T09 · Insecure Skill Coding Practices
- Location
scripts/run.py:81- Finding
Unrestricted API Endpoint Allows Credential and Medical Data Exfiltration
- Content
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- Remediation
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Security audit
Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk
This medical DRG helper is mostly coherent, but its configurable API endpoint could expose sensitive case text and the API key if misused.
Install only if you are comfortable sending DRG case text to the configured medical model endpoint. Use the documented default or another approved HTTPS endpoint, de-identify real patient data first, protect the appkey, and store --output files only where medical data is allowed to reside.
scripts/run.py:81Unrestricted API Endpoint Allows Credential and Medical Data Exfiltration
The skill manifest declares no explicit tool scope or permissions, yet the package description and detected capabilities indicate it can read files, write output files, and make network requests to an external model API. Without an allowlist in the manifest, a caller cannot easily constrain or audit those capabilities, increasing the risk of unintended data access or exfiltration when handling sensitive medical text.
This skill sends raw user-supplied discharge summaries and related DRG question content to an external HTTPS API, and the data is likely to contain highly sensitive medical information. Even if the endpoint is described as an internal medical model, the script provides no minimization, consent prompt, masking, or transmission disclosure, so operators can unintentionally exfiltrate protected health information to a remote service.
The script persists both the original question text and model answer to an output file, which can store sensitive discharge content on disk in plaintext. In a medical workflow this creates additional confidentiality and retention risk, especially if output paths point to shared directories, logs, or long-lived artifacts without any warning or access controls.