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Security audit

varg-video-prompting

Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk

Overview

ClawScan marks this video-prompting skill suspicious because scanners report guidance that may bypass content moderation, instructions to upload local media without clear privacy safeguards, and an unpinned installer; scan coverage is partial.

Treat this as a review item rather than a confirmed malicious skill. Before installing, consider whether you are comfortable with its moderation-rephrasing advice and its hosted-media upload workflow; avoid sharing sensitive footage or recordings unless you have checked the destination and approved the disclosure. The scan was partial because some referenced paths were unresolved, so the evidence does not cover every possible referenced resource.

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Skill Instruction HijackingAlters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
  • Agent Memory PoisoningWrites attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
  • Remote Payload Retrieval and ExecutionFetches external code whose behavior can change after review
  • Embedded Malicious CodeShips malicious scripts inside the skill and executes them locally
  • Unauthorized Access and Privilege EscalationObtains permissions beyond the task's legitimate needs
Vulnerability Patterns
  • Prompt InjectionInstruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
  • Data ExfiltrationExternal Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
  • Supply ChainUnpinned Dependencies, External Script Fetching, Obfuscated Code
  • Excessive AgencyUnrestricted Tool Access, Autonomous Decision Making, Scope Creep
  • Output HandlingUnvalidated Output Injection, Cross-Context Output, Unbounded Output
Findings (14)

MCP server referenced without pinned version: 'npx skills'.

Medium
Category
MCP Rug Pull
Confidence
88% confidence
Finding

The installation command executes an unpinned npm package and retrieves skill content from a mutable repository reference. A compromised or unexpectedly changed release could execute code or install altered agent instructions, although the finding incorrectly describes this installer as an MCP server.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Confidence
50% confidence
Finding

Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 25)May include surrounding context.

md
homepage: https://varg.ai
compatibility: >-
  Needs the varg MCP connection (https://mcp.varg.ai/mcp, OAuth sign-in) or a VARG_API_KEY for
  https://api.varg.ai/v2 (see the varg-ai skill). QA uses ffmpeg and ffprobe locally when
  available; otherwise the MCP analyze_video tool and the hosted ffmpeg tool.
allowed-tools: Bash(curl:*) Bash(ffmpeg:*) Bash(ffprobe:*) Bash(jq:*) Read Write Edit
---

YARA rule 'network_reconnaissance': Network reconnaissance and scanning patterns [hacktools]

Medium
Category
YARA Match
Confidence
65% confidence
Finding

YARA rule matched a hack tool or exploit indicator (offensive tools, reconnaissance, privilege escalation, or exploit frameworks).

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 264)May include surrounding context.

md
g than an
  image-plus-audio talking-head model; do the body in Seedance, then lip-sync on top.
- **Voices**: pick with `search_voices` (by `intent` in words, or `filters`) and audition 2-3 takes yourself or with
  the person; choose by ear. If `eleven_v4` answers `voice_not_found` for a name or preset id, pass the raw ElevenLabs
  `voice_id`. Audio tags shape delivery: `[breathless whisper] ... [fierce shout] ...`, `[calm, slow, soft-spoken]`,
  `[pause]`. Transcribe each take (`whisper_large_v3`) and check brand words are pronounced cleanly.
- Keep one voice per character across the whole project, and freeze the approved take: reuse its file URL instead of
  regenerating, because a new take differs in length and breaks every retime and lip-sync built on the old one.

## 8. Music

- **The song is the clock.** Measure the beat grid on the real file and cut on downbeats (`varg-music-video`).
  Never trust the BPM you asked for. Same lyrics, same "112 BPM" prompt: ElevenLabs Music measur

YARA rule 'network_reconnaissance': Network reconnaissance and scanning patterns [hacktools]

Medium
Category
YARA Match
Confidence
65% confidence
Finding

YARA rule matched a hack tool or exploit indicator (offensive tools, reconnaissance, privilege escalation, or exploit frameworks).

Content

Scanner excerpt · references/models.md (reported line 148)May include surrounding context.

md
from an approved front view, to fill a missing sheet view.
- `nano_banana_pro` (legacy): observed that a resolution provider option made the requested aspect ratio be ignored;
  after any provider option, check the real output size and ratio.

---

## Voice

### ElevenLabs v4 (`eleven_v4`, `eleven_v4_turbo`)

- Audio tags in square brackets steer delivery: `[whispers]`, `[breathless whisper]`, `[fierce shout]`,
  `[calm, slow, soft-spoken]`, `[pause]`, `[laughs]`. ~84 per typical line (Turbo ~42, good for drafts).
- Find voices with `search_voices` (`intent` in words, or `filters` such as gender and accent). Pass the voice's
  `voice_id`. Observed: a voice name or `preset_...` id returned `voice_not_found` on `eleven_v4` while the raw
  ElevenLabs voice id worked; the varg-ai skill lists ids for the premade voices.
- Take length varies between generations: freeze the approved take and reuse its URL.

## Music

| Model | Use | Observed |
|---|---|---|
| `lyria_3_5` (~11) | songs with v

Recommends disguising rejected image content as tension or slapstick to get it past moderation.

Medium
Category
Prompt Injection
Confidence
85% confidence
Finding

The guidance recommends rephrasing rejected imagery so that the same moment passes a content filter, without distinguishing false positives from genuinely prohibited content. Although the examples could be permissible dramatic scenes, this teaches a general response that can undermine provider safety controls.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

The workflow instructs uploading local media to a hosted service without a privacy warning.

Medium
Category
Output Handling
Confidence
96% confidence
Finding

The operational instructions direct an agent to upload local media without requiring approval for external disclosure or checking whether the files are sensitive. Hosted processing is expected for this service, but local references, actor images, or unpublished footage may require different authorization than ordinary generation spending.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Confidence
50% confidence
Finding

Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.

Content

Scanner excerpt · references/mcp-tools.md (reported line 4)May include surrounding context.

md
# Calling varg through the MCP server

The varg MCP server (`https://mcp.varg.ai/mcp`) exposes every varg model on one credit balance. The same request
bodies work on the REST API (`POST https://api.varg.ai/v2/tools/<tool>/call` with a `VARG_API_KEY`; setup in the
`varg-ai` skill). Model specs: `https://varg.ai/models/llms.txt` and `https://varg.ai/models/<model>.md`.

## 1. Connect and sign in

Local-file upload instructions lack a privacy warning about external hosting and public URLs.

Medium
Category
Output Handling
Confidence
92% confidence
Finding

The instructions upload local bytes and return a public_url without an explicit privacy or disclosure approval gate. This can expose confidential footage, personal images, or embedded metadata outside the local environment; the precise accessibility and retention of those URLs are not established here.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Confidence
60% confidence
Finding

Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.

Content

Scanner excerpt · references/mcp-tools.md (reported line 110)May include surrounding context.

1. create_upload({ media_type: "video/mp4", size: , hash: "sha256:", filename: "shot.mp4" })

-> { upload_url, public_url, proxy_url } (or { deduplicated: true, url } if the same bytes exist)

2. PUT the bytes to the proxy URL; it registers the file on success:

curl -X PUT -H "Content-Type: application/octet-stream"
--data-binary @shot.mp4 "https://api.varg.ai${proxy_url}"

-> { ok, public_url, file_id, registered: true }

text

Autonomous Decision Making

Medium
Category
Excessive Agency
Confidence
75% confidence
Finding

Skill enables autonomous high-impact decisions without human-in-the-loop verification. Critical operations (destructive commands, financial transactions, data deletion) should require explicit user confirmation.

Content

Scanner excerpt · references/models.md (reported line 64)May include surrounding context.

md
- Credits: ~82 per 5 s at 720p, ~123 at 1080p (observed about 25 per second at 1080p). Five parallel 5 s clips took
  6-8 minutes; one job once hung for about 30 minutes (submit a backup after ~15, cancel the loser).
- Observed: one file = start frame; two files = start and end frame. Chaining the end of clip N into the start of
  clip N+1 gave seamless continuous moves. Clips came back with native ambient audio without asking.
- Observed: the most faithful to the still, including things you did not want in it (a logo). Clean the still first.
- Prompt it like a camera operator: one continuous move, "no cuts", realistic micro-movements, "no talking" when
  silent. For multi-shot prompts, elements and the reference route, see the `kling-4-prompting` skill.

The lip-sync workflow instructs uploading video and voice recordings without a third-party data-sharing warning.

Medium
Category
Output Handling
Confidence
97% confidence
Finding

This workflow explicitly tells the agent to upload a shot and its vocal slice for processing by Sync via the configured provider. The file does not warn that user-supplied footage and voice recordings will be shared with an external service, which could expose personal or confidential media.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

The transcription template hard-codes English without offering a language choice.

Medium
Category
Output Handling
Confidence
93% confidence
Finding

The generic transcription template fixes the language to "en", while the file instructs users to preserve template content outside placeholders. No English-only scope or user opt-in is documented, so this imposes a language constraint on recordings that may use another language.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

The activation phrase "which model" is not restricted to video or media-generation contexts.

Low
Category
Trigger Abuse
Confidence
91% confidence
Finding

The description explicitly includes asking "which model" as an activation condition without requiring a video-generation context. This phrase also occurs in unrelated requests about language models, statistical models, or product models, potentially causing unintended invocation.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Activation phrases include unqualified requests such as “which model” and “consistent character” without requiring a varg video-generation context.

Low
Category
Trigger Abuse
Confidence
94% confidence
Finding

These invocation conditions can also describe unrelated model selection or character-writing tasks. Although other triggers name specific video models, the broad alternatives have no explicit domain restriction or exclusions.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.