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Security audit

17ce Speedtest

Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk

Overview

The skill mostly does what it claims, but it distributes shared API credentials and can send sensitive request details to a third-party testing service without enough safeguards.

Review before installing. Use only test targets you are authorized to probe, avoid sending private/internal URLs or production cookies through this skill, and do not rely on the bundled shared 17CE credential. Prefer a revised version that removes embedded credentials, uses protected per-user secrets, requires confirmation before external or bulk tests, disables cookie forwarding by default, escapes generated HTML reports, and pins dependencies.

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Insecure DependenciesIntroduces malicious components through unsafe dependency sources
  • Insecure Skill Coding PracticesFinds exploitable flaws such as hardcoded secrets or command injection
  • Skill Instruction HijackingAlters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
  • Agent Memory PoisoningWrites attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
  • Remote Payload Retrieval and ExecutionFetches external code whose behavior can change after review
Findings (5)

T09 · Insecure Skill Coding Practices

Error
Location
scripts/speedtest.py:30
Finding

Credentials and Session Cookies Transmitted over Plaintext HTTP

Content
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Remediation
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T09 · Insecure Skill Coding Practices

Error
Location
SKILL.md:33
Finding

Hard-Coded Shared API Credential and Command-Line Secret Exposure

Content
View full analysis
report.html ``` The same credential and command examples appear in both `SKILL.md` and `README.md`. ### Technical Analysis A reusable API credential is embedded in plaintext in the distributed Skill package. Anyone who can download or inspect the package can obtain it. The Skill also directs the Agent to pass the secret through `argv`. Command-line secrets can be exposed through process listings, shell history, execution telemetry, Agent transcripts, crash reports, and orchestration logs. Marking the account as public does not eliminate these risks: the value remains an authentication credential tied to quota and account state. This behavior exceeds minimum privilege because the Skill could instead request a per-user credential through a protected secret channel, and public website tests do not justify distributing a reusable shared secret. ### Attack Path 1. An attacker downloads the Skill package or reads a copy of `SKILL.md` or `README.md`. 2. The attacker extracts the embedded email address and API password. 3. Alternatively, the attacker observes the command line through process inspection, shell history, Agent logging, or execution telemetry. 4. The attacker submits independent 17CE tasks using the exposed credential. 5. The attacker consumes t ...[truncated 522 chars]
Remediation
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T09 · Insecure Skill Coding Practices

Error
Location
scripts/report.py:65
Finding

HTML and Script Injection in Generated Reports

Content
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{loc}
{display_val}
""" ``` Additional fields are interpolated into table markup: ```python table_rows += f""" {loc}
{f"{total:.1f}" if is_ok else '--'} {label} {f"{ttfb:.1f}" if is_ok else '--'} {f"{dns:.1f}" if is_ok else '--'} {code if code > 0 else '-'} {r.get('SrcIP','-')} """ ``` The user-controlled target URL and test time are also inserted directly: ```python {test_time} ``` ```python {url or "未指定"} ``` ### Technical Analysis The report generator builds HTML through formatted strings without applying HTML entity encoding. The target URL is directly user-controlled. Result fields may originate from the remote 17CE service or from an arbitrary JSON document supplied to `report.py`. An attacker can close the surrounding HTML element and inject new elements, event handlers, or script tags. Because the output is intended to be saved as an HTML file and opened in a brows ...[truncated 1356 chars]
Remediation
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T09 · Insecure Skill Coding Practices

Warning
Location
scripts/speedtest_ws.py:69
Finding

Authenticated Cookies Forwarded to Third-Party Monitoring Infrastructure

Content
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dict: task = { "txnid": int(time.time()), "nodetype": isp_list, "num": num, "Url": url, "TestType": "HTTP", "Host": host or "", "TimeOut": 20, "Request": rt, "NoCache": True, "Speed": 0, "Cookie": cookie or "", "Trace": False, "Referer": url, "UserAgent": agent or "curl/7.47.0", ``` The command-line argument is passed directly into that task: ```python parser.add_argument("--cookie", help="自定义 Cookie") ``` ```python task = build_task( url=args.url, isp_list=args.isp, area_list=args.area, num=args.num, pro_ids=args.pro_ids, rt=args.rt, host=args.host, cookie=args.cookie, agent=args.agent, ) ``` The resulting task is sent to 17CE: ```python await ws.send(json.dumps(task, ensure_ascii=False)) ``` ### Technical Analysis The Skill supports forwarding arbitrary HTTP cookies to the 17CE service, where distributed monitoring nodes use them when requesting the target. Cookies commonly contain authenticated session tokens, authorization state, or access to non-public application resources. WSS protects the connection in transit to the 17CE endpoint, but it does not prevent the receiving service or remote monitoring infrastructure from observing, retaining, or misusing the cookie. The implementation provides no warning, confirmation, domain binding, cookie-name allowlist, redaction, or requirement that the token ...[truncated 1114 chars]
Remediation
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T08 · Insecure Dependencies

Note
Location
requirements.txt:1
Finding

Dependencies Are Not Reproducibly Pinned

Content
View full analysis
=10.4 requests>=2.28.0 ``` ### Technical Analysis The dependency declarations specify only minimum versions and have no upper bounds, exact pins, lock file, or package hashes. A future installation can therefore resolve to versions that were not reviewed with the Skill. The package names themselves are legitimate and no typosquatting or known malicious package was identified in the audited files. The risk arises from non-reproducible dependency resolution and the possibility that a future compromised, vulnerable, or incompatible release will be installed automatically. ### Attack Path 1. The Skill is installed at a later date or in a different environment. 2. The package resolver selects the newest versions satisfying the lower bounds. 3. A selected release contains a vulnerability, malicious modification, or behavior incompatible with the audited code. 4. The dependency is imported by the Skill with the privileges of the invoking process. 5. The vulnerable or compromised dependency affects network handling or executes malicious package code. ### Impact Assessment Impact depends on the behavior of the selected dependency release. A compromised package could execute code with the privileges of the user running the Skill, while a vulnerable networking release could expose credentials, corrupt results, or permit denial of service. No present malicious dependency was confirmed; this is a supply-chain hardening deficiency that increases future installation risk. ]]>
Remediation
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Vulnerability Patterns
  • Data ExfiltrationExternal Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
  • Excessive AgencyUnrestricted Tool Access, Autonomous Decision Making, Scope Creep
  • Trigger AbuseOverly Broad Trigger, Shadow Command Trigger, Keyword Baiting Trigger
  • Taint TrackingDirect Taint Flow, Variable-Mediated Taint Flow, Credential Exfiltration Chain
  • MCP Least PrivilegeUnderdeclared Capability, Wildcard Permission, Missing Permission Declaration
Findings (32)

Context-Inappropriate Capability

High
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
99% confidence
Finding

The README embeds shared 17CE credentials and instructs the agent to use them by default in normal operation. Hard-coded third-party credentials are a real secret-handling vulnerability because they enable unauthorized use, quota theft, account abuse, and accidental disclosure to users, logs, or downstream tooling.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Ssd 3

High
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
99% confidence
Finding

The skill embeds and operationalizes shared account secrets, explicitly telling the agent to use and potentially expose them during standard execution. In context, this is especially dangerous because the secrets are not incidental examples; they are the prescribed authentication path for all users, magnifying the chance of credential leakage, abuse, quota exhaustion, and downstream compromise of the third-party account.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Tp4

High
Category
MCP Tool Poisoning
Confidence
96% confidence
Finding

The documented behavior says the skill performs a WebSocket-based speed test, but the actual described behavior includes authenticated API submission, secret handling, and extra request-shaping features outside that scope. This mismatch can mislead users and reviewers about what data is sent, what credentials are used, and what the skill is really capable of doing.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Context-Inappropriate Capability

High
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
99% confidence
Finding

The skill embeds hard-coded shared account credentials and instructs the agent to use them by default. Exposed credentials can be abused by anyone with access to the skill, lead to quota theft or account compromise, and normalize unsafe secret distribution practices.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Ssd 3

High
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
98% confidence
Finding

The skill both embeds shared credentials and encourages passing user-provided API passwords through bot actions and command-line arguments. Secrets in skill docs, prompts, process arguments, logs, or agent traces may be exposed to other users, operators, or telemetry systems.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Missing User Warnings

High
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
99% confidence
Finding

The script sends authentication material and optional sensitive metadata such as cookies, referer, host, and user-agent to 17CE over plain HTTP via both API_BASE and LEGACY_API_BASE. This allows any network observer or active man-in-the-middle to intercept or modify credentials and request contents, potentially leading to account compromise, session leakage, and tampered test submissions.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Vague Triggers

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
96% confidence
Finding

The trigger list is broad enough to activate on generic phrases like 'check website' or 'website slow', which can cause the skill to run in situations the user did not clearly intend. In this skill, unintended activation is more dangerous because execution sends targets to an external service and may consume shared credentials and external quota automatically.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Missing User Warnings

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
91% confidence
Finding

The skill description says it retrieves real-time speed data from global monitoring nodes via WebSocket but does not clearly warn users that their supplied URL will be transmitted to an external service. This is a genuine privacy and consent issue because users may provide internal, sensitive, or non-public endpoints without realizing they will be probed by third-party infrastructure.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Missing User Warnings

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
93% confidence
Finding

The instructions direct the agent to automatically test multiple AI API endpoints without warning the user that this initiates outbound probes to several third-party services. This increases risk because the action is autonomous, multi-target, and can create unexpected network activity, disclosure of user intent, and potential terms-of-service or monitoring issues.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Autonomous Decision Making

Medium
Category
Excessive Agency
Confidence
86% confidence
Finding

The instruction to 'automatically execute' external tests is a real safety issue because it authorizes autonomous network actions without an explicit confirmation boundary. In this skill, that is more dangerous than usual because the action fans out to multiple external endpoints and uses shared credentials, compounding consent, privacy, and abuse risks.

Content

Scanner excerpt · README.md (reported line 17)May include surrounding context.

md
**1. "Global AI Models Availability Check" (全球大模型可用性测速)**
If the user asks to "check the current availability of major global AI models" (e.g., "全球各大模型的当前可用性情况查看"):
1. You MUST automatically execute `scripts/speedtest_ws.py --json` against the following known core AI API endpoints locally.
   **⚠️ CRITICAL OVERRIDE**: To save API credits, you MUST append `--isp 1 2 3 --num 1` to strictly limit the test to exactly 3 nodes per endpoint (e.g., `python scripts/speedtest_ws.py api.openai.com --isp 1 2 3 --num 1 --json`).
   
   **Global LLM API Endpoints Array:**

Undeclared Tool Scope

Medium
Category
MCP Least Privilege
Confidence
89% confidence
Finding

The skill declares shell and network-capable behavior but does not declare any tool scope or permissions, making it harder to constrain or review what actions the agent may take. In a skill that can execute commands and contact external services, missing scope increases the chance of unintended or overbroad execution.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Missing User Warnings

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
90% confidence
Finding

The description omits a clear warning that target URLs and test activity will be sent to external 17CE infrastructure and potentially fanned out to global monitoring nodes. Users may unknowingly submit internal, sensitive, or private endpoints to a third party, causing confidentiality and exposure risks.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Vague Triggers

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
94% confidence
Finding

Broad trigger phrases like 'check website' or 'website slow' can activate the skill in many contexts where the user did not intend an external speed test. In a networked skill, accidental activation may transmit URLs or cause shell execution without clear user awareness.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Context-Inappropriate Capability

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
89% confidence
Finding

The skill extends from website speed testing into broad probing of multiple third-party AI API endpoints, which is outside the declared scope. This can cause unauthorized or unexpected external traffic, increase legal and policy risk, and turn a narrow utility into a generalized reconnaissance tool.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Autonomous Decision Making

Medium
Category
Excessive Agency
Confidence
80% confidence
Finding

The instruction to 'automatically execute' tests against a predefined list of third-party AI endpoints enables autonomous network actions without an explicit per-run approval step. In this context, that can generate unsolicited traffic to external services and expand the blast radius of accidental or malicious prompts.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 17)May include surrounding context.

md
**1. "Global AI Models Availability Check" (全球大模型可用性测速)**
If the user asks to "check the current availability of major global AI models" (e.g., "全球各大模型的当前可用性情况查看"):
1. You MUST automatically execute `scripts/speedtest_ws.py --json` against the following known core AI API endpoints locally.
   **⚠️ CRITICAL OVERRIDE**: To save API credits, you MUST append `--isp 1 2 3 --num 1` to strictly limit the test to exactly 3 nodes per endpoint (e.g., `python scripts/speedtest_ws.py api.openai.com --isp 1 2 3 --num 1 --json`).
   
   **Global LLM API Endpoints Array:**

Missing User Warnings

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
95% confidence
Finding

The skill tells the agent to use shared public credentials but does not warn users about credential exposure, quota exhaustion, logging, or responsibility for actions taken under that account. This can lead to accidental misuse and weak accountability around authenticated third-party operations.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Missing User Warnings

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
97% confidence
Finding

The HTML report interpolates untrusted fields such as url, Province, ISP, and SrcIP directly into HTML without escaping. If the input JSON or upstream WebSocket data is attacker-controlled or tampered with, this can produce stored/reflected HTML/JavaScript injection in the generated report, leading to XSS when a user opens the report in a browser.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Natural-Language Policy Violations

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
89% confidence
Finding

All human-facing strings in the docstring, argument help, error messages, and console output are hard-coded in Chinese. There is no opt-in, locale selection, or documented justification that this tool is intended only for a Chinese-speaking or region-specific audience.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Description-Behavior Mismatch

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
97% confidence
Finding

The skill description says it 'retrieves real-time speed data from monitoring nodes globally via WebSocket.' In the code, both API endpoints are plain HTTP URLs, and the implementation only submits a test job via requests.post and reports a task/result URL; there is no WebSocket client or logic to stream or collect real-time node results.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Tainted flow: 'data' from requests.post (line 207, network input) → requests.post (network output)

Medium
Category
Data Flow
Confidence
65% confidence
Finding

Data from a source is assigned to a variable that is later passed to a sink, creating a variable-mediated taint flow.

Content

Scanner excerpt · scripts/speedtest.py (reported line 90)May include surrounding context.

python
data.append(("agent", agent))

    try:
        response = requests.post(
            f"{API_BASE}/http",
            data=data,
            timeout=30

Tainted flow: 'data' from requests.post (line 207, network input) → requests.post (network output)

Medium
Category
Data Flow
Confidence
65% confidence
Finding

Data from a source is assigned to a variable that is later passed to a sink, creating a variable-mediated taint flow.

Content

Scanner excerpt · scripts/speedtest.py (reported line 148)May include surrounding context.

python
data.append(("agent", agent))

    try:
        response = requests.post(
            f"{LEGACY_API_BASE}/http",
            data=data,
            timeout=30

Missing User Warnings

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
93% confidence
Finding

This code builds a WebSocket URL from the provided account email and API password-derived authentication code, then sends the测速 task to the remote 17CE service. Although the script prints basic progress messages, it does not warn the user that their supplied account identifier and request details will be transmitted externally.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Natural-Language Policy Violations

Low
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
78% confidence
Finding

The built-in command is presented with a Chinese name and example phrasing for activation, without indicating that users may choose another language. This can be a language/locale policy issue because the skill appears to privilege a specific language path without explicit user choice or justification.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Natural-Language Policy Violations

Low
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
91% confidence
Finding

The document declares lang="zh-CN", and the visible UI text throughout the page is Chinese-only. This imposes a specific language/locale without any indication of user opt-in or justification for a region-specific constraint, which matches the policy-violation category for language/locale handling.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Natural-Language Policy Violations

Low
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
95% confidence
Finding

The document declares lang="zh-CN", and all visible UI text is presented in Chinese, which imposes a specific language/locale on users. Under the policy, locale-specific behavior should either provide user opt-in/choice or be clearly justified as region-specific.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.