T08 · Insecure Dependencies
- Location
SKILL.md:14- Finding
Unpinned Third-Party Package Execution via npx
- Content
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- Remediation
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Security audit
Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk
This skill does what it claims: it sends provided LinkedIn prospect identifiers to Veezee for enrichment, with privacy and setup cautions but no hidden or destructive behavior.
Install only if you are comfortable sending LinkedIn prospect or candidate identifiers to Veezee. Use the LinkedIn-scoped MCP endpoint where possible, avoid the broader all-tools endpoint unless needed, and pin or verify the SDK package before running the `npx` setup command.
SKILL.md:14Unpinned Third-Party Package Execution via npx
The trigger language is broad enough to match common requests about enriching leads, prospects, or candidates, which can cause the skill to activate in situations where the user did not explicitly intend third-party enrichment. In context, this increases the chance of silently sending personal identifiers to an external service without sufficiently specific user consent.
The skill does not clearly warn that prospect identifiers, names, URLs, and related data will be transmitted to Veezee, a third-party service, for processing. Because this skill handles professional-profile and candidate/prospect data, the missing disclosure materially increases privacy, consent, and data-handling risk.
The skill is designed to send prospect identifiers to external Veezee endpoints, which is an actual external data transmission behavior. While this may be core functionality rather than malicious exfiltration, it is still security-relevant because personal and professional identifiers are disclosed to a third party and the skill currently lacks strong user-facing consent and minimization safeguards.
Every call needs an API key. Minting one is free and human-free: no signup, no card. A call without a key fails with `KEY_REQUIRED` (401) carrying `mint_url`; the fix is the free mint below, never a payment. A fresh `vz_trial_` key runs under a free per-IP daily budget of 200 credits, cached data only, first page only on any cursor sequence. Two equivalent surfaces; pick whichever your environment has:
- MCP: add the server `https://mcp.veezee.io/linkedin` (streamable-http; `https://mcp.veezee.io/all` exposes every tool). Hosts that support MCP authorization (Claude Code, claude.ai) open a Veezee sign-in on connect (email code, no password): that is the whole auth step. Other hosts: mint a key with `POST https://api.veezee.io/v1/keys/mint` (empty body; the key is shown once) and put it in the connection's `Authorization: Bearer` header.
- SDK: `import { VeezeeClient } from "@veezee/sdk"`; `const client = new VeezeeClient(); await client.mint();` mints and stores the free key the first time and reuses it on later runs. Platform methods live on the namespace (`client.linkedin.getProfile/searchPeople/getCompany/getPosts`); `client.resolveUrl` and `client.getUsage` are top-level. The client sends retries and Idempotency-Keys for you. The `veezee` CLI (`npx @veezee/sdk init`) mints and stores the same key.
When the free budget or a trial cap runs out (`TRIAL_CAP_EXCEEDED`, `INSUFFICIENT_CREDITS`, `BUDGET_EXHAUSTED`), the error carries `upgrade_url` (https://veezee.io/upgrade) and a machine-readable `offer`. Hand that link to your human; purchases credit the same key directly and it keeps working unchanged.
The skill instructs users to run an unpinned package via npx @veezee/sdk init, which creates a supply-chain risk because the latest published package version will be fetched and executed at runtime. If the package or its dependency chain is compromised, arbitrary code could run in the user's environment during initialization.