T08 · Insecure Dependencies
- Location
requirements.txt:1- Finding
Unbounded Third-Party Dependency Installation
- Content
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=0.23.0 ``` `SKILL.md:27-30`: ```bash pip install -r requirements.txt ``` ### Technical Analysis The dependency specification permits any `httpx` release at or above version 0.23.0. It does not impose an upper bound, select an exact reviewed release, or verify the downloaded artifact with a cryptographic hash. Consequently, installations at different times can resolve to different code. A future compromised, malicious, or incompatible release could be installed without any change to the audited Skill package. The documented command also relies on the user's default Python package index and package-source configuration. The audit did not find evidence that the current `httpx` package is malicious. The risk arises from allowing unreviewed future artifacts to become part of the Skill's effective executable code. ### Attack Path 1. An attacker compromises a future permitted dependency release, its maintainer account, or the package-distribution channel. 2. A user follows the Skill instructions and runs `pip install -r requirements.txt`. 3. The package resolver selects the compromised release because it satisfies `httpx>=0.23.0`. 4. Malicious package code executes during installation, import, or HTTP-client use. 5. The code inherits the privileges and accessible data of the user running the Skill. ### Impact Assessment Successful exploitation could provide code execution with the invoking user's privileges. Because the Skill reads `UPKUAJING_API_KEY`, sends paid requests, and processes LinkedIn query results, compromised dependency code could potentially access: - The API key from the process environment or `~/.upkuajing/.env` - Company and person identifiers submitted by the user - API responses and ac ...[truncated 188 chars]- Remediation
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