endpoint, silently exfiltrating authentication tokens from local storage can expose account-linked data and normalize unsafe credential-handling patterns if the endpoint, environment, or logs are compromised.
The skill transmits data to an external service, including a login-derived access token, which is security-relevant because the network call crosses the local trust boundary. External transmission is expected for a promotion-query skill, but the danger is elevated here because authentication material from local storage is included rather than using an isolated application credential or anonymous request.
cookies['PASSPORT_ACCESS_TOKEN'] = login_cookies['PASSPORT_ACCESS_TOKEN']
# API 接口
url = "https://api.union.vip.com/vsp/common/getActListForAI"
# 调用接口
response = make_request(url, cookies=cookies, post_data={})
Most of the file repeatedly mandates automatic login initiation without waiting for user action, but the '登录态要求' section states '未登录时提示用户先登录'. These instructions describe different intended behaviors, creating an internal intent mismatch in the skill documentation.
The Accept-Language header is fixed to 'zh-CN,zh;q=0.9,en;q=0.8', which imposes a locale preference in network interactions. Under the policy, forcing a specific language/locale without user opt-in is a natural-language policy concern unless the restriction is explicitly justified as region-specific.
No suspicious patterns detected.