T09 · Insecure Skill Coding Practices
- Location
code-analysis-module.py:12- Finding
Predictable temporary path permits destructive recursive deletion
- Content
View full analysis
- Remediation
View remediation
Security audit
Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk
The skill mostly matches a technical analysis and diagramming purpose, but it includes unsafe local cleanup, broad credential loading, and under-scoped persistent outputs that should be reviewed before use.
Install only after reviewing the scripts and limiting permissions. Prefer passing TAVILY_API_KEY through a scoped environment variable, use an explicit output directory, avoid untrusted repository URLs until the /tmp deletion logic is fixed, and treat generated PlantUML/draw.io files from untrusted repos as untrusted content.
code-analysis-module.py:12Predictable temporary path permits destructive recursive deletion
tavily-config.sh:7Global environment file is executed as shell code to obtain one API key
architecture-diagram-generator.py:27Repository-controlled names are embedded into diagram languages without escaping
The skill references configuration management for external API credentials and sourcing a global environment file from the user's home directory, which is materially more sensitive than ordinary analysis behavior. Accessing home-directory environment files can expose secrets and couples the skill to privileged local context without clear user disclosure or isolation.
The skill references configuration management for external API credentials and sourcing a global environment file from the user's home directory, which is materially more sensitive than ordinary analysis behavior. Accessing home-directory environment files can expose secrets and couples the skill to privileged local context without clear user disclosure or isolation.
The skill references configuration management for external API credentials and sourcing a global environment file from the user's home directory, which is materially more sensitive than ordinary analysis behavior. Accessing home-directory environment files can expose secrets and couples the skill to privileged local context without clear user disclosure or isolation.
The skill references configuration management for external API credentials and sourcing a global environment file from the user's home directory, which is materially more sensitive than ordinary analysis behavior. Accessing home-directory environment files can expose secrets and couples the skill to privileged local context without clear user disclosure or isolation.
The skill references configuration management for external API credentials and sourcing a global environment file from the user's home directory, which is materially more sensitive than ordinary analysis behavior. Accessing home-directory environment files can expose secrets and couples the skill to privileged local context without clear user disclosure or isolation.
The skill references configuration management for external API credentials and sourcing a global environment file from the user's home directory, which is materially more sensitive than ordinary analysis behavior. Accessing home-directory environment files can expose secrets and couples the skill to privileged local context without clear user disclosure or isolation.
The skill references configuration management for external API credentials and sourcing a global environment file from the user's home directory, which is materially more sensitive than ordinary analysis behavior. Accessing home-directory environment files can expose secrets and couples the skill to privileged local context without clear user disclosure or isolation.
The skill references configuration management for external API credentials and sourcing a global environment file from the user's home directory, which is materially more sensitive than ordinary analysis behavior. Accessing home-directory environment files can expose secrets and couples the skill to privileged local context without clear user disclosure or isolation.
The skill references configuration management for external API credentials and sourcing a global environment file from the user's home directory, which is materially more sensitive than ordinary analysis behavior. Accessing home-directory environment files can expose secrets and couples the skill to privileged local context without clear user disclosure or isolation.
The skill references configuration management for external API credentials and sourcing a global environment file from the user's home directory, which is materially more sensitive than ordinary analysis behavior. Accessing home-directory environment files can expose secrets and couples the skill to privileged local context without clear user disclosure or isolation.
The skill references configuration management for external API credentials and sourcing a global environment file from the user's home directory, which is materially more sensitive than ordinary analysis behavior. Accessing home-directory environment files can expose secrets and couples the skill to privileged local context without clear user disclosure or isolation.
The skill references configuration management for external API credentials and sourcing a global environment file from the user's home directory, which is materially more sensitive than ordinary analysis behavior. Accessing home-directory environment files can expose secrets and couples the skill to privileged local context without clear user disclosure or isolation.
The skill references configuration management for external API credentials and sourcing a global environment file from the user's home directory, which is materially more sensitive than ordinary analysis behavior. Accessing home-directory environment files can expose secrets and couples the skill to privileged local context without clear user disclosure or isolation.
The manifest describes a skill for deep technical teardown, mechanism analysis, moat identification, risk assessment, evolution prediction, and report generation. This file instead only checks for a fixed set of draw.io filenames and writes placeholder PNG images with canned architecture text, which is a different operational purpose from performing technical insight analysis.
Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.
#!/bin/bash
# Unified Tavily configuration for technical-insight skill
# Uses the global ~/.openclaw/.env configuration
set -e
Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.
#!/bin/bash
# Unified Tavily configuration for technical-insight skill
# Uses the global ~/.openclaw/.env configuration
set -e
Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.
set -e
# Check if global .env file exists
if [ ! -f "$HOME/.openclaw/.env" ]; then
echo "Error: Global Tavily configuration not found at ~/.openclaw/.env"
echo "Please configure your Tavily API key using:"
echo "echo 'TAVILY_API_KEY=your_api_key_here' > ~/.openclaw/.env"
Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.
set -e
# Check if global .env file exists
if [ ! -f "$HOME/.openclaw/.env" ]; then
echo "Error: Global Tavily configuration not found at ~/.openclaw/.env"
echo "Please configure your Tavily API key using:"
echo "echo 'TAVILY_API_KEY=your_api_key_here' > ~/.openclaw/.env"
Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.
set -e
# Check if global .env file exists
if [ ! -f "$HOME/.openclaw/.env" ]; then
echo "Error: Global Tavily configuration not found at ~/.openclaw/.env"
echo "Please configure your Tavily API key using:"
echo "echo 'TAVILY_API_KEY=your_api_key_here' > ~/.openclaw/.env"
Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.
set -e
# Check if global .env file exists
if [ ! -f "$HOME/.openclaw/.env" ]; then
echo "Error: Global Tavily configuration not found at ~/.openclaw/.env"
echo "Please configure your Tavily API key using:"
echo "echo 'TAVILY_API_KEY=your_api_key_here' > ~/.openclaw/.env"
Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.
set -e
# Check if global .env file exists
if [ ! -f "$HOME/.openclaw/.env" ]; then
echo "Error: Global Tavily configuration not found at ~/.openclaw/.env"
echo "Please configure your Tavily API key using:"
echo "echo 'TAVILY_API_KEY=your_api_key_here' > ~/.openclaw/.env"
The script uses 'source' on ~/.openclaw/.env, which not only reads credentials but executes any shell code present in that file. That creates both credential exposure risk and code-execution risk if the file is modified, misplaced, or contains unexpected content; in this skill context, accessing global user secrets is more dangerous because the manifest does not justify broad credential access.
fi
# Source the global configuration
source "$HOME/.openclaw/.env"
# Verify TAVILY_API_KEY is set
if [ -z "$TAVILY_API_KEY" ]; then
The document instructs users to run npx clawdhub publish without pinning an exact package version. npx may fetch the latest package from the registry at execution time, which creates a supply-chain risk: a malicious, compromised, or breaking upstream release could execute arbitrary code on the user's machine during publish. Because this is a release/preparation document, readers are reasonably likely to copy-paste the command, making the issue more operationally dangerous.
The plan explicitly defines writing multiple artifacts under ~/.openclaw/workspace/tech-insight/deep-dive/{技术名称}/ in the user's home directory, but does not mention user consent, visibility, overwrite behavior, or data retention. Silent filesystem writes are risky because they can persist sensitive analysis results, consume disk space, and surprise users with local side effects beyond the immediate chat interaction.
The skill plans to use Tavily API, GitHub, community sites, and source analysis without warning that user-supplied technology targets or related content may be sent to third-party services. This can leak sensitive project names, internal repositories, or proprietary analysis targets, especially if the skill is later used on non-public technologies or codebases.