T09 · Insecure Skill Coding Practices
- Location
scripts/veillabs-client.sh:5- Finding
Unrestricted API Base URL Can Expose Privacy-Sensitive Financial Metadata
- Content
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- Remediation
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Security audit
Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk
This is a coherent Veillabs crypto API skill, but it can create swap and distribution orders and send wallet and transaction details to a configurable endpoint without explicit confirmation safeguards.
Review this skill carefully before installing. Use only the official HTTPS Veillabs API endpoint unless you are intentionally developing locally, verify all wallet addresses and amounts yourself, and require an explicit confirmation before any POST that creates a swap or distribution. Do not provide private keys, seed phrases, or wallet credentials to this skill.
scripts/veillabs-client.sh:5Unrestricted API Base URL Can Expose Privacy-Sensitive Financial Metadata
The skill is marked user-invocable and performs external API-driven financial operations, but it does not declare any explicit tool scope or allowed-tools boundary despite static analysis detecting shell-capable code paths. Missing tool restrictions can let an agent invoke broader execution capabilities than users expect, increasing the blast radius if prompts, future edits, or integrations cause shell use during a funds-moving workflow.
This skill facilitates swaps and seed distributions that can move user funds and send wallet addresses and transaction metadata to an external API, yet it provides no prominent user warning or consent step. In a privacy-focused cryptocurrency context, omission of a warning is especially dangerous because users may not realize they are authorizing irreversible asset transfers and external data disclosure.
The skill documentation instructs an agent to create cryptocurrency swaps and multi-destination fund distributions but does not require an explicit user confirmation or warning that blockchain transfers are irreversible and that a wrong destination address can permanently lose funds. In an agent setting, this omission is risky because users may treat the workflow as routine API automation and overlook the high-stakes nature of sending assets to generated deposit addresses or specified recipient wallets.
Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.
exit 1
fi
# Prevent curl from reading local files via -d @filename
if [[ "$BODY" == @* ]]; then
echo "Error: Data body cannot start with '@' for security reasons."
exit 1
No suspicious patterns detected.