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Security audit

Multi-Agent Manager

Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk

Overview

This skill is an agent-monitoring and coordination helper whose command use is disclosed and aligned with its purpose.

Before installing, understand that this skill can display local OpenClaw agent, workspace, status, and session information, and its communication script can send a message to an agent you name. Use it only with agents and workspaces you control, and treat --watch as a foreground monitoring loop you should stop when no longer needed.

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Skill Instruction HijackingAlters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
  • Agent Memory PoisoningWrites attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
  • Remote Payload Retrieval and ExecutionFetches external code whose behavior can change after review
  • Embedded Malicious CodeShips malicious scripts inside the skill and executes them locally
  • Unauthorized Access and Privilege EscalationObtains permissions beyond the task's legitimate needs
Vulnerability Patterns
  • Trigger AbuseOverly Broad Trigger, Shadow Command Trigger, Keyword Baiting Trigger
  • Behavioral ASTexec() Call, eval() Call, Dynamic Import
  • Prompt InjectionInstruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
  • Data ExfiltrationExternal Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
  • Privilege EscalationExcessive Permissions, Sudo/Root Execution, Credential Access
Findings (13)

Vague Triggers

Medium
Confidence
91% confidence
Finding
The README describes the skill in very broad terms such as 'managing multiple OpenClaw agents' and 'Running multiple AI agents? You need visibility and control' without defining specific activation phrases, contexts, or exclusions. In a markdown skill description, this can create ambiguous trigger scope and increase the chance of unintended invocation for generic multi-agent discussions.

Natural-Language Policy Violations

Medium
Confidence
94% confidence
Finding
This checklist is entirely written in Chinese, including the primary heading and operational instructions, with no indication that the skill is region-specific or that users may choose another language. That creates a natural-language locale policy issue because it imposes a specific language on users without opt-in or justification.

Natural-Language Policy Violations

Medium
Confidence
87% confidence
Finding
The title and all user-facing documentation in this file are written in Chinese, and there is no indication that users may choose another language or that the skill is intended only for a Chinese-language audience. This creates a natural-language policy concern because it implicitly fixes the skill's documentation locale without opt-in or justification.

subprocess module call

Medium
Category
Dangerous Code Execution
Content
"""发送消息给指定智能体"""
    try:
        # 使用 sessions_send 发送消息
        result = subprocess.run(
            ['openclaw', 'sessions', 'send', 
             '--agent', to_agent,
             '--message', message],
Confidence
70% confidence
Finding
subprocess module calls execute external commands. Without careful input validation, this enables command injection.

Natural-Language Policy Violations

Medium
Confidence
91% confidence
Finding
This Python file includes user-facing natural-language text and docstrings in Chinese, such as the module description and function descriptions, with no indication that language selection is optional. Under the policy, forcing a specific language without user opt-in is a locale policy violation unless it is clearly justified as region-specific.

subprocess module call

Medium
Category
Dangerous Code Execution
Content
def get_agent_status():
    """获取智能体状态"""
    try:
        result = subprocess.run(
            ['openclaw', 'status', '--json'],
            capture_output=True,
            text=True,
Confidence
70% confidence
Finding
subprocess module calls execute external commands. Without careful input validation, this enables command injection.

Natural-Language Policy Violations

Medium
Confidence
89% confidence
Finding
The file-level natural-language description includes a Chinese-only subtitle, and the function docstrings are also written only in Chinese. This imposes a specific language in user-facing/documentation text without offering an opt-in or documenting a justified locale restriction.

subprocess module call

Medium
Category
Dangerous Code Execution
Content
def get_session_history(session_key):
    """获取会话历史"""
    try:
        result = subprocess.run(
            ['openclaw', 'sessions', 'history', session_key, '--json'],
            capture_output=True,
            text=True,
Confidence
70% confidence
Finding
subprocess module calls execute external commands. Without careful input validation, this enables command injection.

subprocess module call

Medium
Category
Dangerous Code Execution
Content
def get_agents():
    """获取所有智能体列表"""
    try:
        result = subprocess.run(
            ['openclaw', 'agents', 'list', '--json'],
            capture_output=True,
            text=True,
Confidence
70% confidence
Finding
subprocess module calls execute external commands. Without careful input validation, this enables command injection.

subprocess module call

Medium
Category
Dangerous Code Execution
Content
def get_agent_sessions(agent_id):
    """获取智能体的会话"""
    try:
        result = subprocess.run(
            ['openclaw', 'sessions', 'list', '--json'],
            capture_output=True,
            text=True,
Confidence
70% confidence
Finding
subprocess module calls execute external commands. Without careful input validation, this enables command injection.

subprocess module call

Medium
Category
Dangerous Code Execution
Content
def get_agent_sessions(agent_id):
    """获取智能体的会话"""
    try:
        result = subprocess.run(
            ['openclaw', 'sessions', 'list', '--json'],
            capture_output=True,
            text=True,
Confidence
70% confidence
Finding
subprocess module calls execute external commands. Without careful input validation, this enables command injection.

Natural-Language Policy Violations

Low
Confidence
91% confidence
Finding
The document is written entirely in Chinese, including headings and operational guidance, with no indication that the user can choose another language or that the skill is intended only for a Chinese-speaking context. This can violate a language/locale policy when a skill or its operational instructions implicitly require one language without user opt-in.

Natural-Language Policy Violations

Low
Confidence
84% confidence
Finding
The file includes natural-language descriptions in Chinese alongside the English title, but there is no indication that language choice is configurable or user-selected. Under the stated policy, forcing or assuming a specific language without opt-in can be a locale/language policy issue.

Static analysis

No suspicious patterns detected.