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Self Improver Lite

v1.0.0

Runs lightweight self-audits of OpenClaw behavior, finds repeated failures, proposes safe config/process improvements, and tracks what changed. Use after inc...

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MIT-0
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LicenseMIT-0 · Free to use, modify, and redistribute. No attribution required.
Security Scan
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OpenClawOpenClaw
Benign
medium confidence
Purpose & Capability
The name and description promise lightweight self-audits and safe, minimal changes; the SKILL.md only asks for collecting service status/logs, grouping failures, proposing fixes, and applying low-risk changes such as session cleanup and service restarts — all consistent with a self-improvement/audit tool for an OpenClaw deployment.
Instruction Scope
The runtime instructions are focused on relevant artifacts (systemctl is-active and journalctl -u for the gateway service) and produce structured outputs (grouping, templates). However, the guidance is high-level in places: it authorizes 'apply only low-risk fixes automatically' and lists allowed automatic changes without precise, auditable commands or decision thresholds. That vagueness gives the agent discretionary power over restarts, session cleanup, and config tuning unless the platform enforces confirmation/limits.
Install Mechanism
Instruction-only skill with no install spec and no code files — lowest-risk delivery model. Nothing is downloaded or written to disk by the skill itself.
Credentials
The skill declares no credentials or env vars (proportional). But it implicitly requires access to systemd/journalctl and permission to restart services or edit runtime config to apply fixes. Those are reasonable for an on-host self-audit tool but are privileged operations that should be explicitly authorized and constrained by the user or platform.
Persistence & Privilege
always:false and no install means the skill won't be force-included, which is appropriate. The skill does assume the ability to perform system-level actions during runs; because agents can invoke skills autonomously by default, ensure per-action approvals or conservative autonomy settings so restarts and cleanup are not performed unexpectedly.
Assessment
This skill appears to do what it says: read recent service status/logs, identify recurring failures, and propose or perform small, reversible fixes (e.g., session cleanup, gateway restart, safe config tweaks). Before installing or running it in production: (1) Confirm where the agent will run and whether it has systemd/journalctl access; (2) Require explicit user approval for any restart, config edit, or cleanup action (the SKILL.md's 'auto-allowed' list should be enforced by the platform, not left to the skill); (3) Ensure backups and rollback paths exist and are tested; (4) Restrict the agent's ability to read broader logs or sensitive files beyond the service units it needs; (5) Run initially in a staging environment to validate the decision thresholds and outputs. If you want stronger guarantees, ask the developer to replace vague rules ('low-risk fixes') with explicit, auditable command lists and per-action confirmation prompts.

Like a lobster shell, security has layers — review code before you run it.

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License

MIT-0
Free to use, modify, and redistribute. No attribution required.

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