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Security audit

Vanzhangsh Skills

Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk

Overview

This is a legitimate browser automation helper, but it directs users to install and use a powerful external CLI without enough safeguards for credentials, saved sessions, and captured page data.

Review this before installing. Use a pinned, trusted version of agent-browser if possible, avoid running install commands with elevated privileges, and treat saved browser state, screenshots, videos, traces, network logs, cookies, headers, and credentials as sensitive secrets. Do not commit auth.json or captured browser artifacts to shared repositories.

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Insecure DependenciesIntroduces malicious components through unsafe dependency sources
  • Skill Instruction HijackingAlters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
  • Agent Memory PoisoningWrites attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
  • Remote Payload Retrieval and ExecutionFetches external code whose behavior can change after review
  • Embedded Malicious CodeShips malicious scripts inside the skill and executes them locally
Findings (1)

T08 · Insecure Dependencies

Warning
Location
SKILL.md:14
Finding

Unpinned Third-Party Installation and Execution

Content
View full analysis
Remediation
View remediation
``` 2. Publish and verify the expected npm integrity digest or a cryptographically signed release before installation. 3. Pin source installations to a reviewed full commit hash: ```bash git clone https://github.com/vercel-labs/agent-browser cd agent-browser git checkout --detach ``` 4. Require a committed lockfile and use a frozen-lockfile installation mode so dependency resolution cannot silently change: ```bash pnpm install --frozen-lockfile ``` 5. Avoid global installation where practical. Prefer a project-local, containerized, or otherwise sandboxed installation with minimal filesystem and network permissions. 6. Do not instruct users to install `@latest` as a troubleshooting step. Document a tested compatibility matrix and update the pinned version only after security review. 7. Document the exact system changes and privilege requirements of `agent-browser install --with-deps`. Explicitly discourage execution as root or through `sudo` unless strictly required and independently reviewed. 8. Add automated dependency provenance, vulnerability, and lockfile-integrity checks to the release process. ]]>
Vulnerability Patterns
  • Data ExfiltrationExternal Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
  • Memory PoisoningPersistent Context Injection, Context Window Stuffing, Memory Manipulation
  • Rogue AgentSelf-Modification, Session Persistence
  • Prompt InjectionInstruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
  • Privilege EscalationExcessive Permissions, Sudo/Root Execution, Credential Access
Findings (7)

Self-Modification

High
Category
Rogue Agent
Confidence
85% confidence
Finding

Skill modifies its own code, configuration, or behavior at runtime. Self-modification enables an agent to escalate privileges, disable safety constraints, or install persistent backdoors.

Content

Scanner excerpt · CONTRIBUTING.md (reported line 60)May include surrounding context.

md
## Adding New Commands to the Skill

Update SKILL.md when the upstream CLI adds new commands.
- Keep the Installation section
- Add new commands in the correct category
- Include usage examples

Context Window Stuffing

Medium
Category
Memory Poisoning
Confidence
85% confidence
Finding

Skill attempts to fill the context window with filler content, displacing legitimate instructions and safety constraints. This can degrade agent performance or bypass safety boundaries.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 41)May include surrounding context.

agent-browser open # Navigate to page agent-browser snapshot -i # Get interactive elements with refs agent-browser click @e1 # Click element by ref agent-browser fill @e2 "text" # Fill input by ref agent-browser close # Close browser

text

Missing User Warnings

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
94% confidence
Finding

The skill promotes screenshots, PDFs, video recording, tracing, and network request inspection without cautioning that these artifacts can capture page contents, tokens, PII, headers, and other sensitive data. In an authenticated browser automation context, those outputs can become durable copies of confidential information and are easy to leak via logs, shared folders, or bug reports.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Missing User Warnings

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
90% confidence
Finding

The documentation shows direct credential usage via command-line arguments for HTTP basic auth and elsewhere demonstrates filling login forms, but it does not warn that secrets passed on the command line can be exposed through shell history, process listings, logs, or recordings. This creates a realistic risk of credential leakage during normal use of the skill.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Missing User Warnings

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
93% confidence
Finding

The skill explicitly instructs users to save and reload authenticated browser state, which commonly includes cookies and other session artifacts, but it provides no warning that the saved file is sensitive. If that file is stored insecurely, shared, or committed to source control, an attacker may be able to reuse the session and access authenticated resources without credentials.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Session Persistence

Medium
Category
Rogue Agent
Confidence
95% confidence
Finding

The documented ability to save and later load browser session state enables persistence of authenticated sessions across runs. Without warnings or safeguards, this increases the chance that session-bearing files are mishandled, stolen, or reused to impersonate a user.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 236)May include surrounding context.

bash
agent-browser state save auth.json    # Save session state
agent-browser state load auth.json    # Load saved state

Example: Form submission

Session Persistence

Medium
Category
Rogue Agent
Confidence
95% confidence
Finding

The example normalizes reusing a previously saved authenticated state file to access a dashboard in later sessions, but it omits any caution about the security implications of session replay. In this skill's context, that file can function like a bearer token for the target application.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 265)May include surrounding context.

agent-browser wait --url "/dashboard" agent-browser state save auth.json

Later sessions: load saved state

agent-browser state load auth.json agent-browser open https://app.example.com/dashboard

text