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Security audit

Istore Build Passwall

Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk

Overview

The skill is purpose-related but asks for broad GitHub credentials and performs destructive repository changes plus privileged router installer distribution with weak safeguards.

Review carefully before installing. Use only a disposable fork or fresh branch, avoid pasting broad classic PATs into chat, prefer a fine-grained short-lived token, remove any token from Git config afterward, and verify all downloaded packages and workflow actions before running the generated installer on a router.

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Remote Payload Retrieval and ExecutionFetches external code whose behavior can change after review
  • Unauthorized Access and Privilege EscalationObtains permissions beyond the task's legitimate needs
  • Insecure DependenciesIntroduces malicious components through unsafe dependency sources
  • Insecure Skill Coding PracticesFinds exploitable flaws such as hardcoded secrets or command injection
  • Skill Instruction HijackingAlters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
Findings (5)

T09 · Insecure Skill Coding Practices

Error
Location
references/build-passwall.yml:283
Finding

Shell Injection Through Unvalidated Workflow Inputs

Content
View full analysis

Vulnerability Details

File Location: references/build-passwall.yml:283-284
Vulnerability Type: Workflow input command injection
Risk Level: High

yaml
        SDK_VERSION="${{ inputs.sdk_version }}"
        OPENSSL_TAG="${{ inputs.openssl_tag }}"

Technical Analysis

The free-form sdk_version and openssl_tag inputs are interpolated directly into a generated shell script before the runner executes it. GitHub expression substitution occurs before shell parsing, so shell metacharacters, quotation marks, command substitutions, or newlines in an input can terminate the assignment and introduce additional commands.

Quoting the GitHub expression inside the assignment does not make it safe because attacker-controlled quotation marks are inserted into the script itself. Both affected inputs are required but have no choice restriction or allowlist validation.

Attack Path

  1. An attacker or compromised account with permission to dispatch the workflow provides a crafted value for sdk_version or openssl_tag.
  2. GitHub substitutes that value directly into the run script.
  3. The crafted value escapes the shell assignment and introduces an arbitrary command.
  4. The GitHub-hosted runner executes the injected command in the build job.
  5. The injected code can access the job environment and exercise the workflow's repository write permissions.

Impact Assessment

Successful exploitation permits arbitrary command execution on the GitHub Actions runner. The job declares contents: write and exposes GITHUB_TOKEN in its environment, so injected commands may alter repository contents or releases, replace generated artifacts, access data available to the job, and publish malicious installers. The scope is constrained by the permissions assigned to the workflow token and the attacker's ability to dispatch the workflow.

Remediation
View remediation

Remediation Suggestions

  • Do not embed untrusted GitHub expressions directly in shell source.
  • Pass values through the step's env mapping and reference them as quoted runtime variables.
  • Validate sdk_version and openssl_tag against strict allowlists before use. For example, reject values outside a conservative pattern such as alphanumeric characters, periods, underscores, and hyphens.
  • Prefer choice inputs when the acceptable values are known in advance.
  • Keep workflow permissions read-only by default and grant contents: write only to the release step or a separate job after successful validation.
  • Add automated tests using quotation marks, command substitutions, newlines, and shell metacharacters to verify that malicious input is rejected.

T03 · Remote Payload Retrieval and Execution

Error
Location
references/build-passwall.yml:88
Finding

Unverified Remote Executables Are Repackaged for Root Installation

Content
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Vulnerability Details

File Location: references/build-passwall.yml:88-121, 150-157, 365
Vulnerability Type: Unverified remote payload retrieval and execution
Risk Level: Critical

yaml
        URL1="https://github.com/Openwrt-Passwall/openwrt-passwall2/releases/download/$PW2_LATEST/passwall_packages_ipk_${ARCH_MAP}.zip"
        URL2="https://github.com/Openwrt-Passwall/openwrt-passwall2/releases/download/$PW2_LATEST/passwall_packages_ipk.zip"
        echo "尝试下载依赖包: $URL1"
        curl -fL "$URL1" -o passwall-ipk/passwall_packages.zip || curl -fL "$URL2" -o passwall-ipk/passwall_packages.zip

        SF_BASE="https://sourceforge.net/projects/openwrt-passwall-build/files/releases/packages-22.03"
        SF_ARCH_DIR="${SF_BASE}/${ARCH_MAP}/passwall_packages"

        fetch_sf() {
          local pkg="$1"
          local dest="passwall-ipk/$pkg"
          [ -s "$dest" ] && { echo "已存在: $pkg"; return 0; }
          local url="${SF_ARCH_DIR}/$pkg"
          curl -fL "$url" -o "$dest" 2>/dev/null && echo "成功: $pkg" || { rm -f "$dest"; }
        }

        curl -fL "$APP_URL" -o passwall-ipk/luci-app-passwall.ipk
        curl -fL "$I18N_URL" -o passwall-ipk/luci-i18n-passwall-zh-cn.ipk

        makeself --gzip --nox11 "$STAGING_DIR" "$OUTPUT" "$LABEL" ./install.sh

Technical Analysis

The workflow downloads executable IPK packages and archives from dynamically selected GitHub releases and SourceForge. It checks only whether transfers succeed and files are nonempty. It does not verify cryptographic hashes, signed manifests, package signatures, or an independently authenticated software bill of materials.

The downloaded packages are copied into a self-extracting .run installer. That installer invokes opkg install for the bundled packages on the target router. OpenWrt package installation can execute package-maintainer scripts with root privileges. Therefore, a compromised o ...[truncated 1509 chars]

Remediation
View remediation

Remediation Suggestions

  • Pin every package and archive to an immutable version and a reviewed SHA-256 or stronger digest.
  • Store expected hashes in the repository and fail the build if any digest differs.
  • Prefer upstream signed manifests and verify signatures against pinned, reviewed public keys.
  • Do not silently fall back between artifacts unless each permitted artifact has its own pinned integrity value.
  • Verify individual IPKs after archive extraction rather than validating only the outer archive.
  • Generate and publish an SBOM containing package names, versions, sources, and hashes.
  • Isolate downloading and release publishing into separate jobs. Do not grant repository write access to the job that processes untrusted packages.
  • Require manual approval after integrity verification and before release publication.

T08 · Insecure Dependencies

Error
Location
references/build-passwall.yml:444
Finding

GitHub Actions Dependencies Are Referenced by Mutable Tags

Content
View full analysis

Vulnerability Details

File Location: references/build-passwall.yml:48, 430, 444
Vulnerability Type: Mutable CI dependency references
Risk Level: High

yaml
    - name: 检出代码
      uses: actions/checkout@v4

    - name: 上传安装程序
      uses: actions/upload-artifact@v4

    - name: 创建发布
      uses: softprops/action-gh-release@v1

Technical Analysis

The workflow references GitHub Actions using mutable major-version tags rather than full commit hashes. This includes softprops/action-gh-release, a third-party action that runs while creating a release in a workflow with repository write permission.

A tag can be moved, or its owning project or publishing credentials can be compromised. If that happens, future workflow runs can resolve to code different from the implementation originally reviewed. GitHub Actions execute code inside the workflow environment and can access credentials and files made available to their step.

Attack Path

  1. An action repository or maintainer account is compromised, or a referenced mutable tag is moved.
  2. The tag is changed to point to attacker-controlled action code.
  3. The next workflow run resolves and executes the altered action.
  4. The malicious action accesses build outputs and credentials available to the job.
  5. It can modify, replace, or publish release artifacts using the workflow's write authority.

Impact Assessment

Exploitation may permit repository or release modification, theft of credentials available to the job, and substitution of the router installer with a malicious artifact. The third-party release action is especially sensitive because its legitimate role already requires interaction with repository releases.

Remediation
View remediation

Remediation Suggestions

  • Pin all actions to reviewed full 40-character commit SHAs.
  • Record the corresponding release version in a comment for maintainability.
  • Use dependency update automation that opens reviewed pull requests when action revisions change.
  • Review the source and ownership history of third-party actions before updating pinned revisions.
  • Separate build and release jobs so untrusted build processing does not share a write-capable token.
  • Restrict each job and step to the minimum required permissions.

T09 · Insecure Skill Coding Practices

Error
Location
SKILL.md:53
Finding

GitHub Personal Access Token Is Persisted in Plaintext Git Configuration

Content
View full analysis

Vulnerability Details

File Location: SKILL.md:53
Vulnerability Type: Plaintext credential persistence
Risk Level: High

bash
git remote set-url origin https://<TOKEN>@github.com/<USER>/istoreos.git

Technical Analysis

The documented command embeds the user's GitHub PAT in the remote URL. Git stores this URL in .git/config, leaving the token in plaintext for as long as the cloned repository remains present. The Skill requests a classic PAT with broad repo scope, increasing the impact if the credential is recovered.

The token may also be exposed through diagnostic output, backups, process inspection under some invocation patterns, accidental archiving of the temporary repository, or subsequent operations that print remote configuration. Persisting the PAT in the remote URL is unnecessary for the declared one-time push.

Attack Path

  1. The user supplies a classic GitHub PAT with repo scope.
  2. The Skill places the PAT in the repository's origin URL.
  3. Git writes the credential to .git/config.
  4. The temporary clone is retained, logged, backed up, or becomes readable by another local process or user.
  5. The attacker extracts the PAT and authenticates to GitHub within its assigned scope.

Impact Assessment

A recovered classic repo token may allow access to multiple public and private repositories owned by or shared with the user, depending on token scope and account permissions. It may permit reading private source code, pushing commits, changing repository settings through APIs, manipulating workflows, and publishing releases.

Remediation
View remediation

Remediation Suggestions

  • Use a short-lived, fine-grained token restricted to the single target repository and only the permissions required for the operation.
  • Supply authentication through a temporary Git credential helper or an ephemeral HTTP authorization header rather than storing it in the remote URL.
  • Configure the remote URL without credentials.
  • Disable shell tracing while handling credentials and redact secrets from all output.
  • Remove temporary credential files immediately after the push.
  • Delete the temporary clone after completion and verify that no PAT remains in Git configuration or logs.
  • Prefer GitHub App installation tokens or another short-lived identity mechanism where possible.

T05 · Unauthorized Access and Privilege Escalation

Error
Location
SKILL.md:61
Finding

Destructive Force Push and Repository-Wide Workflow Permission Expansion

Content
View full analysis

Vulnerability Details

File Location: SKILL.md:61, 68-72
Vulnerability Type: Excessive privilege and destructive repository modification
Risk Level: High

bash
git push -u origin main --force
bash
curl -s -X PUT \
  -H "Authorization: token <TOKEN>" \
  -H "Accept: application/vnd.github+json" \
  https://api.github.com/repos/<USER>/istoreos/actions/permissions/workflow \
  -d '{"default_workflow_permissions":"write","can_approve_pull_request_reviews":true}'

Technical Analysis

Adding a workflow file does not require overwriting the target repository's main branch history. The unconditional --force operation can discard commits or files already present in the user's fork.

The Skill also changes repository-wide GitHub Actions defaults to write and allows Actions to approve pull-request reviews. These capabilities are not necessary merely to add and manually run a build workflow. Repository-wide defaults apply beyond the newly introduced workflow and enlarge the authority of existing and future workflows.

Although these operations are disclosed in the Skill text, they exceed minimum privilege for its declared function and create avoidable destructive and privilege-escalation risks.

Attack Path

  1. The user provides a broad PAT and identifies a fork containing existing work.
  2. The Skill replaces the branch state using git push --force, potentially deleting divergent history.
  3. The Skill changes repository-wide workflow defaults from read to write.
  4. It also enables workflow-created pull-request approvals.
  5. A compromised, malicious, or subsequently added workflow can use the expanded permissions to modify repository contents or influence pull-request review processes.

Impact Assessment

The force push can cause loss of repository history and overwrite unrelated user content. The permission change increases the blast radius of every workflow in t ...[truncated 285 chars]

Remediation
View remediation

Remediation Suggestions

  • Clone the user's fork rather than force-pushing a complete clone of the upstream repository.
  • Create a dedicated branch containing only the workflow addition.
  • Push normally without --force and open a pull request for user review.
  • If history replacement is explicitly required, obtain separate informed confirmation and use --force-with-lease after verifying the expected remote state.
  • Do not change repository-wide default workflow permissions.
  • Declare narrowly scoped permissions directly in the workflow, using contents: read for build jobs and granting contents: write only to an isolated release job.
  • Leave can_approve_pull_request_reviews disabled unless a separately documented use case requires it.
  • Use a fine-grained token limited to the target repository and the minimum contents/settings permissions.
  • Back up or preserve the target branch before any potentially destructive operation.
Vulnerability Patterns
  • Data ExfiltrationExternal Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
  • Privilege EscalationExcessive Permissions, Sudo/Root Execution, Credential Access
  • Excessive AgencyUnrestricted Tool Access, Autonomous Decision Making, Scope Creep
  • Tool MisuseTool Parameter Abuse, Chaining Abuse, Unsafe Defaults
  • MCP Tool PoisoningHidden Instructions, Unicode Deception, Parameter Description Injection
Findings (30)

Credential Access

High
Category
Privilege Escalation
Confidence
97% confidence
Finding

Requesting a Personal Access Token from the user is a real credential-handling risk because the skill is asking for reusable, high-value authentication material. In this context, the token is used for repository write access and permission changes, making compromise capable of affecting code integrity and repository security settings.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 12)May include surrounding context.

md
## 工作流程

1. **收集配置** — 请求用户的 GitHub 仓库地址和 Personal Access Token
2. **克隆 istoreos 官方仓库** — 从 https://github.com/istoreos/istoreos.git 克隆完整内容
3. **添加 remote** — 将用户的 fork 添加为 origin
4. **写入 workflow** — 创建 `.github/workflows/build-passwall.yml`

Missing User Warnings

High
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
98% confidence
Finding

The workflow states it will force-push and overwrite the user's repository, but it does not prominently warn that this is destructive and may permanently replace existing content or history. In a repository-management skill, destructive git operations without clear confirmation and backup guidance are dangerous because they can cause irreversible data loss.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Credential Access

High
Category
Privilege Escalation
Confidence
95% confidence
Finding

The prerequisites instruct the user to generate a classic token with broad repo permission, which is more privilege than necessary for many tasks and increases blast radius if exposed. Advising broad-scope credentials without least-privilege guidance is a genuine security weakness in the skill design.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 22)May include surrounding context.

md
## 使用前提

- 已在 GitHub 上 fork `istoreos/istoreos`
- 生成了 Personal Access Token(需开启 `repo` 权限)

## 获取 GitHub Token

Credential Access

High
Category
Privilege Escalation
Confidence
97% confidence
Finding

The skill explicitly tells the user to provide a PAT for pushing code and changing repository permissions, which is direct collection of a sensitive credential for privileged operations. In a conversational or agent environment, this is especially risky because secrets may be retained in transcripts, tooling, or audit logs beyond the user's expectation.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 36)May include surrounding context.

md
当用户触发此 skill 时,要求提供:

- **GitHub 仓库地址**:格式 `https://github.com/YOUR_USER/istoreos.git`
- **Personal Access Token**:用于推送代码和设置仓库权限

---

Ae1

High
Category
analysis-evasion
Confidence
100% confidence
Finding

Referenced artifact was not completely inspected

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 59)May include surrounding context.

md
从 `references/build-passwall.yml` 复制到 `.github/workflows/build-passwall.yml`

Tool Parameter Abuse

High
Category
Tool Misuse
Confidence
99% confidence
Finding

git push -u origin main --force is a destructive operation that can overwrite repository history and content on the target branch. In this skill, the context makes it more dangerous because the stated goal is to replace the user's fork contents with a cloned upstream plus a workflow, so misuse or misunderstanding can cause immediate loss of existing repository work.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 66)May include surrounding context.

bash
git add .
git commit -m "Add PassWall build workflow"
git push -u origin main --force

5. 设置 Workflow permissions(通过 GitHub API)

Chaining Abuse

High
Category
Tool Misuse
Confidence
75% confidence
Finding

Tool calls are chained to bypass individual safety checks or escalate capabilities beyond what any single tool call would allow.

Content

Scanner excerpt · references/build-passwall.yml (reported line 55)May include surrounding context.

yaml
run: echo "date=$(date)" >> "$GITHUB_OUTPUT"

      - name: 准备环境
        run: |
          sudo apt-get update
          sudo apt-get install -y makeself unzip curl jq
          rm -rf artifact/installer

Tool Parameter Abuse

High
Category
Tool Misuse
Confidence
85% confidence
Finding

Tool parameters are crafted to achieve unintended or unsafe behavior. Parameter abuse can bypass intended safety checks (e.g. shell=True, --force, dangerous glob patterns).

Content

Scanner excerpt · references/build-passwall.yml (reported line 58)May include surrounding context.

yaml
run: |
          sudo apt-get update
          sudo apt-get install -y makeself unzip curl jq
          rm -rf artifact/installer
          mkdir -p passwall-ipk artifact/installer staging

      - name: 下载 PassWall 包并解析版本

Tool Parameter Abuse

High
Category
Tool Misuse
Confidence
85% confidence
Finding

Tool parameters are crafted to achieve unintended or unsafe behavior. Parameter abuse can bypass intended safety checks (e.g. shell=True, --force, dangerous glob patterns).

Content

Scanner excerpt · references/build-passwall.yml (reported line 101)May include surrounding context.

yaml
echo "下载成功,解压中..."
          unzip -o passwall-ipk/passwall_packages.zip -d passwall-ipk/
          rm -f passwall-ipk/passwall_packages.zip

          # ============================================================
          # 【关键修复】SourceForge 的 passwall_packages/ 里有 dns2socks、

Chaining Abuse

High
Category
Tool Misuse
Confidence
75% confidence
Finding

Tool calls are chained to bypass individual safety checks or escalate capabilities beyond what any single tool call would allow.

Content

Scanner excerpt · references/build-passwall.yml (reported line 120)May include surrounding context.

yaml
[ -s "$dest" ] && { echo "已存在: $pkg"; return 0; }
            local url="${SF_ARCH_DIR}/$pkg"
            echo "下载: $url"
            curl -fL "$url" -o "$dest" 2>/dev/null && echo "成功: $pkg" || { echo "跳过: $pkg ($url not found)"; rm -f "$dest"; }
          }
          
          # 补齐 GitHub zip 中没有的 Arch-specific 包(dns2socks microsocks shadowsocks-libev 等)

Description-Behavior Mismatch

High
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
98% confidence
Finding

The workflow embeds a device-side installer script that performs package installation, service enablement/startup, firewall reloads, and cache manipulation on routers. This materially exceeds the stated purpose of creating a workflow and turns the skill into a software distribution and remote system-modification mechanism, which is risky because users may trust it as mere workflow scaffolding.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Context-Inappropriate Capability

High
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
97% confidence
Finding

The generated installer performs broad administrative actions on target routers, including opkg update/install, forced package reinstall, service enable/start, firewall reload, and web stack cache/index manipulation. In the context of a skill whose advertised role is workflow creation, these actions are excessive and increase the chance of device instability, unwanted persistence, or silent network-policy changes on production routers.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Tool Parameter Abuse

High
Category
Tool Misuse
Confidence
85% confidence
Finding

Tool parameters are crafted to achieve unintended or unsafe behavior. Parameter abuse can bypass intended safety checks (e.g. shell=True, --force, dangerous glob patterns).

Content

Scanner excerpt · references/build-passwall.yml (reported line 291)May include surrounding context.

yaml
# 温和地刷新 LuCI 缓存(不重启服务,避免丢失登录状态)
          refresh_luci() {
            # 清理缓存文件
            rm -f /tmp/luci-indexcache 2>/dev/null || true
            rm -rf /tmp/luci-modulecache/* 2>/dev/null || true

            # 优先使用 luci-reload(如果可用)

Tool Parameter Abuse

High
Category
Tool Misuse
Confidence
90% confidence
Finding

Tool parameters are crafted to achieve unintended or unsafe behavior. Parameter abuse can bypass intended safety checks (e.g. shell=True, --force, dangerous glob patterns).

Content

Scanner excerpt · references/build-passwall.yml (reported line 292)May include surrounding context.

yaml
refresh_luci() {
            # 清理缓存文件
            rm -f /tmp/luci-indexcache 2>/dev/null || true
            rm -rf /tmp/luci-modulecache/* 2>/dev/null || true

            # 优先使用 luci-reload(如果可用)
            if command -v luci-reload >/dev/null 2>&1; then

Tool Parameter Abuse

High
Category
Tool Misuse
Confidence
85% confidence
Finding

Tool parameters are crafted to achieve unintended or unsafe behavior. Parameter abuse can bypass intended safety checks (e.g. shell=True, --force, dangerous glob patterns).

Content

Scanner excerpt · references/build-passwall.yml (reported line 292)May include surrounding context.

yaml
refresh_luci() {
            # 清理缓存文件
            rm -f /tmp/luci-indexcache 2>/dev/null || true
            rm -rf /tmp/luci-modulecache/* 2>/dev/null || true

            # 优先使用 luci-reload(如果可用)
            if command -v luci-reload >/dev/null 2>&1; then

Tool Parameter Abuse

High
Category
Tool Misuse
Confidence
90% confidence
Finding

Tool parameters are crafted to achieve unintended or unsafe behavior. Parameter abuse can bypass intended safety checks (e.g. shell=True, --force, dangerous glob patterns).

Content

Scanner excerpt · references/build-passwall.yml (reported line 292)May include surrounding context.

yaml
refresh_luci() {
            # 清理缓存文件
            rm -f /tmp/luci-indexcache 2>/dev/null || true
            rm -rf /tmp/luci-modulecache/* 2>/dev/null || true

            # 优先使用 luci-reload(如果可用)
            if command -v luci-reload >/dev/null 2>&1; then

Tool Parameter Abuse

High
Category
Tool Misuse
Confidence
85% confidence
Finding

Tool parameters are crafted to achieve unintended or unsafe behavior. Parameter abuse can bypass intended safety checks (e.g. shell=True, --force, dangerous glob patterns).

Content

Scanner excerpt · references/build-passwall.yml (reported line 432)May include surrounding context.

yaml
echo "GitHub Actions运行ID: ${{ github.run_id }}" >> version.txt
          echo "构建选项: ${{ inputs.build_option }}" >> version.txt

          rm -rf artifact/installer/*
          mv -f "$OUTPUT" artifact/installer/
          mv -f version.txt artifact/installer/
          echo "构建产物:"

Missing User Warnings

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
95% confidence
Finding

The skill explicitly asks the user to provide a GitHub Personal Access Token and then uses it directly in git and API operations, but it does not warn about the sensitivity of the credential, storage/logging risks, or safer alternatives. This creates a real risk of token exposure through chat history, shell history, process listings, remote URLs, or accidental reuse beyond the intended repository action.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Missing User Warnings

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
93% confidence
Finding

The skill enables write workflow permissions and allows GitHub Actions to create and approve pull requests, which materially increases the power of any workflow added to the repository. Without an explicit warning about the security implications, users may unknowingly grant automation the ability to modify repository state or facilitate supply-chain abuse if the workflow or dependencies are compromised.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Confidence
86% confidence
Finding

This command transmits an authorization token to GitHub's API to change repository workflow permissions. Although communication is with a legitimate external service, it is still a sensitive credential transmission and becomes dangerous in the context of a skill that solicits user tokens and may expose them through logs, transcripts, or unsafe handling.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 73)May include surrounding context.

bash
# 设置 default_workflow_permissions 为 write
curl -s -X PUT \
  -H "Authorization: token <TOKEN>" \
  -H "Accept: application/vnd.github+json" \
  https://api.github.com/repos/<USER>/istoreos/actions/permissions/workflow \

Sudo/Root Execution

Medium
Category
Privilege Escalation
Confidence
70% confidence
Finding

Commands invoke sudo or root privileges. Verify this elevated access is necessary and justified.

Content

Scanner excerpt · references/build-passwall.yml (reported line 56)May include surrounding context.

yaml
- name: 准备环境
        run: |
          sudo apt-get update
          sudo apt-get install -y makeself unzip curl jq
          rm -rf artifact/installer
          mkdir -p passwall-ipk artifact/installer staging

Sudo/Root Execution

Medium
Category
Privilege Escalation
Confidence
70% confidence
Finding

Commands invoke sudo or root privileges. Verify this elevated access is necessary and justified.

Content

Scanner excerpt · references/build-passwall.yml (reported line 57)May include surrounding context.

yaml
- name: 准备环境
        run: |
          sudo apt-get update
          sudo apt-get install -y makeself unzip curl jq
          rm -rf artifact/installer
          mkdir -p passwall-ipk artifact/installer staging

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Confidence
50% confidence
Finding

Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 76)May include surrounding context.

md
# 分别从两个仓库获取信息
          # openwrt-passwall2 的 zip 包(包含所有依赖)
          PW2_LATEST=$(curl_gh "https://api.github.com/repos/Openwrt-Passwall/openwrt-passwall2/releases/latest" | jq -r .tag_name || true)
          [ -z "$PW2_LATEST" ] || [ "$PW2_LATEST" = "null" ] && PW2_LATEST="26.5.1-1"
          # openwrt-passwall 的最新版本(luci-app-passwall 主包)
          PKG_LATEST=$(curl_gh "https://api.github.com/repos/Openwrt-Passwall/openwrt-passwall/releases/latest" | jq -r .tag_name || true)

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Confidence
50% confidence
Finding

Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.

Content

Scanner excerpt · references/build-passwall.yml (reported line 76)May include surrounding context.

yaml
# 分别从两个仓库获取信息
          # openwrt-passwall2 的 zip 包(包含所有依赖)
          PW2_LATEST=$(curl_gh "https://api.github.com/repos/Openwrt-Passwall/openwrt-passwall2/releases/latest" | jq -r .tag_name || true)
          [ -z "$PW2_LATEST" ] || [ "$PW2_LATEST" = "null" ] && PW2_LATEST="26.5.1-1"
          # openwrt-passwall 的最新版本(luci-app-passwall 主包)
          PKG_LATEST=$(curl_gh "https://api.github.com/repos/Openwrt-Passwall/openwrt-passwall/releases/latest" | jq -r .tag_name || true)

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Confidence
50% confidence
Finding

Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.

Content

Scanner excerpt · references/build-passwall.yml (reported line 79)May include surrounding context.

yaml
# 分别从两个仓库获取信息
          # openwrt-passwall2 的 zip 包(包含所有依赖)
          PW2_LATEST=$(curl_gh "https://api.github.com/repos/Openwrt-Passwall/openwrt-passwall2/releases/latest" | jq -r .tag_name || true)
          [ -z "$PW2_LATEST" ] || [ "$PW2_LATEST" = "null" ] && PW2_LATEST="26.5.1-1"
          # openwrt-passwall 的最新版本(luci-app-passwall 主包)
          PKG_LATEST=$(curl_gh "https://api.github.com/repos/Openwrt-Passwall/openwrt-passwall/releases/latest" | jq -r .tag_name || true)