T08 · Insecure Dependencies
- Location
requirements.txt:1- Finding
Unpinned Third-Party Python Dependencies
- Content
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Vulnerability Details
File Location:
requirements.txt:1-4
Vulnerability Type: Supply-chain exposure through unpinned dependencies
Risk Level: MediumVulnerable Code
text requests pandas beautifulsoup4 pyyamlThe installation instructions at
README.md:27andREADME.md:34invoke these requirements directly:bash cd ~/.claude/skills/soccer-lottery && pip install -r requirements.txtbash cd ~/.openclaw/skills/soccer-lottery && pip install -r requirements.txtTechnical Analysis
The dependency declarations specify neither exact versions nor package integrity hashes. Consequently, each installation may resolve to a different set of package versions than those reviewed during this audit. Package installation and subsequent import can execute code with the privileges of the user running the Skill.
No evidence indicates that the currently named packages are malicious or are typosquatted. The vulnerability is the absence of reproducible, integrity-verified dependency resolution, which unnecessarily expands trust to all future releases selected by the package index and resolver.
The Skill does not require this degree of supply-chain flexibility for its declared football-data analysis functionality. Exact, reviewed dependency versions are sufficient.
Attack Path
- An attacker compromises a dependency maintainer account, the package distribution channel, or a future dependency release.
- The attacker publishes a malicious version under one of the dependency names in
requirements.txt. - A user follows the documented installation command.
- Because no version or hash is constrained,
pipresolves and downloads the malicious release. - Malicious package code executes during installation or when the Skill imports the package.
- The payload runs with the installing or invoking user's privileges.
Impact Assessment
Successful exploitation could execute arbitrary code under the affected us ...[truncated 748 chars]
- Remediation
View remediation
Remediation Suggestions
- Pin every direct dependency to an exact, reviewed version, for example using
package==x.y.z. - Generate a lock file that includes all transitive dependencies so installations are reproducible.
- Record cryptographic hashes and install with
pip --require-hashes. - Build the lock file from a trusted package index in a controlled environment.
- Run dependency vulnerability and provenance checks in continuous integration.
- Review and update pinned versions through a controlled process rather than resolving unrestricted latest releases during user installation.
- Remove unused dependencies where possible; minimizing the dependency graph reduces the supply-chain attack surface.
- Pin every direct dependency to an exact, reviewed version, for example using
