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Security audit

varg-ad-library-remix

Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk

Overview

The skill is marked suspicious because it sends video content or URLs to Varg for analysis without a clear privacy warning, and its installer uses an unpinned npm package; the scans found no clear malicious intent.

Treat this as a review-before-install skill, not a finding of malicious intent. Before using it, check whether you are comfortable sending footage and URLs to Varg, especially private material or URLs with access tokens; the scan reports no clear disclosure or confirmation step. Installation also runs an unpinned npm package. The scan was partial because several local references were missing, so evidence about the complete artifact is incomplete.

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Skill Instruction HijackingAlters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
  • Agent Memory PoisoningWrites attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
  • Remote Payload Retrieval and ExecutionFetches external code whose behavior can change after review
  • Embedded Malicious CodeShips malicious scripts inside the skill and executes them locally
  • Unauthorized Access and Privilege EscalationObtains permissions beyond the task's legitimate needs
Vulnerability Patterns
  • Data ExfiltrationExternal Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
  • Supply ChainUnpinned Dependencies, External Script Fetching, Obfuscated Code
  • Output HandlingUnvalidated Output Injection, Cross-Context Output, Unbounded Output
  • Prompt InjectionInstruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
  • Privilege EscalationExcessive Permissions, Sudo/Root Execution, Credential Access
Findings (5)

MCP server referenced without pinned version: 'npx skills'.

Medium
Category
MCP Rug Pull
Confidence
90% confidence
Finding

The installation command executes an unpinned npm package through npx, allowing the code executed during installation to change without changes to this README. This is a supply-chain exposure rather than an unpinned MCP server, as the finding labels it; exploitation would require a malicious or compromised package release.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

The local-video workflow lacks a warning that supplied footage is sent to a third-party analysis service.

Medium
Category
Output Handling
Confidence
88% confidence
Finding

The README advertises analysis of a local video without explicitly explaining that its contents will leave the user's environment for third-party processing. References to the Varg API provide some notice, but do not establish informed authorization to upload potentially confidential local footage; the risk is substantially lower for public competitor ads.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

The workflow uploads reference videos and submits ad URLs to Varg without a privacy or third-party data-sharing warning.

Medium
Category
Output Handling
Confidence
88% confidence
Finding

The workflow directs the agent to upload reference videos and submit their URLs to Varg without a privacy check or confirmation for nonpublic material. Public competitor ads make most intended uses low sensitivity, but private footage or URLs containing access tokens could expose confidential information to the external service.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Confidence
60% confidence
Finding

Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 53)May include surrounding context.

Download with media-download (vdl <url>), upload (POST /v2/files or create_upload), then:

bash
curl -s -X POST https://api.varg.ai/v2/tools/video_analyze/call -H "Authorization: Bearer $VARG_API_KEY" \
  -H "Content-Type: application/json" -d '{"model":"video-analyze","video_url":"AD_URL",
  "prompt":"Break this competitor product ad down for a remix: every shot with start-end seconds, camera and what happens; all on-screen text with timings; audio; the hook in the first 3 seconds; the angle (which pain or desire it sells), the format, the offer, the proof moment and the CTA; and the awareness level of the viewer it targets."}'

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Confidence
50% confidence
Finding

Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 53)May include surrounding context.

Download with media-download (vdl <url>), upload (POST /v2/files or create_upload), then:

bash
curl -s -X POST https://api.varg.ai/v2/tools/video_analyze/call -H "Authorization: Bearer $VARG_API_KEY" \
  -H "Content-Type: application/json" -d '{"model":"video-analyze","video_url":"AD_URL",
  "prompt":"Break this competitor product ad down for a remix: every shot with start-end seconds, camera and what happens; all on-screen text with timings; audio; the hook in the first 3 seconds; the angle (which pain or desire it sells), the format, the offer, the proof moment and the CTA; and the awareness level of the viewer it targets."}'