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Security audit

deterministic-controller

Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk

Overview

The skill is docs-only and not self-executing, but its templates define under-scoped autonomous orchestration that can import plans, dispatch workers, read sensitive memory files, create scheduled polling, and send Telegram logs.

Review carefully before installing. Use this only in a workspace where autonomous OpenClaw workers, scheduled polling, and Telegram control-plane messages are acceptable. Keep cron and heartbeat disabled until reviewed, restrict Plan Path values to a trusted project directory, validate sprint plans before activation, avoid storing secrets in files read by HEARTBEAT_TICK, and do not enable broad cross-provider messaging unless you have strict destination controls.

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Skill Instruction HijackingAlters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
  • Unauthorized Access and Privilege EscalationObtains permissions beyond the task's legitimate needs
  • Insecure Skill Coding PracticesFinds exploitable flaws such as hardcoded secrets or command injection
  • Agent Memory PoisoningWrites attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
  • Remote Payload Retrieval and ExecutionFetches external code whose behavior can change after review
Findings (4)

T05 · Unauthorized Access and Privilege Escalation

Warning
Location
templates/HEARTBEAT.md:34
Finding

Heartbeat unnecessarily loads sensitive identity and memory files

Content
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Remediation
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T01 · Skill Instruction Hijacking

Error
Location
templates/HEARTBEAT.md:81
Finding

Unvalidated sprint plans are imported and autonomously dispatched as executable instructions

Content
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ACTIVE`): 1) Read the promoted row’s `Plan Path`. 2) Replace the entire `## Sprint Steps (manager-led multi-worker execution)` section in `ACTIVITIES.md` with the sprint block from that file. 3) Ensure the imported sprint block declares `Sprint state: **ACTIVE**`. 4) Dispatch Step 1 per same-cycle rules. - The controller MUST NOT read any other backlog plan files besides the one being promoted. ``` ### Technical Analysis A queue row controls the `Plan Path`. When that row is promoted, the controller reads the referenced Markdown, copies its sprint block into the authoritative execution state, marks it active, and dispatches its first step during the same control cycle. The design does not require: - Canonical-path validation or confinement to an approved project directory. - Rejection of path traversal or symlink redirection. - A strict machine-readable schema for imported steps. - Filtering of embedded controller directives or prompt-injection content. - Tool, command, filesystem, or network restrictions for generated workers. - Human approval between importing a plan and dispatching its first task. Because free-form plan content becomes an autonomous worker assignment, the plan file crosses from data into executable Agent instructions without validation. The exact-execution framing in the controller and poll payload further increases the likelihood that injected instructions will be followed. ### Attack Path 1. An attacker gains the ability to modify a queued sprint-plan file, influence a generated plan through a loose project ...[truncated 1044 chars]
Remediation
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/projects/`. 2. Reject absolute paths, traversal components, symbolic links, and paths outside the approved workspace root. 3. Replace free-form Markdown imports with a strict schema containing only recognized fields, step identifiers, approved action types, and bounded evidence paths. 4. Treat plan content exclusively as untrusted data; reject embedded trigger lines, controller directives, tool-call syntax, or attempts to override system policy. 5. Add an operator approval gate after plan validation and before changing the sprint to `ACTIVE`. 6. Do not dispatch Step 1 in the same cycle as import. Require a separate approved trigger. 7. Apply enforceable worker-level tool allowlists, filesystem boundaries, network restrictions, and command policies outside prompt text. 8. Record and verify a cryptographic digest or trusted signature for approved plans before each import. 9. Define maximum plan size, step count, task length, and allowed evidence locations. 10. Abort promotion safely when any validation fails, without persisting the rejected instructions into `ACTIVITIES.md`. ]]>

T05 · Unauthorized Access and Privilege Escalation

Warning
Location
docs/openclaw_config_snippets.md:72
Finding

Optional logging configuration grants unrestricted cross-context and cross-provider messaging

Content
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Remediation
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T09 · Insecure Skill Coding Practices

Warning
Location
templates/HEARTBEAT.md:57
Finding

Telegram lifecycle logs transmit untrusted task and failure text without redaction

Content
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` Executable rule: When this spec says "Emit ", do BOTH: 1) Print `` in output. 2) Send via `message(action=send, channel="telegram", target="", message="")`. Lifecycle logs: - `HB_START trigger=<...>` - `HB_COMPLETE trigger=<...> state= doing= todo= blocked=` Project logs: - `PROJECT_TASK_STARTED task="..."` - `PROJECT_TASK_COMPLETE task="..."` - `PROJECT_TASK_FAILED task="..." reason="..." retry="n/max"` - `PROJECT_TASK_BLOCKED task="..." reason="..."` ``` ### Technical Analysis The logging contract requires every emitted event to be transmitted to Telegram. Several event formats interpolate task names and failure reasons that may originate from imported sprint plans, worker output, exceptions, command failures, or other runtime-controlled content. The contract does not define secret redaction, character filtering, maximum lengths, safe error normalization, or an identifier-only format. As a result, credentials, personal data, local paths, command output, or attacker-chosen strings may be copied into an external Telegram message. A configured destination does not eliminate this risk: destination authorization and content authorization are separate controls. ### Attack Path 1. Telegram logging is configured and enabled. 2. An attacker places sensitive or crafted content in an imported task name, or causes a worker operation to fail with sensitive information in the error reason. 3. The controller constructs a `PROJECT_TASK_*` lifecycle line containing that text. 4. The executable logging rule sends the compl ...[truncated 571 chars]
Remediation
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Vulnerability Patterns
  • Data ExfiltrationExternal Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
  • Privilege EscalationExcessive Permissions, Sudo/Root Execution, Credential Access
  • Rogue AgentSelf-Modification, Session Persistence
  • Trigger AbuseOverly Broad Trigger, Shadow Command Trigger, Keyword Baiting Trigger
  • Prompt InjectionInstruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
Findings (5)

Self-Modification

High
Category
Rogue Agent
Confidence
90% confidence
Finding

Skill modifies its own code, configuration, or behavior at runtime. Self-modification enables an agent to escalate privileges, disable safety constraints, or install persistent backdoors.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 14)May include surrounding context.

md
- You want a **lean portfolio queue** (`ACTIVITIES.md`) with external sprint-plan import via `Plan Path`.

## DON'T USE WHEN
- You want a turnkey, self-modifying installer that patches config / creates cron jobs automatically.
- You need complex runtime code; this skill is **templates + docs**.

## Outputs

Vague Triggers

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
92% confidence
Finding

The README advertises an example prompt named “do this for me,” which is a highly generic phrase commonly used in ordinary conversation. In a skill-triggering context, that kind of broad phrasing can cause unintended invocation because it does not constrain domain, action, or exclusions.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Missing User Warnings

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
93% confidence
Finding

The snippet explicitly enables cross-context and cross-provider message sending, which can cause data to be sent to the wrong conversation, account, or platform if misconfigured or invoked unexpectedly. Because this is presented as an optional config example without adjacent warnings, scoping guidance, or approval controls, it increases the chance of privacy leaks and unintended disclosure of sensitive agent context.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Missing User Warnings

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
93% confidence
Finding

The prompt instructs the agent to copy templates, edit files, create a plan file, and create directories inside the workspace without any requirement to check for existing content, prompt before overwriting, or constrain writes to a freshly initialized location. In an agentic environment, this can lead to unintended modification or destruction of user data if the target workspace already contains files at those paths or if placeholders are resolved incorrectly.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Missing User Warnings

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
90% confidence
Finding

The prompt directs creation of a cron job that modifies system or control-plane automation state, but it does not clearly warn the user that persistent scheduled behavior is being installed. Even though the job is initially disabled, creating it establishes latent automation that could later be enabled intentionally or accidentally, affecting session behavior and increasing operational risk.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.