T08 · Insecure Dependencies
- Location
install.sh:13- Finding
Unpinned dependencies are installed into the active Python environment
- Content
View full analysis
=1.0.0", "python-dotenv>=1.0.0"], ``` ### Technical Analysis The installer retrieves `openai` and `python-dotenv` without exact version pins, integrity hashes, a lockfile, or an isolated virtual environment. The manifest's `>=` constraints similarly permit any later release. Consequently, the code installed and imported by the Skill can change after the Skill itself has been audited. The direct package names are legitimate and no malicious dependency is currently demonstrated, but this installation method leaves the Skill exposed to compromised upstream releases, dependency-account takeover, and incompatible future versions. Using the active `pip3` also modifies the user's current Python environment rather than a Skill-specific environment. This can create dependency conflicts and expands the scope of package installation beyond what is necessary for the Skill. ### Attack Path 1. An attacker compromises a permitted package release or its publishing account. 2. A new malicious version is published under the legitimate package name. 3. A user runs `install.sh`. 4. `pip3` resolves and downloads the newest permitted release without hash verification. 5. Package-controlled code executes during installation or when `repurpose.py` imports the package. 6. The malicious package obtains the privileges of the user running the installer or Skill. ### Impact Assessment A compromised dependency could read files accessible to the current user, including the Skill's OpenAI API key and article contents; make network requests; alter the user's Python environment; or execute arbi ...[truncated 276 chars]- Remediation
View remediation
