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Security audit

Trading DevBox POC

Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk

Overview

This trading skill is not visibly malicious, but it enables wallet creation and live trading through an unreviewed plugin with weak consent and safety boundaries.

Review before installing. Only use this if you can verify the exact plugin package and version, understand where wallet keys are stored, and are comfortable with live-trading risk. Treat any deployment or funded wallet use as real financial activity unless the plugin independently proves it is sandbox-only.

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Insecure DependenciesIntroduces malicious components through unsafe dependency sources
  • Skill Instruction HijackingAlters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
  • Agent Memory PoisoningWrites attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
  • Remote Payload Retrieval and ExecutionFetches external code whose behavior can change after review
  • Embedded Malicious CodeShips malicious scripts inside the skill and executes them locally
Findings (1)

T08 · Insecure Dependencies

Error
Location
SKILL.md:14
Finding

Unpinned and Unverifiable Financial Plugin Installation

Content
View full analysis

Vulnerability Details

File Location: SKILL.md, lines 14–20
Vulnerability Type: Unpinned third-party dependency with sensitive wallet and live-trading capabilities
Risk Level: High

Vulnerable Code Snippet

markdown
## Setup

Install the OpenClaw plugin:

```bash
openclaw plugins install devbox-poc

Zero user interaction. Wallet auto-generated on first run.

text

### Technical Analysis

The setup instructions install the registry-resolved `devbox-poc` plugin without specifying an immutable version, integrity digest, verified publisher, or trusted source repository. The plugin implementation is not included in the audited project, so its behavior cannot be inspected or compared against the documentation.

The dependency is particularly sensitive because the document states that it automatically generates a wallet and supports deployment to live trading. The declared description of a “POC demo with mock data” also conflicts with the documented live-trading behavior, making the plugin's actual operational scope unclear.

An attacker who compromises the package, publisher account, registry resolution process, or an unpinned future release could cause users to install modified code under the legitimate-looking plugin name.

### Attack Path

1. An attacker compromises the plugin publisher account or distribution registry, substitutes the package, or publishes a malicious future release under the resolved package name.
2. A user follows the documented setup command without receiving a version or integrity guarantee.
3. OpenClaw resolves, installs, and loads the attacker-controlled plugin.
4. The plugin executes with whatever wallet, filesystem, network, and trading permissions the OpenClaw environment grants it.
5. The malicious plugin can target generated wallet material, falsify strategy results, alter deployment parameters, or initiate unauthorized financial operations.

### Impact Assessment

Successful exploitation may allow execution of
...[truncated 500 chars]
Remediation
View remediation

Remediation Suggestions

  1. Pin the plugin to a reviewed, immutable version rather than resolving the latest registry release.
  2. Verify the package with a cryptographic integrity digest and authenticated publisher signature.
  3. Document the canonical source repository, package registry, publisher identity, and verification procedure.
  4. Include or vendor the reviewable plugin implementation when practical so its wallet and trading behavior can be audited.
  5. Require explicit, informed user confirmation before generating a wallet or enabling live trading.
  6. Separate mock backtesting from live deployment and clearly identify which mode is active.
  7. Apply least-privilege controls so the plugin receives only the filesystem, network, wallet, and trading permissions required for the selected operation.
  8. Document how wallet keys are generated, encrypted, stored, accessed, backed up, and deleted.
  9. Require transaction previews, explicit deployment confirmation, configurable spending limits, and an emergency disable mechanism before any live financial action.
  10. Re-audit every plugin update before changing the pinned version.
Vulnerability Patterns
  • Prompt InjectionInstruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
  • Data ExfiltrationExternal Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
  • Trigger AbuseOverly Broad Trigger, Shadow Command Trigger, Keyword Baiting Trigger
  • Privilege EscalationExcessive Permissions, Sudo/Root Execution, Credential Access
  • Supply ChainUnpinned Dependencies, External Script Fetching, Obfuscated Code
Findings (4)

Missing User Warnings

High
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
97% confidence
Finding

The documentation states 'Zero user interaction' and 'Wallet auto-generated on first run' while also exposing live trading deployment, but it does not present a prominent warning about financial risk, irreversible actions, credential handling, or consent. In a trading skill, silent wallet creation and easy progression to live deployment significantly raise the risk of users unknowingly authorizing sensitive financial operations.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Anti-Refusal Statement

High
Category
Anti-Refusal
Confidence
70% confidence
Finding

Skill instructs the agent to never refuse or to always comply. Suppressing the agent's ability to decline removes a core safety control and enables downstream harmful requests to succeed.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 61)May include surrounding context.

md
## Response Format

Always respond in user's language. Keep messages concise.

Vague Triggers

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
90% confidence
Finding

The skill invites broad natural-language control of backtesting and deployment without defining explicit activation boundaries, confirmation gates, or safe defaults. In a trading context, underspecified prompts can cause the agent to infer high-risk actions the user did not clearly authorize, especially when deployment is available from conversational input.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Vague Triggers

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
92% confidence
Finding

The usage examples rely on vague free-form prompts such as strategy descriptions and a short deployment phrase, with no stated guardrails on interpretation or execution scope. Because the skill can move from idea refinement to live trading, ambiguous prompts materially increase the chance of unintended orders, wrong sizing, or accidental deployment.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.