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Security audit

Deepgram Asr

Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk

Overview

The skill matches its Deepgram transcription purpose, but it should be reviewed because its API call is constructed incorrectly and may mishandle the Deepgram API key.

Review or fix the curl command before installing. Only use this skill for audio you are comfortable sending to Deepgram, use a narrowly scoped Deepgram key with billing limits where possible, and rotate the key if this script has already been run in an environment where command errors or proxy logs may have captured arguments.

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Insecure Skill Coding PracticesFinds exploitable flaws such as hardcoded secrets or command injection
  • Skill Instruction HijackingAlters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
  • Agent Memory PoisoningWrites attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
  • Remote Payload Retrieval and ExecutionFetches external code whose behavior can change after review
  • Embedded Malicious CodeShips malicious scripts inside the skill and executes them locally
Findings (1)

T09 · Insecure Skill Coding Practices

Warning
Location
scripts/transcribe.sh:106
Finding

Incorrect curl End-of-Options Placement Can Expose the API Key and Break Requests

Content
View full analysis
Remediation
View remediation
Vulnerability Patterns
  • Data ExfiltrationExternal Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
  • Supply ChainUnpinned Dependencies, External Script Fetching, Obfuscated Code
  • MCP Least PrivilegeUnderdeclared Capability, Wildcard Permission, Missing Permission Declaration
  • Prompt InjectionInstruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
  • Privilege EscalationExcessive Permissions, Sudo/Root Execution, Credential Access
Findings (6)

External Script Fetching

High
Category
Supply Chain
Confidence
90% confidence
Finding

Remote code is downloaded and executed. This bypasses code review and could introduce malicious code.

Content

Scanner excerpt · scripts/transcribe.sh (reported line 108)May include surrounding context.

sh
trap 'rm -f "$tmpfile"' EXIT

# Call API (-- prevents option injection from filenames starting with -)
http_code=$(curl -sS -w '%{http_code}' -o "$tmpfile" -- "$url" \
  -H "Authorization: Token $DEEPGRAM_API_KEY" \
  -H "Content-Type: ${mime}" \
  --data-binary "@${in}")

Undeclared Tool Scope

Medium
Category
MCP Least Privilege
Confidence
89% confidence
Finding

The skill advertises shell-based execution via a script but does not declare any explicit tool scope such as permissions or allowed-tools. That creates an avoidable trust and policy gap: an agent may invoke shell capabilities without a clear least-privilege contract, increasing the chance of unintended command execution or broader filesystem/network access than reviewers expect.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Confidence
60% confidence
Finding

Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 60)May include surrounding context.

md
esac

# Build URL
url="https://api.deepgram.com/v1/listen?model=${model}&smart_format=true&punctuate=true"
if [[ -n "$language" ]]; then
  url="${url}&language=${language}"
fi

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Confidence
60% confidence
Finding

Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.

Content

Scanner excerpt · scripts/transcribe.sh (reported line 97)May include surrounding context.

sh
esac

# Build URL
url="https://api.deepgram.com/v1/listen?model=${model}&smart_format=true&punctuate=true"
if [[ -n "$language" ]]; then
  url="${url}&language=${language}"
fi

Missing User Warnings

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
94% confidence
Finding

The script uploads the provided audio file to Deepgram via an HTTP request, which transmits potentially sensitive user data off the local system. While this behavior is inferable from the script's purpose, there is no explicit confirmation prompt or user-facing disclosure near execution that the audio content will be sent to a third-party service.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Confidence
70% confidence
Finding

Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.

Content

Scanner excerpt · scripts/transcribe.sh (reported line 108)May include surrounding context.

sh
trap 'rm -f "$tmpfile"' EXIT

# Call API (-- prevents option injection from filenames starting with -)
http_code=$(curl -sS -w '%{http_code}' -o "$tmpfile" -- "$url" \
  -H "Authorization: Token $DEEPGRAM_API_KEY" \
  -H "Content-Type: ${mime}" \
  --data-binary "@${in}")