VIGIL Security Scanner

• Outcome: Review
• Latest audit: Jun 8, 2026 · 5:46 PM UTC
• Version: 1.0.3

Overview

This appears to be a real crypto security scanner, but it bundles wallet-changing and reputation-reporting actions despite repeatedly framing the skill as read-only.

Install only if you are comfortable sending wallet and token addresses to the VIGIL hosted service. Do not run the revoke, batch-revoke, or report-scam scripts unless you intentionally want to sign an onchain transaction or submit an external report. Keep Bankr read-write authentication disabled unless you specifically need revocation.

SkillSpector

By NVIDIA

Vulnerability Patterns

• Data Exfiltration: External Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
• MCP Least Privilege: Underdeclared Capability, Wildcard Permission, Missing Permission Declaration
• MCP Tool Poisoning: Hidden Instructions, Unicode Deception, Parameter Description Injection
• Prompt Injection: Instruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
• Privilege Escalation: Excessive Permissions, Sudo/Root Execution, Credential Access

Findings (15)

Lp3

Medium

• Category: MCP Least Privilege
• Confidence: 96% confidence
• Finding: The skill executes shell commands (`bash`, `curl`, `jq`, `grep`, `tr`) but does not declare shell permissions. That creates a capability-transparency problem: reviewers or runtime policy may treat it as less privileged than it really is, increasing the chance that networked shell execution is approved without proper scrutiny.

Description-Behavior Mismatch

Medium

• Confidence: 91% confidence
• Finding: The reference documents a `POST /report/submit` capability to send scam reports, which exceeds the stated manifest scope of scanning and revocation. Scope drift in security tooling is dangerous because an agent may invoke undocumented or under-reviewed write actions, causing unexpected external submissions and user-data transmission.

Description-Behavior Mismatch

High

• Confidence: 95% confidence
• Finding: This script performs a state-changing report submission even though the skill is described as a keyless read-only scanner. That mismatch is dangerous because users or downstream agents may invoke the skill under the assumption that it only analyzes data, when it can actually submit external reports and alter community reputation data.

Intent-Code Divergence

Medium

• Confidence: 91% confidence
• Finding: The header comments explicitly advertise scam-report submission behavior, which contradicts the stated read-only scanner purpose of the skill. In an agent setting, this kind of capability mismatch increases the chance of unsafe tool use, accidental reputation-impacting actions, and social engineering through misleading packaging.

Missing User Warnings

Medium

• Confidence: 93% confidence
• Finding: The documentation includes revocation build/submit endpoints that result in blockchain transactions but does not place an explicit warning near them about signing, gas costs, irreversible onchain effects, and the need for user confirmation. In an agent context, weak warning language increases the risk that a tool is wired into flows that initiate destructive wallet actions without sufficiently informed consent.

External Transmission

Medium

• Category: Data Exfiltration

Content

### 2. Scan approvals (wallet)

```bash
RESULT=$(curl -m 30 -s "https://mcp.vigil.codes/tools/call" \
  -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
  -d '{
    "jsonrpc": "2.0",

• Confidence: 94% confidence
• Finding: curl -m 30 -s "https://mcp.vigil.codes/tools/call" \ -H "Content-Type: application/json" \ -d

External Transmission

Medium

• Category: Data Exfiltration

Content

### 3. Scan token safety

```bash
RESULT=$(curl -m 30 -s "https://mcp.vigil.codes/tools/call" \
  -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
  -d '{
    "jsonrpc": "2.0",

• Confidence: 94% confidence
• Finding: curl -m 30 -s "https://mcp.vigil.codes/tools/call" \ -H "Content-Type: application/json" \ -d

External Transmission

Medium

• Category: Data Exfiltration

Content

### 4. Check honeypot

```bash
RESULT=$(curl -m 30 -s "https://mcp.vigil.codes/tools/call" \
  -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
  -d '{
    "jsonrpc": "2.0",

• Confidence: 94% confidence
• Finding: curl -m 30 -s "https://mcp.vigil.codes/tools/call" \ -H "Content-Type: application/json" \ -d

External Transmission

Medium

• Category: Data Exfiltration

Content

### 5. Get safety score

```bash
RESULT=$(curl -m 30 -s "https://mcp.vigil.codes/tools/call" \
  -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
  -d '{
    "jsonrpc": "2.0",

• Confidence: 94% confidence
• Finding: curl -m 30 -s "https://mcp.vigil.codes/tools/call" \ -H "Content-Type: application/json" \ -d

External Transmission

Medium

• Category: Data Exfiltration

Content

### 6. Generate wallet report

```bash
RESULT=$(curl -m 30 -s "https://mcp.vigil.codes/tools/call" \
  -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
  -d '{
    "jsonrpc": "2.0",

• Confidence: 95% confidence
• Finding: curl -m 30 -s "https://mcp.vigil.codes/tools/call" \ -H "Content-Type: application/json" \ -d

External Transmission

Medium

• Category: Data Exfiltration

Content

### 7. Monitor wallet (real-time alerts)

```bash
RESULT=$(curl -m 30 -s "https://mcp.vigil.codes/tools/call" \
  -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
  -d '{
    "jsonrpc": "2.0",

• Confidence: 95% confidence
• Finding: curl -m 30 -s "https://mcp.vigil.codes/tools/call" \ -H "Content-Type: application/json" \ -d

External Transmission

Medium

• Category: Data Exfiltration

Content

### 8. Token market context (price + liquidity)

```bash
RESULT=$(curl -m 30 -s "https://mcp.vigil.codes/tools/call" \
  -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
  -d '{
    "jsonrpc": "2.0",

• Confidence: 93% confidence
• Finding: curl -m 30 -s "https://mcp.vigil.codes/tools/call" \ -H "Content-Type: application/json" \ -d

External Transmission

Medium

• Category: Data Exfiltration

Content

### 9. Deployer reputation (verification + age)

```bash
RESULT=$(curl -m 30 -s "https://mcp.vigil.codes/tools/call" \
  -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
  -d '{
    "jsonrpc": "2.0",

• Confidence: 93% confidence
• Finding: curl -m 30 -s "https://mcp.vigil.codes/tools/call" \ -H "Content-Type: application/json" \ -d

External Transmission

Medium

• Category: Data Exfiltration

Content

### 10. Batch scan multiple tokens

```bash
RESULT=$(curl -m 30 -s "https://mcp.vigil.codes/tools/call" \
  -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
  -d '{
    "jsonrpc": "2.0",

• Confidence: 94% confidence
• Finding: curl -m 30 -s "https://mcp.vigil.codes/tools/call" \ -H "Content-Type: application/json" \ -d

External Transmission

Medium

• Category: Data Exfiltration

Content

### 11. Multi-source consensus verdict

```bash
RESULT=$(curl -m 30 -s "https://mcp.vigil.codes/tools/call" \
  -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
  -d '{
    "jsonrpc": "2.0",

• Confidence: 93% confidence
• Finding: curl -m 30 -s "https://mcp.vigil.codes/tools/call" \ -H "Content-Type: application/json" \ -d

VirusTotal

64/64 vendors flagged this skill as clean.

Static analysis

Detected: suspicious.generated_source_template_injection

User-controlled placeholder is embedded directly into generated source code.

Critical

• Code: suspicious.generated_source_template_injection
• Location: SKILL.md:47