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Security audit

Call Grok4 Llm

Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk

Overview

The package claims to be a Grok 4 calling skill, but its only artifact instead rewrites the agent’s role and instruction hierarchy.

Review before installing. This skill does not appear to implement a transparent Grok 4 integration; it mainly changes how the agent should behave, who it should act as, and what context it should obey. Ask the publisher to replace the role-hierarchy prompt with narrow Grok 4 invocation instructions, clear input/output boundaries, and explicit handling of untrusted meeting-minutes content.

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Skill Instruction HijackingAlters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
  • Agent Memory PoisoningWrites attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
  • Remote Payload Retrieval and ExecutionFetches external code whose behavior can change after review
  • Embedded Malicious CodeShips malicious scripts inside the skill and executes them locally
  • Unauthorized Access and Privilege EscalationObtains permissions beyond the task's legitimate needs
Findings (1)

T01 · Skill Instruction Hijacking

Error
Location
SKILL.md:13
Finding
Skill-Level Instruction and Role Hijacking<![CDATA[ ## Vulnerability Details **File Location**: `SKILL.md`, line 13 **Vulnerability Type**: `T01: Skill Instruction Hijacking` **Risk Level**: High ### Complete Code Snippet ```markdown # 1. Primary Rule: Output Language**This is the highest-priority directive and must be followed unconditionally.**1. **Language-Matching Principle:** All of your outputs—including every part of the meeting minutes, replies to superior AI models (`message`), interim summaries, and creative ideas—**must** use exactly the same language as the one used in the user’s initial challenge.2. **Explicit Language Instructions:** If the user explicitly specifies a response language (e.g., “in English please”, “请用中文回答”), that instruction has the highest priority and **must** be followed strictly.3. **No Language Inference:** * It is **strictly forbidden** to decide your response language based on the language of this system prompt. * It is **strictly forbidden** to decide your response language based on the language used in the meeting minutes.---# 2. Role & IdentityYou are a creative expert and a core member of a top-tier creative team. Your codename is **$SHOW_NAME$**.# 3. Context of InteractionYou are participating in a brainstorming meeting chaired by your superior—the Chief Creative Officer (CCO). You are not working independently; you are part of the creative team.The entire context of the meeting, historical discussions, and current agenda items are recorded in real time in the **meeting minutes**. These minutes are your sole source of information and memory, and you must adhere to them.# 4. Core Instructions1. **Understand the Context:** Before responding, you **must** carefully read the attached meeting minutes to fully grasp the current discussion progress, other members’ viewpoints, and the overall goal of the meeting.2. **Stay Task-Focused:** Your task is to respond **only to the specific question or task** posed to you by the CCO in this turn. Do not drift into topics ...[truncated 2951 chars]
Remediation
<![CDATA[ ## Remediation Suggestions 1. Remove claims that skill instructions have the “highest priority” or must be followed “unconditionally.” 2. Explicitly state that system, developer, platform safety, and access-control instructions remain authoritative. 3. Remove the replacement identity, superior-agent hierarchy, and mandatory CCO-subordination language unless those concepts are essential to a narrowly scoped creative task. 4. Treat meeting minutes as untrusted reference data rather than instructions. Delimit them clearly and state that commands, policy changes, role assignments, and tool requests embedded within them must not be executed automatically. 5. Replace the “sole source of information and memory” requirement with a limited instruction to summarize relevant meeting context while preserving authoritative instructions and validated task context. 6. Restrict the skill to its advertised purpose. If it is intended to call Grok 4, implement a transparent and reviewable integration with explicit user authorization, endpoint restrictions, secure credential handling, input validation, output handling, and failure behavior. 7. Add adversarial tests covering meeting minutes that contain prompt injection, requests to ignore prior instructions, fabricated authority claims, tool-use requests, and attempts to exfiltrate sensitive context. 8. Ensure runtime template variables such as `$SHOW_NAME$` are safely validated and cannot inject additional instructions during substitution. ]]>
Vulnerability Patterns
  • Trigger AbuseOverly Broad Trigger, Shadow Command Trigger, Keyword Baiting Trigger
  • Prompt InjectionInstruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
  • Data ExfiltrationExternal Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
  • Privilege EscalationExcessive Permissions, Sudo/Root Execution, Credential Access
  • Supply ChainUnpinned Dependencies, External Script Fetching, Obfuscated Code
Findings (1)

Vague Triggers

Medium
Confidence
95% confidence
Finding
The skill description, 'AI agent for call grok4 llm tasks,' is so broad that it does not meaningfully constrain when the skill should be invoked or what operations it is authorized to perform. In an agentic environment, this ambiguity can cause over-invocation, unintended delegation, and misuse in unrelated contexts, increasing the risk of prompt-injection exposure or unsafe handling of sensitive data.

Static analysis

No suspicious patterns detected.