T05 · Unauthorized Access and Privilege Escalation
- Location
templates/HEARTBEAT.md:34- Finding
Heartbeat unnecessarily loads sensitive identity and memory files
- Content
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- Remediation
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Security audit
Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk
The skill is docs-only and not self-executing, but its templates define under-scoped autonomous orchestration that can import plans, dispatch workers, read sensitive memory files, create scheduled polling, and send Telegram logs.
Review carefully before installing. Use this only in a workspace where autonomous OpenClaw workers, scheduled polling, and Telegram control-plane messages are acceptable. Keep cron and heartbeat disabled until reviewed, restrict Plan Path values to a trusted project directory, validate sprint plans before activation, avoid storing secrets in files read by HEARTBEAT_TICK, and do not enable broad cross-provider messaging unless you have strict destination controls.
templates/HEARTBEAT.md:34Heartbeat unnecessarily loads sensitive identity and memory files
templates/HEARTBEAT.md:81Unvalidated sprint plans are imported and autonomously dispatched as executable instructions
docs/openclaw_config_snippets.md:72Optional logging configuration grants unrestricted cross-context and cross-provider messaging
templates/HEARTBEAT.md:57Telegram lifecycle logs transmit untrusted task and failure text without redaction
Skill modifies its own code, configuration, or behavior at runtime. Self-modification enables an agent to escalate privileges, disable safety constraints, or install persistent backdoors.
- You want a **lean portfolio queue** (`ACTIVITIES.md`) with external sprint-plan import via `Plan Path`.
## DON'T USE WHEN
- You want a turnkey, self-modifying installer that patches config / creates cron jobs automatically.
- You need complex runtime code; this skill is **templates + docs**.
## Outputs
The README advertises an example prompt named “do this for me,” which is a highly generic phrase commonly used in ordinary conversation. In a skill-triggering context, that kind of broad phrasing can cause unintended invocation because it does not constrain domain, action, or exclusions.
The snippet explicitly enables cross-context and cross-provider message sending, which can cause data to be sent to the wrong conversation, account, or platform if misconfigured or invoked unexpectedly. Because this is presented as an optional config example without adjacent warnings, scoping guidance, or approval controls, it increases the chance of privacy leaks and unintended disclosure of sensitive agent context.
The prompt instructs the agent to copy templates, edit files, create a plan file, and create directories inside the workspace without any requirement to check for existing content, prompt before overwriting, or constrain writes to a freshly initialized location. In an agentic environment, this can lead to unintended modification or destruction of user data if the target workspace already contains files at those paths or if placeholders are resolved incorrectly.
The prompt directs creation of a cron job that modifies system or control-plane automation state, but it does not clearly warn the user that persistent scheduled behavior is being installed. Even though the job is initially disabled, creating it establishes latent automation that could later be enabled intentionally or accidentally, affecting session behavior and increasing operational risk.