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Security audit

Ai Content Tailor

Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk

Overview

This appears to be a legitimate content-rewriting skill, but its installer and uninstaller can write or delete files outside the skill directory.

Review before installing. Use this only with articles you are comfortable sending to OpenAI, avoid putting sensitive drafts or secrets in inputs, and do not run uninstall.sh until the BASE_DIR bug is fixed or you have verified the exact .env and output paths it will remove. Prefer a virtual environment and a securely permissioned API key instead of the provided global pip install and plaintext .env setup.

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Insecure DependenciesIntroduces malicious components through unsafe dependency sources
  • Insecure Skill Coding PracticesFinds exploitable flaws such as hardcoded secrets or command injection
  • Skill Instruction HijackingAlters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
  • Agent Memory PoisoningWrites attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
  • Remote Payload Retrieval and ExecutionFetches external code whose behavior can change after review
Findings (3)

T08 · Insecure Dependencies

Warning
Location
install.sh:13
Finding

Unpinned dependencies are installed into the active Python environment

Content
View full analysis
=1.0.0", "python-dotenv>=1.0.0"], ``` ### Technical Analysis The installer retrieves `openai` and `python-dotenv` without exact version pins, integrity hashes, a lockfile, or an isolated virtual environment. The manifest's `>=` constraints similarly permit any later release. Consequently, the code installed and imported by the Skill can change after the Skill itself has been audited. The direct package names are legitimate and no malicious dependency is currently demonstrated, but this installation method leaves the Skill exposed to compromised upstream releases, dependency-account takeover, and incompatible future versions. Using the active `pip3` also modifies the user's current Python environment rather than a Skill-specific environment. This can create dependency conflicts and expands the scope of package installation beyond what is necessary for the Skill. ### Attack Path 1. An attacker compromises a permitted package release or its publishing account. 2. A new malicious version is published under the legitimate package name. 3. A user runs `install.sh`. 4. `pip3` resolves and downloads the newest permitted release without hash verification. 5. Package-controlled code executes during installation or when `repurpose.py` imports the package. 6. The malicious package obtains the privileges of the user running the installer or Skill. ### Impact Assessment A compromised dependency could read files accessible to the current user, including the Skill's OpenAI API key and article contents; make network requests; alter the user's Python environment; or execute arbi ...[truncated 276 chars]
Remediation
View remediation

T09 · Insecure Skill Coding Practices

Warning
Location
install.sh:18
Finding

OpenAI API key file is created without restrictive permissions

Content
View full analysis
"$BASE_DIR/.env" << 'EOF' # OpenAI API Configuration OPENAI_API_KEY=your-api-key-here EOF echo "⚠️ 请编辑 $BASE_DIR/.env 文件,填入你的 OPENAI_API_KEY" fi ``` ### Technical Analysis The installer asks the user to place an OpenAI API key in a plaintext `.env` file, but it neither establishes a restrictive umask nor explicitly applies mode `0600`. The resulting permissions depend on the user's current umask. In an environment with a permissive umask, the file may be readable by other local users or processes. API-key access is necessary for the declared OpenAI functionality, but making the credential potentially accessible outside the owning account exceeds the minimum access required. This is aggravated by the separate base-directory calculation defect: the installer creates the file in the parent of the Skill directory, while `source/repurpose.py` loads `.env` from the Skill directory. ### Attack Path 1. The user runs `install.sh` under a permissive umask. 2. The installer creates `.env` without an explicit restrictive mode. 3. The user replaces the placeholder with a valid OpenAI API key. 4. Another local account or process with access to that path reads the file. 5. The exposed key is used to issue unauthorized OpenAI API requests. Exploitation requires local filesystem access and permissions sufficient to read the resulting file. ### Impact Assessment The exposed credential can allow unauthorized use of the victim's OpenAI account within the key's permissions and limits. This may result in API charges, quota exhaustion, service disruption, or access to capabilities granted to that key. This issue does not itself grant operating-system privilege escalation. Its scope is the OpenAI API autho ...[truncated 46 chars]
Remediation
View remediation
"$SCRIPT_DIR/.env" <<'EOF' # OpenAI API Configuration OPENAI_API_KEY=your-api-key-here EOF chmod 600 "$SCRIPT_DIR/.env" ``` 3. Correct the base directory so the installer and Python implementation use the same Skill-local file. 4. Add `.env` to version-control and packaging exclusion rules. 5. Document that the key must never be committed, shared, or included in generated output. 6. Consider supporting scoped or restricted API credentials where the provider permits them. ]]>

T09 · Insecure Skill Coding Practices

Error
Location
uninstall.sh:4
Finding

Incorrect base-directory calculation can delete data outside the Skill directory

Content
View full analysis
Remediation
View remediation
Vulnerability Patterns
  • Data ExfiltrationExternal Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
  • Privilege EscalationExcessive Permissions, Sudo/Root Execution, Credential Access
  • Tool MisuseTool Parameter Abuse, Chaining Abuse, Unsafe Defaults
  • Prompt InjectionInstruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
  • Supply ChainUnpinned Dependencies, External Script Fetching, Obfuscated Code
Findings (17)

Credential Access

High
Category
Privilege Escalation
Confidence
60% confidence
Finding

Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 133)May include surrounding context.

md
OPENAI_API_KEY = os.getenv("OPENAI_API_KEY")
if not OPENAI_API_KEY:
    print("❌ 未设置 OPENAI_API_KEY,请编辑 .env 文件")
    sys.exit(1)

try:

Credential Access

High
Category
Privilege Escalation
Confidence
60% confidence
Finding

Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.

Content

Scanner excerpt · install.sh (reported line 22)May include surrounding context.

sh
OPENAI_API_KEY = os.getenv("OPENAI_API_KEY")
if not OPENAI_API_KEY:
    print("❌ 未设置 OPENAI_API_KEY,请编辑 .env 文件")
    sys.exit(1)

try:

Credential Access

High
Category
Privilege Escalation
Confidence
60% confidence
Finding

Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.

Content

Scanner excerpt · install.sh (reported line 27)May include surrounding context.

sh
OPENAI_API_KEY = os.getenv("OPENAI_API_KEY")
if not OPENAI_API_KEY:
    print("❌ 未设置 OPENAI_API_KEY,请编辑 .env 文件")
    sys.exit(1)

try:

Credential Access

High
Category
Privilege Escalation
Confidence
60% confidence
Finding

Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.

Content

Scanner excerpt · source/repurpose.py (reported line 19)May include surrounding context.

python
OPENAI_API_KEY = os.getenv("OPENAI_API_KEY")
if not OPENAI_API_KEY:
    print("❌ 未设置 OPENAI_API_KEY,请编辑 .env 文件")
    sys.exit(1)

try:

Credential Access

High
Category
Privilege Escalation
Confidence
60% confidence
Finding

Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.

Content

Scanner excerpt · install.sh (reported line 21)May include surrounding context.

sh
read -p "是否删除配置文件和输出?(y/N): " -n 1 -r
echo
if [[ $REPLY =~ ^[Yy]$ ]]; then
    rm -f "$BASE_DIR/.env"
    rm -rf "$BASE_DIR/output"
    echo "✅ 已删除配置和输出"
fi

Credential Access

High
Category
Privilege Escalation
Confidence
60% confidence
Finding

Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.

Content

Scanner excerpt · install.sh (reported line 23)May include surrounding context.

sh
read -p "是否删除配置文件和输出?(y/N): " -n 1 -r
echo
if [[ $REPLY =~ ^[Yy]$ ]]; then
    rm -f "$BASE_DIR/.env"
    rm -rf "$BASE_DIR/output"
    echo "✅ 已删除配置和输出"
fi

Credential Access

High
Category
Privilege Escalation
Confidence
60% confidence
Finding

Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.

Content

Scanner excerpt · source/repurpose.py (reported line 15)May include surrounding context.

python
read -p "是否删除配置文件和输出?(y/N): " -n 1 -r
echo
if [[ $REPLY =~ ^[Yy]$ ]]; then
    rm -f "$BASE_DIR/.env"
    rm -rf "$BASE_DIR/output"
    echo "✅ 已删除配置和输出"
fi

Credential Access

High
Category
Privilege Escalation
Confidence
60% confidence
Finding

Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.

Content

Scanner excerpt · uninstall.sh (reported line 13)May include surrounding context.

sh
read -p "是否删除配置文件和输出?(y/N): " -n 1 -r
echo
if [[ $REPLY =~ ^[Yy]$ ]]; then
    rm -f "$BASE_DIR/.env"
    rm -rf "$BASE_DIR/output"
    echo "✅ 已删除配置和输出"
fi

Tool Parameter Abuse

High
Category
Tool Misuse
Confidence
95% confidence
Finding

Tool parameters are crafted to achieve unintended or unsafe behavior. Parameter abuse can bypass intended safety checks (e.g. shell=True, --force, dangerous glob patterns).

Content

Scanner excerpt · uninstall.sh (reported line 13)May include surrounding context.

sh
read -p "是否删除配置文件和输出?(y/N): " -n 1 -r
echo
if [[ $REPLY =~ ^[Yy]$ ]]; then
    rm -f "$BASE_DIR/.env"
    rm -rf "$BASE_DIR/output"
    echo "✅ 已删除配置和输出"
fi

Tool Parameter Abuse

High
Category
Tool Misuse
Confidence
95% confidence
Finding

Tool parameters are crafted to achieve unintended or unsafe behavior. Parameter abuse can bypass intended safety checks (e.g. shell=True, --force, dangerous glob patterns).

Content

Scanner excerpt · uninstall.sh (reported line 14)May include surrounding context.

sh
echo
if [[ $REPLY =~ ^[Yy]$ ]]; then
    rm -f "$BASE_DIR/.env"
    rm -rf "$BASE_DIR/output"
    echo "✅ 已删除配置和输出"
fi

Missing User Warnings

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
95% confidence
Finding

The skill instructs users to configure an OpenAI API key and describes LLM-based rewriting, but it does not explicitly warn that the input article content will be transmitted to a third-party API for processing. This creates a privacy and data-handling risk because users may submit proprietary, confidential, or personal content without informed consent.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Natural-Language Policy Violations

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
97% confidence
Finding

Multiple user-facing messages in the script are written only in Chinese, including installation status and instructions. This forces a specific language for users without opt-in and matches the policy category for language or locale violations.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Natural-Language Policy Violations

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
92% confidence
Finding

The manifest description is entirely in Chinese and describes the skill's behavior in a way that implies a Chinese-language, China-platform-specific workflow. There is no indication that users can choose another language or locale, and no documented justification that this skill is restricted to Chinese-language users only.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Natural-Language Policy Violations

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
94% confidence
Finding

The title and user-facing strings indicate the skill is designed and presented exclusively in Chinese, and the prompt templates require Chinese output styles for specific platforms. There is no indication that users can opt into another language or locale, which can violate language/locale policy when no explicit choice is offered.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Missing User Warnings

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
97% confidence
Finding

The skill sends the full article content to an external OpenAI API for rewriting without any consent prompt, disclosure, redaction step, or data-classification check. If users process proprietary, personal, or otherwise sensitive drafts, that content leaves the local environment and may be exposed to third-party processing, violating privacy expectations or organizational policy.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Natural-Language Policy Violations

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
96% confidence
Finding

The script's natural-language output and prompt are entirely in Chinese, which imposes a specific language on users without opt-in. This matches the language/locale policy concern because the file provides no alternative language handling or justification for being Chinese-only.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Natural-Language Policy Violations

Low
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
86% confidence
Finding

The natural-language content of the skill description, parameters, and examples is presented in Chinese, and there is no indication that users may select another language or that the skill is intentionally limited to a Chinese-speaking context. Under the language/locale policy, forcing a specific language without opt-in can be a policy concern unless the restriction is documented and justified.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.