T05 · Unauthorized Access and Privilege Escalation
- Location
SKILL.md:421- Finding
Read-Only Safety Declaration Contradicted by Privileged Agent Restart Instructions
- Content
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Vulnerability Details
File Location:
SKILL.md:17andSKILL.md:421-422
Vulnerability Type: Safety-boundary violation and unauthorized state-changing operation
Risk Level: MediumVulnerable Code
yaml metadata: safety: read-only author: network-security-skills-suite version: "1.0.0" openclaw: '{"emoji":"🔍","safetyTier":"read-only","requires":{"bins":["ssh"],"env":[]},"tags":["arista","eos","health"],"mcpDependencies":[],"egressEndpoints":[]}'text 4. If the agent is not running, attempt: `agent [name] shutdown` then `no agent [name] shutdown` in configuration mode (note: this is a config change)Technical Analysis
The Skill explicitly declares both
safety: read-onlyandsafetyTier: read-only, but its recovery procedure instructs the operator or executing agent to enter EOS configuration mode and issue commands that modify device state.The commands
agent [name] shutdownandno agent [name] shutdownadministratively stop and restart an EOS subsystem agent. They therefore require privileges beyond the stated privilege-1 diagnostic prerequisite and are not read-only operations. Restarting an agent can temporarily disable the protocol or subsystem it controls.The placeholder
[name]also permits selection of operationally critical agents such as BGP, STP, routing-information-base, bridging, or ASIC-management agents. Although the document acknowledges that the operation is a configuration change, this warning does not resolve the contradiction with the machine-readable safety metadata. An automation framework may trust that metadata when approving or executing the Skill.No evidence of malicious intent, credential theft, persistence, external payload retrieval, or arbitrary command construction was found. The issue is a misrepresented privilege and operational safety boundary.
Attack Path
- An automation platform or operator loads the Skill based on ...[truncated 1661 chars]
- Remediation
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Remediation Suggestions
- Remove the agent restart commands from this read-only health-check Skill. Limit the procedure to collecting agent state, logs, crash information, and escalation data.
- Move all state-changing recovery operations into a separately classified remediation Skill whose metadata clearly indicates that configuration changes and service disruption are possible.
- If restart guidance must remain, change the safety metadata so it no longer claims a read-only tier.
- Require explicit human confirmation immediately before any restart, including the selected agent name and its affected subsystem.
- Require validation of configuration authorization, a maintenance window, redundancy status, and an approved change record before execution.
- Add agent-specific impact warnings and prohibit automated substitution of arbitrary or unvalidated agent names.
- Collect logs and crash artifacts before restarting an agent so diagnostic evidence is preserved.
- Add pre-change and post-change checks, including protocol-neighbor state, MLAG status, VXLAN/EVPN health, and traffic-impact verification.
- Document a rollback and escalation procedure, including when the operator must stop and contact Arista TAC rather than restart the agent.
